Exploiting similarities between secret and cover images for improved embedding efficiency and security in digital steganography by Abdulla, Alan Anwer
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPLOITING SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SECRET 
AND COVER IMAGES FOR IMPROVED 
EMBEDDING EFFICIENCY AND SECURITY IN 
DIGITAL STEGANOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
ALAN ANWER ABDULLA 
 
 
 
 
Department of Applied Computing 
The University of Buckingham 
United Kingdom 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science to 
the School of Science in the University of Buckingham 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2015 
 
Copyright © Alan Abdulla and the University of Buckingham 2015 
All Rights Reserved
 I 
 
Abstract 
The rapid advancements in digital communication technology and huge increase in 
computer power have generated an exponential growth in the use of the Internet for 
various commercial, governmental and social interactions that involve transmission of a 
variety of complex data and multimedia objects. Securing the content of sensitive as 
well as personal transactions over open networks while ensuring the privacy of 
information has become essential but increasingly challenging. Therefore, information 
and multimedia security research area attracts more and more interest, and its scope of 
applications expands significantly. Communication security mechanisms have been 
investigated and developed to protect information privacy with Encryption and 
Steganography providing the two most obvious solutions. Encrypting a secret message 
transforms it to a noise-like data which is observable but meaningless, while 
Steganography conceals the very existence of secret information by hiding in mundane 
communication that does not attract unwelcome snooping.  Digital steganography is 
concerned with using images, videos and audio signals as cover objects for hiding secret 
bit-streams. Suitability of media files for such purposes is due to the high degree of 
redundancy as well as being the most widely exchanged digital data.  Over the last two 
decades, there has been a plethora of research that aim to develop new hiding schemes 
to overcome the variety of challenges relating to imperceptibility of the hidden secrets, 
payload capacity, efficiency of embedding and robustness against steganalysis attacks. 
Most existing techniques treat secrets as random bit-streams even when dealing with 
non-random signals such as images that may add to the toughness of the challenges. 
This thesis is devoted to investigate and develop steganography schemes for embedding 
secret images in image files. While many existing schemes have been developed to 
perform well with respect to one or more of the above objectives, we aim to achieve 
optimal performance in terms of all these objectives. We shall only be concerned with 
embedding secret images in the spatial domain of cover images. 
The main difficulty in addressing the different challenges stems from the fact that the 
act of embedding results in changing cover image pixel values that cannot be avoided, 
although these changes may not be easy to detect by the human eye. These pixel 
changes is a consequence of dissimilarity between the cover LSB plane and the secret 
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image bit-stream, and result in changes to the statistical parameters of stego-image bit-
planes as well as to local image features. Steganalysis tools exploit these effects to 
model targeted as well as blind attacks. These challenges are usually dealt with by 
randomising the changes to the LSB, using different/multiple bit-planes to embed one or 
more secret bits using elaborate schemes, or embedding in certain regions that are noise-
tolerant. Our innovative approach to deal with these challenges is first to develop some 
image procedures and models that result in increasing similarity between the cover 
image LSB plane and the secret image bit-stream. This will be achieved in two novel 
steps involving manipulation of both the secret image and the cover image, prior to 
embedding, that result a higher 0:1 ratio in both the secret bit-stream and the cover 
pixels‘ LSB plane.   
For the secret images, we exploit the fact that image pixel values are in general 
neither uniformly distributed, as is the case of random secrets, nor spatially stationary. 
We shall develop three secret image pre-processing algorithms to transform the secret 
image bit-stream for increased 0:1 ratio. Two of these are similar, but one in the spatial 
domain and the other in the Wavelet domain.  In both cases, the most frequent pixels are 
mapped onto bytes with more 0s. The third method, process blocks by subtracting their 
means from their pixel values and hence reducing the require number of bits to represent 
these blocks. In other words, this third algorithm also reduces the length of the secret 
image bit-stream without loss of information. We shall demonstrate that these algorithms 
yield a significant increase in the secret image bit-stream 0:1 ratio, the one that based on 
the Wavelet domain is the best-performing with 80% ratio. 
For the cover images, we exploit the fact that pixel value decomposition schemes, 
based on Fibonacci or other defining sequences that differ from the usual binary 
scheme, expand the number of bit-planes and thereby may help increase the 0:1 ratio in 
cover image LSB plane. We investigate some such existing techniques and demonstrate 
that these schemes indeed lead to increased 0:1 ratio in the corresponding cover image 
LSB plane. We also develop a new extension of the binary decomposition scheme that is 
the best-performing one with 77% ratio.  
We exploit the above two steps strategy to propose a bit-plane(s) mapping embedding 
technique, instead of bit-plane(s) replacement to make each cover pixel usable for secret 
embedding. This is motivated by the observation that non-binary pixel decomposition 
schemes also result in decreasing the number of possible patterns for the three first bit-
planes to 4 or 5 instead of 8.  We shall demonstrate that the combination of the mapping-
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based embedding scheme and the two steps strategy produces stego-images that have 
minimal distortion, i.e. reducing the number of the cover pixels changes after message 
embedding and increasing embedding efficiency. We shall also demonstrate that these 
schemes result in reasonable stego-image quality and are robust against all the targeted 
steganalysis tools but not against the blind SRM tool.   
We shall finally identify possible future work to achieve robustness against SRM at 
some payload rates and further improve stego-image quality. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Digital steganography is an information security mechanism that is general concerned 
with concealing the presence of a secret data/object during mundane communication 
sessions by embedding the secret data in another innocuous data/object in such a way 
that only the sender and intended recipient are aware of the secret‘s existence. It is an 
alternative to cryptography in protecting sensitive secrets where the adversary is aware 
of the presences of the secret but cannot extract it. Thus, digital steganography is the art 
and science of making the act of communication itself a secret.  
In recent years, interest in steganography has shifted from traditional and ancient 
practices into hiding secret data and media objects, especially secret image files, in 
image files. This area of steganography, for example, is becoming a common technique 
in protecting sensitive communications by intelligence and law enforcing agencies to 
crime prevention by exchanging facial images of suspects to be compared with databases 
of known criminal faces. Moreover, forensic investigators often need to take and 
transmit photos of the scene of the crime, or left fingerprints, for later comparison 
without undermining the integrity of the evidence. Armed forces have a variety of 
similar needs such as exchanging military maps or surveillance video in hostile 
environment/situations.  Modern health care systems required by law to maintain the 
privacy of critical information when storing or exchanging patient‘s medical images such 
as X-ray. Furthermore, financial as well as commercial organizations such as banks can 
benefit from such technology to prevent customers‘ account information/identification 
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from being accessed illegally by unauthorised users. Therefore, those mentioned 
communication systems become more and more dependent on digital steganography.  
This thesis is concerned with the design, the development and the testing the 
performance of secure embedding and transmission of secret messages in image objects. 
Throughout the recent history of digital communication, many steganography techniques 
have been developed for embedding secrets into digital images primarily by 
manipulating their least significant bit-planes (LSBs). Although, the effect of these 
changes may not be visible to human eye, but the presences of the secret can become 
more detectable, by a determined and digitally skilled adversary, the longer the secret 
message is. Steganographers must address the problem of embedding capacity of the 
cover image while protecting against detectability.  Embedding longer secrets, though 
desirable, definitely result in some form of cover image distortion or even degraded 
image quality. Hence, the robustness of message embedding against adversary attacks is 
closely linked to maintaining image quality.  Embedding efficiency is the most important 
requirement for digital steganography that employs all the above addressed problems 
(i.e. payload capacity, message detectability or security, and stego-image quality). 
Embedding efficiency means minimising the changes made to the cover image pixels, as 
a result of embedding a secret message, while maintaining capacity. 
We shall investigate and test techniques to improve security and efficiency of 
message embedding techniques in digital images. Most existing steganography 
techniques focus on the embedding strategy and give no consideration to pre-processing 
the secret image except encrypting or compressing the secret. Here encryption is aimed 
at protected the secret even if it was detected while compression is used to improve the 
quality of the resulted stego-image. One of the premises of this thesis is that applying 
carefully selected pre-processing techniques could help enhance the embedding 
efficiency and security of the steganography systems. The objective of our approach, in 
relation to pre-processing, is to increase the probability of similarity between the secret 
bits value and the cover pixels‘ least significant bit (LSB) value. Consequently, 
designing a new pixel value decomposition technique to decompose cover pixels value 
with aim of making the cover pixels‘ LSB value similar, as much as possible, to the 
secret bits value could support our objective.  
This chapter provides a general introduction to the research area and the 
investigations carried out in this thesis by first starting with some background 
knowledge and examples of ancient and digital steganography, then an overview of the 
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research problem is explained. Moreover, the challenges and success criteria for digital 
steganography are discussed followed by listing some recent and potential applications 
of digital steganography. Furthermore, the main motivation of this study is discussed, 
and the research objectives are identified based on the established definition of the 
research project followed by an overview of our contributions. We close the chapter by 
highlighting the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 From Ancient to Digital Steganography 
Linguistically, steganography means secret writing since the word steganography 
originally derives from two Greek words, steganos means covert or secret, and graphy 
means writing (Cole & Krutz, 2003). Practically, it means the art and science of hiding 
secret data in an innocent looking dummy container in such a way that the existence of 
the embedded data is imperceptible and un-detectable (Kahn, 1996). Thus, 
steganography is the process of hiding secret data within the publicly accessible 
information. 
In physical (i.e. non-digital) steganography, the cover object may be basically 
anything, for example a physical text document, a painting, or a piece of wood, as long 
as it can be used to convey a hidden message to the intended recipient without raising 
suspicion of untrusted parties.  Interestingly, the first documented cover object used for 
the purposes of steganography was the human body. Greek historian Herodotus detailed 
that steganography‘s ancient origin can be traced back to 440 BC (Macaulay & others, 
1904). It was started by the Greek fellow named Histiaeus, the ruler of the ancient 
Greek city of Miletus, who shaved the hair of his most trusted slave and wrote/tattooed 
the message on his head. Once the hair had grown, the message was hidden and he was 
sent to their allies to communicate with them without the enemies‘ knowledge. The 
purpose was to instigate a revolt against Persians (Macaulay & others, 1904). Another 
example of physical steganography was again ancient Greeks technique by writing 
secret messages on wax-covered tables. To pass a hidden message, a person would 
scrape the wax off a table, write a message on underlying wood and again cover the 
table with wax to make it appear blank and unused. The recipient would simply remove 
the wax from the table to see the message (Johnson & Jajodia, 1998). Also, invisible ink 
was used for writing secret messages by the American revolutionaries during the USA 
revolution on pieces of paper so that the paper appeared to the average person as just 
being blank pieces of paper. Liquids such as urine, milk, vinegar and fruit juices were 
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used as ink. When these substances are heated, they darken and become visible to the 
human eye (Mangarae, 2006). Also, invisible ink was used in both World Wars by the 
German army. In World War II, Germany also used microdots to hide large amounts of 
data on printed documents, masqueraded as dots of punctuation (Cole & Krutz, 2003). 
The advent of electronic and computer technology as well as advances in 
communication technology triggered an interest in developing steganography 
techniques to fit the new medium of communication. Although, the focus of the early 
days of the new technology era was on cryptography as the main security mechanism 
for the protection of sensitive information. This may have been a result of the fact that 
access to computer technology in the early days of main frame computers and 
minicomputers was limited to governmental and corporate organisations besides the 
scientific community. The advent of space exploration in the early sixties led to the 
emergence of Digital Image Processing (DIP) and nuclear medicine. The convergence 
of communication and computer technology has triggered the digital revolution that has 
escalated over the last two decades and pushed mobile technology into the front to 
finally widen access to this technology beyond any expectation. This has led to an 
emergence of huge interest in digital image processing for a variety of applications with 
new security concerns that is very difficult to address by cryptography alone. The rise of 
terrorism has finally rekindled the interest in digital steganography. It is often claimed 
that the 11
th
 of September bombers were using steganography for hiding their secret 
plans in innocuous communications of digital media objects. Whether it is true or not, 
this story and similar more recent cases seem to be generating more incentives to 
research various aspects of steganography and steganalysis. 
Digital steganography exploits properties of digital media files such as images, 
audios, and videos to hide a variety of secrets that could remain undetected. Although 
some digital/computer based steganography references can be found before 1995, most 
of the interest and action in the field has occurred since 2000 (Cole & Krutz, 2003). In 
image-based steganography, a secret message is often hidden within an image in such a 
way that others cannot discern the presence or contents of the secret. It is important that 
the stego-image does not contain any easily detectable artefacts due to message 
embedding that could be detected by electronic surveillance. For example, a message 
might be embedded in an image by changing the pixels‘ LSB to be the message bits.  
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The Prisoner’s problem 
Steganography systems have one general principle, described by (Katzenbeisser & 
Petitolas, 2004) based on a simple scenario formulated by Simmons known as the 
prisoners‘ problem (Simmons, 1984) as follows: Two criminals, Alice and Bob, have 
been arrested and locked in separate cells. The warden Wendy allows them to exchange 
messages but the communication has to be completely open to her. As Alice and Bob 
need to coordinate their escape plan, they need to find a different way to communicate 
secretly without being caught. Since any suspicion of a secret information exchange 
would result in an immediate communication cut off, the prisoners cannot protect their 
message exchange by encryption. Alice and Bob resort to using steganography to avoid 
detection. The job of the warden Wendy is steganalysis, she needs to find out whether or 
not Alice and Bob‘s communications include secretly embedded messages. Alice, who 
wants to send a secret message to the recipient Bob, randomly chooses a harmless cover 
file and embeds the secret message in the cover file and probably uses a stego key. 
Alice’s constructed stego file must be as much as possible undistinguishable from the 
cover file neither by a human eye nor by a computer system. Alice transmits the stego 
file to Bob over the open communication channel allowed by the prison authority. The 
purpose of the system is to prevent Wendy, from observing or noticing the presence of a 
hidden message. On the other side, Bob extracts the embedded message since he knows 
the embedding method and the stego key used in the embedding process. Only the 
transmitter and the intended recipient should have the stego key. Most steganography 
systems prompt users to provide a stego key when they try to embed information in a 
cover file.  
Sometimes, attackers like Wendy can detect a hidden message in a stego file and 
determine how the message was embedded, but they are unable to extract the hidden 
message. This system is considered to be a secure steganography system because the 
secret message is unreadable unless one has the related stego key. Therefore, stego keys 
must be chosen as strong as possible in order to prevent attackers from breaking the 
steganography systems using all possible stego keys (Cox, et al., 2005).  
The security of steganography systems must be based on the assumption that 
attackers have full knowledge of the steganography system design, the embedding and 
extracting algorithm. However, attackers only miss the stego key to suspect that a secret 
communication is taking place. Therefore, most of steganography systems available 
nowadays meet this principle (Rabah, 2004). Therefore, it is assumed that Wendy has a 
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complete knowledge of the steganography algorithm that the prisoners may use. This is 
a very important assumption and it is one of the most important security principles that 
have been accepted and practiced since the middle of the 19
th
 century and known as 
Kerckhoff‘s principles (Rabah, 2004). Figure 1-1 illustrates the general structure of 
image steganography systems. 
 
 
Figure 1-1: General structure of the image-based steganography process. 
The main terminologies used in the steganography are:  
1. The cover object is the carrier of the secret message.  
2. The secret message is the information that is to be hidden in a suitable cover 
object producing stego object. Note that in this thesis the terms message, 
hidden message, and secret message are used interchangeably. 
3. The process of hiding information is called embedding algorithm which is the 
way or the idea that usually used to embed the secret message in the cover 
object (Swanson, et al., 1996) (Petitcolas, et al., 1999) and it is also called 
steganography system, steganography technique, or steganography scheme. 
4. The stego key is a random key agreed between the participants, and it is 
usually used to control the hiding process/algorithm so as to restrict detection 
or recovery of the embedded data to authorised parties only. 
In Section 1.3, steganography systems requirements are presented. 
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1.2 Overview of the Research Problem 
With advancements in digital communication technology, the exponential growth in 
the use of the Internet, and a huge increase in computer power; the difficulties in 
ensuring the privacy of information become increasingly challenging. Therefore, 
information and multimedia security research area attract more and more interest, and 
its scope of applications expand significantly. Communication security mechanisms 
have been investigated and developed to protect information privacy with Encryption 
and Steganography providing the most obvious solutions. Encrypting a secret message 
transforms it to a meaningless data which looks more like random noise and is generally 
observed during transmission, while steganography is not observable. Steganography 
aims to make the secret communication itself undistinguishable from mundane 
communication, i.e. hiding the presence of the secret message. It modifies the 
carrier/cover in an imperceptible way only so that it reveals nothing neither the 
embedding of a message nor the embedded message itself.  
Although steganography is an old field, the recent developments in digital 
communication technology and the emergence of social media networks have brought 
new attention to steganography. With the arrival of the digital era, advances in mobile 
devices and technologies, and the widespread availability of efficient multimedia 
manipulation tools, exchanging secrets and sensitive information between different 
groups of users has become a much easier task.  Digital steganography is a much easy to 
use alternative to encryption and creates new opportunities for crime and abuse through 
hiding secrets and illegal material in digital carriers/covers such as audio, image and 
videos files. The phenomenal volume of exchanged messages and media files greatly 
reduce the chance of being caught by legitimate authorities. The growth in the use of 
multimedia files for steganography is due a high degree of redundancy in the media 
data, which makes them suitable to embed information without degrading their visual 
quality. Steganography is made much easier if the cover file includes a lot of 
redundancies. Images and videos are examples of files that contain a high degree of 
spatial and temporal redundancies that are often exploited for compression. For 
example, it is well known that changing the least significant bits of some/all image 
pixels do not have a noticeable impact on image quality/content. Consequently, the LSB 
plane may be seen as redundant and those bits can be altered to hide any binary secret. 
Note that, such type of data hiding certainly result in some distortion that could be 
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detectable by image statistical analysis tools, but criminals bet on the difficulty 
experienced by authorities in processing huge volumes of daily file exchanges.   
Most hiding schemes are designed, and their performances are tested with a random 
bit-stream secret. However, this thesis focuses on the scenario whereby both the 
embedded message and the cover are grayscale images. The reason for choosing images 
as a cover is that images usually have a high degree of redundancy and also images are 
widely exchanged over the Internet than other digital media and they attract little 
suspicion. Moreover, the reason for choosing images as secret messages is due to their 
frequently used in many applications as mentioned earlier. 
There are different ways of categorising the different techniques of steganography 
due to the variety of media file types that can be used as cover files as well as the fact 
that there is more than one way of representing cover files. For example, audio and 
image files can be represented in the spatial domain as well as frequency domain and 
each of these can provide different ways of embedding secrets with advantages as well 
as limitations. In Chapter 2, we shall give an account of categorisation of embedding 
techniques. 
While steganographers aim to design difficult to detect, and efficient steganography 
techniques, steganalysers attempt to defeat the goal of steganography by detecting the 
presence of a hidden message, even if they cannot retrieve it. Steganalysis schemes 
attempt to exploit the fact that any embedding scheme will result in some kind of local 
random distortions, albeit difficult to detect by the naked eye, or may violate in a small 
way, but computable, some statistical/correlation models that are known/expected to 
hold among the different spatial/gray-level components of cover images. There are 
numbers of existing image steganalysis tools that are widely used to detect the 
presence/absence of a hidden message and estimate the size of the embedded secret 
message. These tools are classified in different ways, whereby some are targeting 
specific embedding schemes while others are designed to detect the presences of hidden 
messages without knowledge of the embedding algorithm. We will discuss the 
classification of these tools in Chapter 2. In this thesis, we aim to investigate 
steganography schemes that have the ability of withstanding against most reliable and 
well-known steganalysis techniques, and therefore we shall give details about the theory 
and working of certain tools in Chapter 3. 
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1.3 Challenges and Success Criteria for Digital Steganography 
The most important and obvious success criteria for steganographers is the ability to 
avoid attracting suspicion of the presence of a hidden message in otherwise innocuous 
looking communication. General factors that influence this overarching objective and 
must be addressed by image-based steganography systems are: 1) the quality of the 
stego-image (i.e. minimising the perceptual difference between the stego and the cover 
image); 2) the payload capacity of the cover image (i.e. the amount of secret data that 
can be embedded in the cover image); 3) detectability of the message (i.e. prevent 
detection/recovery by a third party); and 4) the robustness of the stego-image (i.e. 
protection against distortion attacks).  However, the first two requirements are at odds 
with each other, and it is quite difficult to increase the payload capacity and 
simultaneously maintain the imperceptibility of a stego-image. Consequently, a 
compromise may have to be found that is application dependent. The third requirement is 
relevant to the first one; in other words, by improving the stego-image quality the 
steganography system becomes less detectable. Currently, most existing steganography 
systems deal with first three requirements without taking the robustness against 
distortion attacks into account. This is most likely due to the fact that robustness is 
application dependent (Cox, et al., 2007), and most steganography systems consider the 
passive warden scenario in which the warden does not interfere with the stego file in any 
way (Cox, et al., 2005). It is a challenge for steganographers to achieve a good balance 
among all these different steganography requirements. 
The above first three requirements, are affected directly by the number of changing 
pixels of the cover image after embedding the secrets, and, therefore, in the literature 
minimising this change has been stated as the most important requirement.  The amount 
of change must be considered relative to the payload capacity, and, hence, it is natural to 
model this requirement by the ratio of changed pixels to the size of the secret message.  
In recent proposed steganography techniques, less ratio of changing of cover image 
pixels‘ value after message embedding, while maintaining payload capacity, has been 
used as an indicator of higher stego-image quality and lower message detectability. The 
evaluation of the ratio of changing cover image pixels‘ value is called embedding 
efficiency in the literature, which can be defined as the number of secret bits embedded 
per one embedding change. When the embedding efficiency increases, the less detectable 
traces will be introduced in the stego-image, and the more robust against steganalysis 
techniques. Embedding efficiency is the main objective in this thesis.  
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All these requirements can be associated with quantitative measures that can be 
modelled and determined in terms of the stego-images that can provide objective tools to 
test the performance of any embedding scheme. Performance evaluations for image 
steganography techniques are presented in Section 2.4. 
1.4 Digital Steganography– Some Emerging Applications 
Digital steganography has various useful applications. However, like any other 
science it can be used for good as well as ill intentions. Government organisations and 
business communities rely heavily on exchanging, sharing and processing information 
to assist them in making a variety of strategic decisions and steganography is one of the 
security infrastructures that are established to help protect and preserve the integrity of 
information flowing across different channels. Digital steganography is useful in 
protecting sensitive communications for many applications such as intelligence and law 
enforcing agencies to prevent crime (Petitcolas, et al., 1999) (Mercuri, 2004); military 
purposes such as exchanging military maps (Jenifer, et al., 2014) (Wayner, 2002) (Wu & 
Tsai, 2003); in health care systems to maintain the privacy of critical information such 
as medical records (Liu, et al., 2013) (Cheddad, et al., 2008) (Li, et al., 2007) (Raul, et 
al., 2007); and in financial and business organizations (Juarez-Sandoval, et al., 2013) 
such as banks to prevent customers‘ account information from being accessed illegally 
by unauthorised users, or identity cards; where individuals‘ details are embedded in their 
photographs (Jain & Uludag, 2002).  
On the other hand, digital steganography is also used by malicious users, organised 
crime, and international terrorism to hide their ill intentions. Here two examples of 
steganography threat are highlighted out of many examples. The most dangerous usage 
of steganography was when it was used by a terrorist group on the 11
th
 of September 
2001. In his article (Lau, 2003), Stephen states that “News stories began appearing in 
mainstream United States media in the days following September 11
th
 reporting that 
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were using the internet to covertly communicate 
between various terrorist cells to plan and relay information. One interesting aspect of 
the media reports was that the al-Qaeda was supposedly using a technique known as 
steganography to covertly communicate.”  
Terrorists are not the only criminals who may employ steganography techniques for 
illegal purposes. Steganography was reported to be used by South American drug 
dealers to communicate photographs of transit routes and cocaine shipment information 
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(Kodovsk, 2012). The mentioned examples of illegal usage of steganography have all 
relied on the use of digital images as cover files because images have a high degree of 
redundancy and are suitable to embed information without degrading their visual 
quality. Moreover, images are widely exchanged over the Internet than other digital 
media and they attract little suspicion. 
1.5 Motivation 
There has been an explosive growth in multimedia technology and applications in the 
past several years. Efficient representation for storage, transmission, retrieval and 
security of information are some of the biggest challenges faced. With growing need of 
information security, digital image steganography has established itself as an important 
discipline in signal processing and multimedia security. That is due in part to the strong 
interest from the research community. The motivation behind developing image 
steganography methods its growing use by various organizations to communicate 
securely, which include the military or intelligence operatives (in the field of espionage 
and crime prevention) as well as a variety of companies and organisations that provide 
public services to protect customers information. The main goal of using the image 
steganography is to avoid drawing attention to the transmission of hidden information.   
I am particularly motivated to help in reducing the huge digital gap that exists 
between the developed world and my own nation Kurdistan (and may other third world 
countries that are in the process of building its institutions and suffer from terrorisms). 
For that, I try to study and design efficient and secure image-based steganography 
techniques in order to be used in my country which by the many organizations that need 
to maintain security and privacy of its information such as hospitals needing to establish 
and benefit a medical information records system, intelligence and law enforcing 
agencies for knowledge-based crime and terrorism prevention, and financial 
organizations and banks to protect customers account information against illegal access 
by unauthorised users/actions. Despite the fact that there are many existing practical 
image-based steganography systems, but still the trade-off between steganography 
requirements is a problem in this research area. This is a motivation to design image-
based steganography techniques that minimises the embedding impact on the stego-
image while maintaining payload capacity. Security considerations form another 
incentive to assess robustness against a plethora of steganalysis tools. 
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1.6 Objectives  
Section 1.3 has highlighted the main challenges of the steganography systems as 
increasing the payload capacity while maintaining the stego-image quality and message 
detectability; or improving message detectability while maintaining payload capacity.  
The main objectives of the investigations conducted in this thesis are focused on the 
design image-based steganography schemes that have the property of improving 
embedding efficiency as well as message un-detectability while maintaining payload 
capacity. In this thesis, we confine our investigations into the steganography schemes 
that work in the spatial domain of the cover images and manipulate/modify image bit-
planes. To meet the above objectives, our approach strategy can be summarised in this 
research question: Can the probability of similarity between the secret image bit-
streams and the cover images LSB plane be increased without compromising the 
payload capacity? In achieving this, i.e. optimising similarity between the secret image 
bit-streams and cover image LSB plane, the following sub-objectives are identified: 
 To manipulate the secret image prior to embedding it in a way that its binary 
representation contains a higher ratio of 0 bits to the 1 bits (0:1) and possibly 
reduce the size of the secret image before embedding.  
 To study and investigate existing pixel value decomposition techniques used for 
image steganography, and design a new pixel value decomposition scheme that 
achieves the best ratio of 0:1 in the LSB plane of the cover image. 
 To exploit the possible increase in similarity between the pre-processed secret 
image bit-stream and the LSB plane of a decomposed cover image, and develop  
new steganography schemes that achieve high embedding efficiency, acceptable 
stego-image quality, high payload capacity and robustness against the most 
common steganalysis attacks. 
1.7 Contributions 
The main contributions of this thesis are related to the above stated objectives and 
can be enumerated as follows: 
1. We developed three pre-processing algorithms that encode the secret images, 
prior to embedding, into bit-streams with significantly increased 0:1 ratio. The 
first two algorithms are based on the similar strategy adopted in statistical 
coding by exploiting the structure of histograms of the secret image spatial 
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domain and Integer Wavelet sub-bands, respectively. One of these algorithms 
provides highest 0:1 ratio (80% on average). The third algorithm is directly 
applied on the spatial domain of the secret image, and it reduces the secret image 
bit-stream size by 30% of the original secret image size.  This algorithm not only 
reduce the size of the secret image, but produces a similar property to that of the 
first two algorithms in that the reduced size also have approximately 57% ratio 
of 0:1 (on average).  
2. A new pixel value decomposition scheme is proposed that has a property that on 
average, approximately 77% of cover pixels have 0 LSB value. This would 
increase the probability of similarity between the cover images LSB plane and 
the secret image bit-streams obtained in 1. This results in reducing the ratio of 
the pixels change of the cover image after embedding the secrets. 
3. A bit-plane mapping technique is proposed for Fibonacci based message 
embedding. This mapping based embedding is solved the problem of skipping 
some cover pixels, due to Zeckendorf‘s theorem, to use for embedding the 
secrets. In other words, by using mapping based embedding instead of bit 
replacing based embedding, every cover pixel can be used for embedding the 
secret bits. This proposed mapping technique is not only applicable on Fibonacci 
based embedding technique, but also applicable on some other pixel value 
decomposition schemes including our proposed in 2. 
4. As a combination of steps 1, 2, and 3, efficient and secure image-based 
steganography approaches are designed that increase embedding efficiency and 
improve message un-detectability due to minimise the ratio of cover pixels 
change after message embedding, while maintaining the payload capacity. 
Minimising the ratio of changed of the cover image pixels reflects less 
detectability and withstands to existing well-known steganalysis tools. 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organised into seven chapters: 
Chapter two introduces background information about steganography that is relevant 
to the objectives and challenges of digital steganography. It also describes common 
secure communication mechanisms, namely steganography and cryptography, 
highlighting their objectives and relevance to information security. In addition, it 
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explains various categories of steganography techniques, the main performance 
evaluations criteria, and different kinds of attacks that undermine their effectiveness.   
Chapter three gives a literature review of the most relevant image-based 
steganography approaches as well as different steganalysis approaches. Also, it gives a 
brief overview of our proposed approaches.  
Chapter four presents two initial simple image-based steganography schemes that 
manipulate more than one bit-plane including the LSB to embed one or two secret bits. 
The first scheme embeds one secret bit in a way that depends on the first two LSBs of 
the cover image pixels, and the second scheme attempts to double capacity by 
embedding two secret bits in each cover pixel value; and improve un-detectability. It 
also discusses the related experimental results. 
Chapter five presents the first step of our embedding strategy by showing three 
proposed algorithms as a pre-processing on the secret image prior to embedding. It also 
shows the related experimental results. 
Chapter six presents the second step of our embedding strategy by studying and 
investigating different pixel value decomposition techniques, and presenting the 
proposed new pixel value decomposition technique. Furthermore, it discusses the 
related experimental results. 
Chapter seven presents the last step of our embedding strategy by showing the 
proposed mapping based embedding schemes.  Experimental results are provided to 
show the efficiency and security of these proposed embedding schemes. 
Chapter eight presents the conclusions and potential directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2  
Steganography: Background, Objectives and 
Approaches 
This chapter aims to present a reasonable account of background information about 
steganography that is relevant to the objectives and challenges of digital steganography. 
We first describe common secure communication mechanisms, namely steganography 
and cryptography, highlighting their objectives and relevance to information security. 
Understanding similarities and differences between steganography and cryptography 
helps in developing appropriate security tools that meet the multi-faceted and 
dynamically changing requirements of highly connected society for robust and efficient 
tools. We shall describe various categories of steganography techniques, the main 
performance evaluations criteria, and different kinds of attacks that undermine their 
effectiveness. The main focus in these discussions will be on image-based 
steganography systems, i.e. hiding sensitive data in innocuous image file covers.    
2.1 Information Security Mechanisms 
Over the last few decades, the phenomenal advances in, and convergence of, 
computing and communication technologies has led to an exponential growth in their 
deployment in all aspects of societal, health, crime fighting and economic activities. The 
emergence of smart and mobile technologies, the social networking, the rise in 
terrorism, and cloud computing have led to an explosion in the amount, type, and 
sensitivity of exchanged information all the time and have raised serious concerns about 
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the security of information and infrastructure.  Safeguarding the secrecy of sensitive and 
valuable information assets is not new and predates the digital age. Cryptography is the 
more commonly used mechanism of information security and attracted the focused 
research efforts and matured throughout the centuries. The advents of digital technology 
in the last few decades re-energised research interest in the other long practiced security 
mechanisms of information hiding and steganography, which has led to the 
development of a plethora of dual use tools that could be used to undermine or to 
protect sensitive digital information. In this section, we shall describe the main 
objectives of the two security mechanisms of cryptography and steganography, the 
principles that govern their development, evaluation and evolutions, and their main 
developed techniques. 
2.1.1 Information Security – Objectives and Governing Principles 
Any computer and communication system have several security related requirements 
that should be addressed if the system is to be accepted and work reliably. Overall, five 
key objectives/services have been identified for securing a variety of information 
systems: confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and non-repudiation. 
Cole identifies these concepts as follows (Cole & Krutz, 2003):  
1. “Confidentiality deals with protecting, detecting, and deterring the unauthorized 
disclosure of information‖. 
2. “Integrity deals with preventing, detecting, and deterring the unauthorised 
modification of information‖. 
3. “Availability relates to preventing, detecting, or deterring the denial of access to 
critical information‖. 
4. “Authentication in most transaction you need to be able to authenticate or 
validate that the people you are dealing with are who they say they are‖. 
5. “Non-repudiation deals with the ability to prove in a court of law that someone 
sent something or signed something digitally‖. 
The above individual objectives do not have the same priority or importance in all 
information systems. Cryptography and steganography have emerged as the two well-
suited mechanisms to protect sensitive information, but both mechanisms are fraught 
with serious challenges.  It is widely accepted that no one security method can address 
all the above objectives, but together steganography and cryptography can provide the 
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tools that cover most of these services (Cole & Krutz, 2003).  However, securing 
computing and communication systems is not a collection of procedures and tools that 
could be put together once and be assured that nothing could go wrong. The landscape 
of security is dynamically changing due to many factors such as rapid changes in 
technology and emergence of new services and scenarios.  
Confidentiality is the most fundamental security service offered by cryptography 
since the secret message is scrambled in such a way that only the intended recipient can 
unscramble it. By using hash functions combined with cryptographic keys, integrity and 
authentication services are provided. Cryptography hash function thus used to ensure 
the integrity of data. Digital signature also offers data authentication as well as support 
non-repudiation. Digital signature schemes encrypt the message with a private key. The 
encrypted message acts as a signature since only a specific private key could have 
produced the specific result (Cole & Krutz, 2003). To summarise, of the five security 
services, cryptography offers confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation.  
On the other hand, since steganography ensures the privacy of sensitive information 
by concealing it in other information objects, then confidentiality is also offered by 
steganography. Since the embedded information could have been altered intentionally 
or not, and the alteration will not be noticed by the receiver, therefore the integrity of 
the steganography cannot be checked. Authentication and non-repudiation are not 
offered automatically by steganography, since steganography does not have the 
functionality of knowing the origin of embedded information and someone can later 
deny having embedded the information. However, authentication can be offered if the 
steganographic key is used, since knowledge of the key can identify a person to be the 
one who sends the secret message. To summarise, steganography only offers 
confidentiality and authentication out of five security services. Thus, cryptography and 
steganography have two security services in common, namely confidentiality and 
authentication/identification. However, cryptography can offer two additional security 
services that are not offered by steganography at the moment, namely data integrity and 
non-repudiation. Although both cryptography and steganography are offered 
confidentiality service, steganography provides more confidentiality and information 
security than cryptography since it conceals the existence of secret message rather than 
only protecting the message contents.  
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Although both cryptography and steganography provide the two well researched 
secret communication techniques, they have different ways of achieving their intended 
objectives.  Cryptography conceals only the meaning or contents of a secret message 
from an attacker by scrambling it, whereas steganography even conceals the existence 
of the secret message.  In other words, use of cryptography would not stop a third party 
knowing that some secret communication is going on, while in steganography, the 
message to be sent is concealed in such a way that an intruder would not normally know 
whether any secret communication is going on or not. Cryptography and steganography 
they have a different definition in terms of system breaking (Zollner, et al., 1998). A 
cryptography system is considered broken if an attacker can read the secret message. On 
the other hand, steganography system is considered broken if an attacker can detect the 
existence or read the contents of the embedded secret message. Intuitively, the security 
of the steganography system depends on the inability of an attacker to distinguish a 
cover object from stego object (Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2002). Moreover, 
steganography system will be considered to have failed or be insecure if an attacker 
detects the presence of secret message even without decoding it (Zollner, et al., 1998) 
(Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2002). As a result, this consideration makes steganography 
systems more fragile than cryptography systems in terms of system security failure. 
Therefore, steganography systems must avoid detection in order to achieve security and 
not considered failed systems.  
Since steganography adds an extra layer of protection to cryptography, it is 
recommended that they be used together for achieving a higher level of security. For 
example, one straightforward approach in securing a sensitive message may be based on 
first encrypting it and then hide it in a cover object.  
Due to the fact that both cryptography and steganography tools are no longer a 
private enterprise, but are regularly used by the public to protect their information assets 
and their privacy, these tools must adhere to certain principles in order to be accepted 
and used. As early as 1883 the Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerkhoff has laid down 
six principles that are now referred to as the Kerkhoff‘s Principles, for the design of 
secure ciphers. The most important interpretation of these principles stipulates that 
security of ciphers is not served in any way by using a secret cipher algorithm but rather 
on the secrecy of the key used for encryption. This is why research efforts in 
cryptography are dominated by the security of key management systems and protocols. 
As mentioned in the last chapter, this principle extends naturally to steganography in 
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that one should always credit the warden with knowledge of the embedding algorithm 
while ensuring the secrecy of the steganographic key parameter of the algorithm.    
Finally, it is essential to recognise that steganography is only one class of 
information hiding (Petitcolas, et al., 1999), and information hiding has a wider remit 
and objectives beyond the security of communication. Over the last few decades, the 
concept of hiding information has provided solutions to other non-security-oriented 
applications such as copyright protection, detecting breaches of licences/agreements, 
protection against fraud, abuse of power and falsification of evidences. The three classes 
of information hiding share some common characteristics with steganography while 
having important differences in their requirements. We now briefly describe the other 
two classes.  
Digital Watermarking 
Watermarking is an old technique of embedding a mark into documents such as 
paper currency and traveller cheques as a protection against forgery. Digital 
watermarking is similarly concerned with embedding marks into digital documents to 
protect against the removal of copyright. It is aimed to protect the right of the owners of 
digital media such as images, music, and videos. Even if people copy or make a minor 
change to the watermarked file, the owner should still be able to prove it is his or her 
file. There are two kinds of watermarks, visible and invisible. In the visible case, the 
watermark, typically a text or logo, is visibly embedded in the image or video. Invisible 
watermarking is similar to steganography in that the mark is made imperceptible to 
maintain document quality. Often these invisible marks are textual messages embedded 
in audio or image files for authentication of the digital file to protect against fraud and 
illegal distribution.  
The similarity between watermarking and steganography in terms of the operational 
objective of embedding a message may give the impression that these are two different 
names for the same concept. On the contrary, there are many settled differences. For 
example, unlike the case of steganography the embedded message/mark in 
watermarking is not a secret. Moreover, the two hiding concepts differ significantly in 
terms of system breakability. A watermarking system, whether visible or not, is 
considered broken if an attacker can remove or distort the mark perhaps by embedding 
another mark to undermine copyright ownership. On the other hand, a steganography 
system is considered broken if an attacker can detect the existence of a secret been 
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communicated even if the embedded secret is not retrieved. In other words, the two 
concepts differ in terms of robustness which in watermarking is a measure of the ability 
to remove/distort the mark while in steganography, robustness refers to the ability of the 
embedding scheme to avoid detection by steganalysers.   
Here we note that it may be difficult to achieve absolute robustness of watermarking 
schemes, and, therefore, it is more realistic to aim at practical robustness, i.e. it is either 
infeasible to remove the mark or the amount of work needed to remove the mark results 
in useless output document. In this respect, Stirmark is an example of attack on invisible 
watermark which in reality does not remove the mark but render it undetectable 
(Petitcolas, et al., 1998). Depending on the application and watermarking requirements, 
the list of distortions and attacks to be considered includes, but is not limited to: Signal 
enhancement (sharpening, contrast enhancement, colour correction, gamma correction); 
additive and multiplicative noise (Gaussian, uniform, speckle, mosquito); linear filtering 
(low-pass, high-pass filtering); non-linear filtering (median filtering, morphological 
filtering); and lossy compression (Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2002).  
Another difference between watermarking and steganography is that the first is used 
to hide a small amount of information and therefore unlike steganography, embedding 
capacity is not an issue for watermarking. 
Fingerprinting   
This third kind of information hiding is aimed at detecting any break of licensing 
agreement or copyright infringement. This would be necessary for the music and film 
industry as well as software industry when selling multiple copies of a digital 
product/release to prevent secondary copying and illegal re-selling to the third party.  A 
different fingerprint, i.e. a small serial number, would be embedded in every copy of the 
digital file. In this way, the fingerprint conveys information about the legal recipient of 
the copy rather than the source of digital data, as in the case of watermarking, in order 
to identify legally distributed copies of the data. In this way, the presence of individual 
fingerprint is useful for monitoring or tracing back the source of illegal action. Invisible 
hidden fingerprint requires a high robustness against standard data processing as well as 
malicious attacks. To some extent, differences and similarities between fingerprinting 
and steganography are very much like those between watermarking and steganography. 
Although watermarking and fingerprinting are not strictly designed as security tools, 
and as such are not concerned with the secrecy of a message/mark, they share many 
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common underpinning protection oriented concepts and objectives. With this wider 
interpretation of security in mind, the classification of security systems are often 
depicted as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Diagram of classification of security systems. 
2.2 Digital Steganography – Categorisation and Hiding Methods 
Digital steganography has been categorised in the literature in different ways by 
different research reviews. Here we should confine our discussion to categorisations of 
digital steganography relating to the use of media files for cover (i.e. carrier) and how 
the different representation of such files can be exploited for hiding secrets. This would 
be more relevant to our research objectives and the stated scope of this thesis.  
In steganography, file format with a high degree of redundancy is preferable since 
redundant bits can be replaced with secret information without the embedded 
information being perceivable. The data/information content of most types of digital 
media files are well-known for the presence of high level of redundancy, and a variety 
of media files can accommodate sufficient capacity for embedding large secrets. 
Moreover, media files are widely exchanged over the Internet than other digital files 
without attracting much suspicion. Therefore, digital media files are probably the richest 
source of cover files for steganography. Here we are concerned with the categorisation 
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of digital steganography according to the carrier media file type and the embedding 
domain representation of the media file.  
Carrier type based categorisation 
Different type of digital media are often used as cover files, due to the fact that such 
files involve sufficiently large amount of redundancies, for hiding secrets without 
having significant impact on the information content, or quality of the stego file. The 
first approach to categorise steganography techniques is therefore based on the choice of 
the cover file type. Different types of digital media cover files have different properties 
and structure that would most likely dictate how the secret data can be hidden according 
to these properties. Understanding the common properties and structure of the type of 
cover file can give us an indication or idea on how and where the secret data might be 
hidden (Cole & Krutz, 2003). Accordingly, different steganography types can be 
classified as to whether the cover file is an image, audio, video, or text file. For 
example, the steganography system that uses digital images as cover files benefits from 
the different bit-planes decomposition of the images, knowledge about the statistical 
properties of these bit-planes, the nature of local and global natural image texture, 
colour distribution, as well as the properties of different frequency domain of images. 
For audio files, understanding the frequency of delays, pitch structure, as well as 
frequency decomposition can be exploited to hide secrets without being audible or 
effecting the quality of the signal. Hiding secrets in video files would be based on 
hiding the secret using the sequence of the video frames as well as the audio signal. 
Therefore, steganography schemes for video files can benefit from properties of the 
audio and visual data while providing much more payload capacity. For digital text 
files, steganographers exploit the formatting of the documents of variable spacing 
between characters/words. Added spaces before certain words may be linked to the 
hidden secret and interpreted in different ways including associating an importance to 
the following word or its first character. 
Media file representation domain based categorisation 
Approaches to digital steganography can be classified into two groups in terms of 
embedding domains: spatial domain and transformed/frequency domain methods. In 
what follows, we shall focus on the case where the cover file is a grayscale image. 
 23 
 
1. Spatial Domain Techniques: 
The spatial domain of an     image refers to the image data modelled as an 
    matrix of integers representing the gray-level intensities of image pixels each 
being represented as an unsigned 8-bit byte. For any such image, one can identify 8 bit-
planes binary images where the i
th
 bit-plane image of an     grayscale image  , is 
the    binary image    which is defined for each pixel (x,y) as:  
            
                               (2. 1) 
 
From Figure 2-2, one can see the 8 bit-planes in the binary representation of a grayscale 
image of Lenna and how these bit-planes are significant. It is noticeable that the most 
significant bit-plane (MSB) contains most significant information comparing to other 
bit-planes and the 1
st
 LSB bit-plane contains the least significant information. In other 
words, when we look at each bit-plane, it does appear as though the 1
st
 LSB plane is 
more random than that of bit-planes of higher scale (e.g. 5
th
 or more). In fact, the first 
three bit-planes, from right-down, contain redundant information, and these 
redundancies are suitable to be exploited to embed secret bits without degrading the 
cover image visual quality. 
 
Figure 2-2: Bit-planes of Lenna image. 
The least significant bit replacement/substitution (LSBR) steganography scheme and 
its variants are the most common embedding techniques developed over the last decades 
in the spatial domain. These spatial domain substitution techniques, simply replace the 
bits of the secret message in the LSB of the cover image pixels, perhaps using some 
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agreed order of the selected pixels. In short, these schemes produce a stego-image 
which only differ from the cover image in their LSB plane and, therefore, causing little 
or no drastic/visible distortion to the cover image. These are relatively efficient and easy 
to use, and therefore, are the most common techniques used for digital steganography 
and especially with digital images. However, the information embedded in the LSB 
plane of an image could easily be destroyed by applying a slight change to the stego-
image such as compression (Rabah, 2004).  
Looking back at Figure 2-2, one can see that the randomness of pixels in the 2
nd
 bit-
plane, and to some extent the 3
rd
 bit-plane, provide some opportunities for hiding secrets 
without being noticeable and embedding techniques have been developed that exploit 
randomness in these and higher bit-planes than the LSB but not without consequences. 
Some more details on steganography techniques based on a variation of these 
substitution approaches are presented and reviewed in Chapter 3 highlighting 
advantages and disadvantages.  
Here, an example of secret bits embedding in the cover pixels‘ LSB is illustrated. Let 
the three integer numbers 16, 197, 243 be three cover pixels‘ value. In order to embed 
three secret bits 0,1,0, the cover pixels‘ value need to convert in binary form each of 8 
bits length. The following bit-streams are binary representation of the cover pixels‘ 
value: 
(16) decimal = (00010000) binary 
(197) decimal = (11000101) binary 
(243) decimal = (11110011) binary 
The left-most bit in the stream is called the Most Significant Bit (MSB), and the 
right-most bit is called Least Significant Bit (LSB). Furthermore, the second bit from 
the right is called 2
nd
 LSB, i.e. generally, the i
th
 bit from the right is called i
th
 LSB, 
where 1< i <7. Most of steganography schemes based on the substitution techniques are 
replacing the secret bits with the LSB, since modifying the LSB has less effect on the 
cover pixel value, either it changes by 1 or remain as it is. Thus, the following bit-
streams are binary representation of the stego pixels after embedding the secret bits 0, 1, 
0, each bit in one pixel: 
(00010000) binary = (16) decimal 
(11000101) binary = (197) decimal 
(11110010) binary = (242) decimal 
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As a result, cover pixel values 16, 197, 243 become 16, 197, 242 after embedding the 
secret bits 0, 1, 0 in each pixel respectively. 
Besides the binary representation of the pixel values of grayscale images in 8-bit 
bytes, in recent years, other kinds of representation of pixel values have been 
investigated to use in steganography. The idea is that, instead of using the sequence of 
powers of 2, {2
0
, 2
1
, 2
2
,  2
3
,  2
4
, 2
5
, 2
6
, 2
7} to represent the pixel values {0,1,2, … 255}, 
one can use different sequences, such as the Fibonacci sequence {1,2,3,5, 8,…, 233},  to 
express grayscale image values in other than 8-bits. These could be useful in reducing 
the effect on image quality when higher bit-planes are used for message embedding.  In 
the next chapter, we shall review such schemes as well as schemes based on the use of 
the Lucas, Catalan,  prime, and natural sequences for pixel value representation. We 
shall also review other schemes that manipulate/use bit-planes in ways that cannot be 
literally described as substitutions, although make some substitutions. 
2. Frequency Domain Techniques: 
 The frequency domain of an image usually refers to the representation of the image 
(or signal) in terms of waveforms, and a variety of such waveforms have been used to 
decompose/transform an image signal in terms of sub-bands of the frequencies of the 
waveforms that generate the given image.  In 1822, Jean B. Fourier the French 
mathematician has shown that certain types of functions (which include audio and 
image data files) can be represented (i.e. decomposed/analysed) by linear combination 
of the periodic trigonometric sinusoidal wave functions (e.g.         ,         ) of 
different frequencies (Gonzalez & Woods, 2002). The coefficients of the waveforms 
that a signal can be expressed in terms of their linear sum, is known as the frequency 
domain of the signal/image as compared to the original spatial domain representing the 
image pixel  intensities. The Fourier transform can be inverted without loss, and thus 
become a useful tool to process/manipulate a signal/image in the spatial domain by 
processing/analysing the frequency content of the signal.  The Fourier transform has 
been developed further, and its discrete version DFT has become the main tool for 
analysing and processing images as well as audio signals.   
The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is based on the real part version of the DFT 
and provides an efficient alternative for image compression and other image processing 
techniques (Gonzalez & Woods, 2002).  While both DCT and DFT provide information 
about the frequencies of the waveforms that contribute to a signal/image, there is no 
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information about the location of such frequencies within the signal, i.e. DFT and DCT 
provide frequency support but not spatial/time support. This is due to the fact that the 
trigonometric waveforms periodic functions whose support is infinite and covers the 
entire real line. For images of sufficiently large size, this makes the process of 
decomposing them by DFT or DCT inefficient. To overcome this shortcoming, it is 
customary to apply these transforms on blocks of small fixed size (usually     pixels). 
However, in image compression, and other processing tasks, this approach results in 
creating blocky effects and image artefacts.   
Below is an example of an image and its transformed domains using DFT, and DCT. 
In the case of DFT, the displayed image is the Fourier spectrum. Since the Fourier 
coefficients are complex numbers, then we cannot display the corresponding frequency 
domain. The DCT coefficients are real numbers and can be displayed. However, like the 
DFT, each DCT coefficient depends on every pixel in its area of definition, and image c 
is the scaled DCT image computed on the whole image, not in blocks. 
   
a b c 
 
Figure 2-3: DFT and DCT Frequency domains: (a) original image, (b) spectrum of the DFT domain, and 
(c) DCT domain. 
A Wavelet Transform (WT) is another frequency domain signal processing/analysis 
function that unlike the DFT and DCT simultaneously provides information about the 
frequencies present in the signal and their spatial location. The Discrete Wavelet 
Transform (DWT) is a special case of WT that decomposes a signal into at multiple 
scales low- and high- frequency sub-bands allowing one to extract and analyse the 
regular patterns as well as anomalies that may be present in the signal. It provides a 
compact representation of a signal/image in time and in terms frequency subranges and 
is efficiently computed (Gonzalez & Woods, 2002).  There are a number of different 
ways of decomposing an image by a wavelet transform. The most commonly used 
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DWT image decomposition is the pyramid scheme (also referred to as the non-standard 
decomposition).  The 2D-DWT is a multi-resolution decomposition of an image by the 
successive application of the DWT on the rows of the image followed by application on 
its columns, and is equivalent to filtering the input image with a bank of band-pass 
filters whose impulse responses are modelled by different scales of the same mother 
wavelet. Consequently, a wavelet-transformed image is decomposed into a set of sub-
bands with different resolutions each represented by a different frequency band. At a 
resolution level of k, the pyramidal scheme decomposes an image I into 3k + 1 sub-
bands (LLk, HLk, LHk, HHk, . . . , HL1, LH1, HH1). LLk represents the k-level 
approximation of the image, while HL1, LH1, and HH1 contain vertical, horizontal, and 
diagonal features of the image I (see Figure 2-4).   
 
  
a b 
  
c d 
Figure 2-4: DWT (a) Original image, (b) Level 1, (c) Level 2, (d) Level 3. 
For these various frequency domain representation of images, changing the 
coefficients slightly or the quantisation is expected have comparably slight effect on the 
visual appearance of the images when the transforms are inverted. Therefore, all these 
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provide opportunities to manipulate the frequency domain coefficients to embed a secret 
stream without raising suspicion.    
Embedding in the transformed domain is performed on the coefficients of the 
transformed domain of the image. The three main types of transforms used for image-
based steganography are (Codr, 2009): Discrete Fourier Transform DFT 
(Bhattacharyya, et al., 2009), Discrete Wavelet Transform DWT (Chen, et al., 2006), 
and Discrete Cosine Transform DCT (Westfeld, 2001). More details with an example of 
message embedding in the frequency domain are given in the next chapter. 
Although, in this thesis, we will only develop spatial domain steganography 
schemes, we shall be using wavelet to manipulate secret images for improved 
embedding efficiency and message detectability (see Chapter 5).    
2.3 Steganalysis and Steganography Attacks 
Steganalysis is the study of detecting the presence of suspect communication 
transaction that carries a steganographically hidden secret, i.e. the art of seeing the 
unseen. The two fields, therefore, operate in a ‗cat and mouse‘ style strategy, and 
steganalysers attempt to defeat the goal of steganographers by detecting the presence of 
a hidden message. Attacks on general information hiding can be classified as active or 
passive attacks. Active attacks aim to destroy the embedded secret message while 
passive attacks aim to determine the presence/absence of a hidden message and estimate 
its size.  
Active attacks assume that the attacker can capture the stego file and change it by 
introducing distortion before passing it on in order to prevent secret communication 
(Cox, et al., 2005).  Examples of active attack are linear and non-linear filters (e.g. 
blurring, sharpening, median filtering), lossy compression, gamma correction, 
recolouring, resampling, scaling, rotation, noise adding, cropping, etc. (Fridrich, 1999). 
These kinds of attacks are most likely to be used for watermarking and authentication 
applications rather than attacking steganography files. 
The passive attack, also known as steganalysis, do not attempt to interference by 
altering the suspect stego file, but can either prevent or permit the message delivery. 
The communication between parties will be blocked if the warden suspects that a secret 
is being communicated. Currently, most steganography research is concerned with such 
kind of scenarios, (Cox, et al., 2005). In general, neighbouring pixels in natural images 
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(i.e. images without hidden secrets) are known to be highly correlated and there is a 
certain level of statistical dependence between the LSB-plane and the other bit-planes 
beside statistical properties that exists between pairs of consecutive gray values (0 ↔ 1, 
2 ↔ 3 …, 254 ↔ 255).  The act of embedding a secret in a natural image will result in 
changing these known correlations and statistics in a manner that is influenced by the 
payload.  Steganalysis tools have designed to exploit these facts by analysing images to 
discover whether the image contains a secret message or not. Here, we describe two 
classes of steganalysis: 
1- Structural steganalysis: Aim to detect specific modifications due to the parity 
structure of the LSB replacement using local pixels' correlation. While efficient, 
such detectors rely on empirical pixel correlation models and do not exploit global 
statistical methods (Cogranne, et al., 2014). This class includes the regular and 
singular group RS tool (Fridrich, et al., 2001), the weighted stego WS tool (Fridrich 
& Goljan, 2004), the revised WS tool (Ker & Bohme, 2008), and LSBM 
steganalyser (Ker, 2005). 
2- Statistical steganalysis: Analyses the underlying statistics of an image in order to 
detect modifications due to statistical property of the stego-image (Kaur & Kaur, 
2014). This class includes the pairs of value (PoV) tool (Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 
2000) and the difference image histogram (DIH) tool (Zhang & Ping, 2003). 
A detailed description of these steganalysis tools will be given in Chapter 3.  It is 
clear that these tools target specific steganography embedding schemes and are 
therefore referred to in the literature as targeted (specific) steganalysis tools.  For 
example, the RS, PoV, the two versions of the WS, and DIH tools are designed to break 
the steganography embedding techniques that are based on LSB replacement, while 
Ker‘s LSBM steganalysis is designed to break the LSB matching embedding techniques 
(Sharp, 2001).  
In recent years, interest has increased in non-targeted steganalysis tools, also known 
as blind steganalysis, whereby no knowledge of the algorithm or its effect is assumed. 
While, the targeted tools are designed to defeat certain steganography embedding 
algorithms that operate on the LSB, blind steganalysis tools are designed to detect the 
existence of secret messages embedded in digital media irrespective of the 
steganography embedding algorithm (Luo, et al., 2008). This type of steganalysis is 
referred to as universal in that it attempts to detect different types of steganography 
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embedding techniques. For example, the spatial rich model (SRM) developed by 
(Fridrich & Kodovsky, 2012) is designed to break different steganography systems and 
tested on three different steganography techniques such as LSB matching (Sharp, 2001), 
edge adaptive (EA) (Luo, et al., 2010) and Highly Un-detectable steGO (HUGO) (Pevn, 
et al., 2010). These attacks are based on the fact that any embedding method creates 
different minor local distortions (referred to as features) throughout the cover image and 
modelling such features (i.e. quantifying the relationship between a pixel and its 
neighbours) could help reveal the presence of secrets. However, these methods cannot 
get any information about the amount of embedded messages (Zhang & Ping, 2003).  
Universal steganalysis can be considered as a two-class pattern recognition problem and 
consists of two parts, feature extraction and pattern classification.  Universal detection 
aims at classifying given images into two categories: cover and stego images. Some 
existing universal image steganalysis methods first extract some features from images, 
then select or design a classifier, and train the classifier using the features extracted 
from training image sets, and lastly, classify the features (Luo, et al., 2008). Generally, 
classifiers like a Fisher Linear Discriminants (FLDs) or Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
are used. The general framework of blind steganalysis is illustrated in Figure 2-5. Such 
steganalysis techniques are less accurate compared to targeted steganalysis since they 
can detect a wider class of steganography techniques. Since such kinds of steganalysis 
are feature-based steganalysis, where a set of effective statistical/distortion features is 
extracted to differentiate cover images from stego-images; therefore take longer time 
and are not considered as real-time tools (Ker, et al., 2013) (Holub, et al., 2014). 
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Figure 2-5: General framework of universal steganalysis. 
Moreover, some of these steganalysis techniques only determine the 
presence/absence of the embedded message while some others go further attempting to 
estimate the size of the embedded message such as WS (Fridrich & Goljan, 2004), 
revisiting WS (Ker & Bohme, 2008) and DIH (Zhang & Ping, 2003).  
Most of the steganalysis mentioned in this section are used in our experiments to 
evaluate the un-detectability performance of the proposed steganography schemes and 
will, therefore, be described in more details and reviewed in the next chapter. The 
diagram below illustrates the above classification of steganalysis techniques. 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Classification of the steganalysis techniques. 
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Specific Universal Specific Universal 
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2.4 Performance Evaluations of Image Steganography Techniques    
In order to evaluate and compare the performance of a steganography technique, we 
need some criteria that could be quantitatively measured directly from the stego file. 
Currently, no standard test or measure is available in order to evaluate the performance 
or the effectiveness of steganography systems, and benchmarking approaches for 
steganography algorithms or applications are uncommon (Kraetzer, 2007). 
In Section 1.3, five commonly used evaluation criteria for image steganography 
techniques were identified: payload capacity, stego-image quality, detectability, 
robustness against active attacks, and embedding efficiency. Since we have discussed 
before that steganography techniques do not need to be robust against active attacks 
(Cox, et al., 2005) (Cox, et al., 2007); but desirable steganography techniques should 
satisfy high embedding capacity and imperceptibility. In this section, we present and 
discuss the four remaining criteria.  
2.4.1 Data Payload or Capacity 
This defines the maximum length of secret binary string that can be embedded in the 
cover image while all other requirements are met. In the case of image spatial domain 
based steganography techniques, the payload may be stated in units of measurements 
such as the data embedding rate in terms bits per pixel (bpp), or the ratio of the secret 
message to number of cover pixels. When bpp = 1.0, then the number of embedded 
secret bits is equal to the number of cover pixels and also means that the embedding rate 
is 100 % or full capacity. In this thesis, the capacity is measured by using embedding 
ratio, i.e. if a cover image   is of size     pixels, and the length of the embedded 
secret is L bits, then the embedding ratio p is given by equation      (2. 2): 
   
 
    
         (2. 2) 
 
 As discussed before, there is a trade-off between the payload capacity and 
imperceptibility. Nevertheless, steganography techniques that embed messages for 
which L > (   ) and introduce distortions to stego files are considered as worthless 
systems. On the other hand, increasing the steganography capacity while maintaining an 
acceptable level of stego-image quality is considered a positive contribution. 
Additionally, improving the stego-image quality while maintaining the steganography 
capacity is also considered a significant contribution (Wu & Hwang, 2007). 
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2.4.2 Stego-image Quality 
In steganography, stego-image quality is an indicator that there is no visual 
difference between the cover image and the stego-image. Evaluating the quality of 
stego-images is a significant indicator of the performance of the embedding algorithm 
(Wu & Hwang, 2007). Generally, there are two ways to measure stego-image quality: 
objective quality methods and subjective quality methods (Stoica, et al., 2003). The 
objective methods are based on measurements automatically computed using the image 
data, while subjective methods are based on human observer judgement. In practice, 
subjective evaluation is usually too inconvenient, time consuming and expensive. The 
goal of objective image quality assessment is to develop quantitative measures that can 
automatically predict perceived image quality. Objective image quality evaluation 
metrics are classified into three categories according to the availability of the original 
image (reference): full reference (FR), no-reference (NR), and reduced reference (RR) 
image quality assessment (Wang, et al., 2003). The full reference means that the 
original image and the test image are available, while the no reference means that only 
the test image is available. The reduced reference means that the test image and some 
information about the original image are available (Ponomarenko, et al., 2008). 
For objective quality methods, two types of perceptibility can be distinguished and 
evaluated in signal processing systems, namely fidelity and quality. Fidelity means the 
perceptual similarity between signals before and after processing. However, quality is 
an absolute measure of the goodness of an image as perceived by the human eye. For 
example, a distorted, blurred and low-resolution grayscale image is naturally considered 
to be of low quality. A stego-image is expected to look identical to the cover image but 
it may have a slightly lower quality, but because it is indistinguishable from the cover 
image, then it would have high fidelity. For image-based steganography, the fidelity is 
defined as the perceptual similarity between the original cover image and the stego-
image. Therefore, the fidelity evaluation requires both images before and after 
embedding. However, attackers and perhaps recipients do not have access to the original 
cover image. Additionally, steganography systems must avoid attracting the attention of 
anyone not involved in the secret communication process and therefore stego-images 
must have a reasonably good quality. Therefore, quality is the major perceptual concern 
for most steganography techniques in order to avoid any suspension and therefore 
detection (Cox, et al., 2005). 
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There are two measurements, the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and the mean 
square error (MSE) that are widely used as image quality measures. Both represent 
perceptual distance metrics and quantify the distortion amount between an image and a 
processed version of it.  By definition, these two are measures of similarity between two 
images (Wang, et al., 2003) and, therefore, are fidelity metrics and not as quality 
measures. Significantly, fidelity is defined as the perceptual quality of stego files and 
therefore PSNR, and MSE describe how imperceptible the secret message is (Cox, et 
al., 2005). Although MSE and PSNR can result in poor performance, and they are not 
very well matched to perceived visual quality, they are still applicable in several image 
processing applications for their simplicity in computation and independence of viewing 
conditions and individual observers (Wang & Bovik, 2002) (Wang, et al., 2004).  Thus, 
in this thesis, we are adopting the use of these two measures as indicators of 
perceptibility of the secret message in the stego-image. Accordingly, a high 
imperceptible secret in a stego-image can be discerned from a high PSNR value, and, 
therefore, both cover image and stego-image are perceived to be very similar. 
In our experiments, the quality of the stego-image is examined using the PSNR to 
test the performance of the various embedding schemes developed in this thesis in terms 
of this criteria. For self-containment, we shall now formally state the definition of MSE 
and PSNR measures. 
1. Mean Square Error (MSE): 
MSE is a full reference (FR) metrics used to measure the difference between two 
images, (Wang, et al., 2003) (Stoica, et al., 2003). It is the average of square of 
differences between the pixel values in the two images, i.e.  
     
 
  
           
   
 
   
 
   
         (2. 3) 
Where: 
    is the  
   row and the    column pixel in the original image (cover image).  
   
  is the     row and the    column pixel in the reconstructed image (stego-image). 
  and   are the height and width of the image.   
2. Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR): 
PSNR is another full reference (FR) metrics used for objective image quality 
evaluation. Like MSE, it is a measurement of similarity between two images. It is 
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used in many image processing applications and considered as a reference model to 
evaluate the efficiency of other objective image quality evaluation methods (Wang, 
et al., 2002). It is widely used and very popular, since the computation of these two 
metrics is very easy and fast (Ponomarenko, et al., 2008).  PSNR is a logarithmic 
function of MSE and is measured in decibels (dB) units, (Wang, et al., 2003) 
(Stoica, et al., 2003): 
             
  
   
   
(2. 4) 
 
Where,   is the maximum pixel value. For the 8-bit grayscale image,   = 255. The 
resultant PSNR is a decimal value between 0 and infinity (∞). In the case of two 
identical images, the PSNR value is ∞. Moreover, the higher the value of PSNR 
indicates the higher similarity between the cover and stego-image. 
2.4.3 Un-detectability of Hidden Secrets  
Un-detectability of a hidden secret in an otherwise mundane communication 
transaction is the main and most important requirement for any steganography system. 
By un-detectability, we understand the inability of an attacker/steganalyser to 
distinguish between cover and stego-image. For modern digital communication, it is 
somewhat impractical to be concerned with detectability by a human observer.  Hence, 
the un-detectability requirement is concerned with the ability of the embedding 
algorithm to withstand against steganalysis attacks that aim to decide whether an input 
image has a secret embedded in it or not. This basically means that the produced stego-
images should be statistically undistinguishable from cover images (Fridrich & Goljan, 
2004). As discussed in Section 2.3, there are a variety of steganalysis techniques for 
determining whether or not an image contains a secret message.  
2.4.4 Embedding System Efficiency 
The embedding efficiency is an important attribute of steganography techniques 
directly influencing their security and is defined by (Fridrich & Soukal, 2006) as the 
number of message bits embedded per one change as a result of embedding.  Thus, in 
image-based steganography, high embedding efficiency refers to reducing the number 
of necessary changes of cover pixels for a given embedding rate. The concept of 
embedding efficiency has been first introduced by (Crandall, 1998), and was first 
adopted by (Westfeld, 2001) for embedding in DCT domain. It has since been accepted 
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as an important attribute of steganography schemes (Fridrich, et al., 2007). Because a 
smaller number of embedding changes is less likely to disrupt statistical properties of 
the cover image, schemes that employ high embedding efficiency generally have better 
steganography security. In other words, steganography techniques that employ high 
embedding efficiency, they produce stego-images with minimal distortion.  
A formal definition of steganography security was given by (Cachin, 1998), and the 
concept of embedding efficiency is an essential indicator of steganography security.  
The detectability of a data hidden in a stego-image is influenced by many factors, such 
as the choice of the cover object, the selection rule used to identify individual elements 
of the cover that could be modified during embedding, the type of the embedding 
operation that modifies the cover elements, and the number of embedding changes, 
directly related to the secret message length. Assuming two embedding techniques share 
the same source of cover object, the same selection rule and embedding operation, the 
one that introduces fewer embedding changes will be less detectable as it decreases the 
chance that any statistics used by the warden will be sufficiently disturbed to mount a 
successful steganalysis attack (Fridrich, et al., 2007). Since our concern and 
contribution in this thesis is embedding efficiency, some of image-based steganography 
techniques that have high embedding efficiency are reviewed in the next chapter. The 
embedding efficiency can be calculated such as: 
 
                       
 
                        
               (2. 5) 
 
The embedding efficiency also can be calculated by the ratio of necessary cover pixel 
change, the number of cover pixels that need to be changed after embedding the secrets 
proportion to the length of the secret message. The higher is the value of embedding 
efficiency; the lower is the embedding change of the cover pixels. 
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2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have covered the necessary background related to the research 
area of the thesis by introducing the reader to the main information concerning the 
relationship between steganography and information security. The general discussion 
covered steganography within the wider security mechanism of information hiding and 
elaborated on the distinction between steganography and the other hiding schemes 
(watermarking and fingerprinting). We also discussed and identified the various security 
services provided by the two secret communication mechanisms, namely steganography 
and cryptography. Moreover, a brief insight into steganography categorisation based on 
carrier type and image domain is given.  Furthermore, we have investigated issues 
concerning steganalysis and steganography attacks.  Finally, different criteria used to 
evaluate the performance of steganography techniques and to make a decision of which 
steganography technique is better than another is presented.  
In the next chapter, Chapter 3, we review the literature for research on image-based 
steganography approaches, highlighting the strengths and limitations of each of them. In 
addition, some well-known steganalysis tools for detecting the secret message that 
embedded in the image spatial domain are described and reviewed. 
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Chapter 3  
Image-based Steganography and Steganalysis: 
Literature Review 
In the previous chapter, general background information about digital steganography 
was presented and discussed to provide the reader with sufficient knowledge of the 
research area of interest in this thesis. The focus was on the link between information 
hiding and cryptography as security mechanisms, general categorisation of different 
known digital steganography schemes, basic attacks on steganography systems, and 
different measurements that are used to evaluate the performance of the image-based 
steganography schemes. In this chapter, we conduct a literature review of the most 
relevant image-based steganography schemes in Section 3.1, and different steganalysis 
tools in Section 3.2. We shall also give Section 3.3, a brief overview of our proposed 
approaches in this thesis.  
3.1 Image-based Steganography Approaches 
We have already pointed out that digital carriers/covers such as audio, image and 
video files have become the most obvious choices to use in digital steganography in 
order to conceal a secret message into it. In this thesis, we are using images as cover 
files for carrying secret messages, due to the fact that images usually have a high degree 
of redundancy, widely exchanged over the Internet than other digital media and do not 
attract suspicion. Therefore, the literature review, in this chapter, will be limited to 
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digital steganography approaches that have been developed for grayscale images. This 
review will cover embedding methods for the spatial domain and transformed/frequency 
domain image representation.  We shall first review the frequency domain techniques.  
Frequency Domain Steganography 
These techniques work first by using a frequency domain transform of the input 
spatial domain cover image, and then exploiting redundancies in the transformed 
coefficients, or other properties usually used for compression or other frequency domain 
image processing such as quantisation, to embed the secret message such that inverting 
the frequency transform produces that stego-image have little or no effect on the visual 
appearance of the cover image.    
The three main types of frequency domain image transforms, described in Chapter 2, 
have been used for image-based steganography. The following references describe each 
of these three frequency domain steganography techniques. 
The DCT-based F5 steganography technique was developed by Andreas Westfield 
with the aim of preserving the statistical properties of a stego-image (Westfield, 2001). 
The DCT transforms each block 8 x 8 of cover pixels into 8 x 8 matrix of frequency 
coefficients that are real numbers. The entries of the matrix appear in the order of their 
absolute values along its zig-zag entries, with the AC coefficient in the top left corner 
being the most significant low frequency content representing the block energy. This 
property has been exploited for compression whereby as many as possible insignificant 
DC coefficients along the zig-zag path are ignored, from a selected position onwards, 
after which a quantisation step is used to reduce the number of symbols to be coded.  
During secret embedding, instead of changing the LSBs of the quantised DCT 
coefficients; F5 algorithm decrements the absolute value of the quantised coefficients 
by one (Westfield, 2001).  The F5 adopted quantisation suitably rounds the selected 
DCT coefficients to integers in the range -2048 to 2047. In order to minimise the 
necessary number of changes when embedding a message, the F5 algorithm employs 
the matrix embedding algorithm proposed by (Crandall, 1998). It does not embed the 
secret bits sequentially into the DCT coefficients but into randomly chosen DCT 
coefficients. The F5 is one of the most popular embedding schemes in DCT domain 
steganography for its robustness against statistical steganalysis attacks (e.g. the PoV) 
though it has been successfully broken in (Fridrich et. al, 2003).  
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An image embedding technique based on DFT is proposed by (Bhattacharyya et. al, 
2009) with the aim to be resistant against the statistical attack of PoV. The technique 
first divides the cover image into non-overlapping blocks of size 2 x 2 and transforms 
the blocks spatial domain into the frequency domain using DFT. The bits of the secret 
message are then embedded in the LSB within the real part of the DFT coefficients 
excluding the first one. Unfortunately, the authors do not pay any attention to any of the 
other requirements of steganography such as stego-image quality and payload capacity.   
The main disadvantage of using DFT or DCT transforms for embedding is that these 
transforms do not provide spatial support that basically implies that every coefficient in 
the frequency domain depends on and is affected by, every image pixel. Hence, 
distortion as a result of embedding one bit will be spread over the entire image or the 
block. Inevitably this will have an impact on stego-image quality which can only be 
dealt with by limiting the payload capacity. On the other hand, DWT-based 
steganography do not have a similar disadvantage. And there has been a great interest in 
DWT-based steganography as well as watermarking.  
In 2006, Chen et al. proposed a steganography technique which embeds the secret 
message in DWT domain with the aim of keeping the message safe from being 
destroyed by unintended users on the Internet. The secret message embeds in the high 
frequency coefficients of the DWT domain by substituting the secret bits with the LSB 
of the DWT high frequency coefficients while coefficients in the low frequency sub-
band are preserved unaltered to improve image quality (Chen, et al., 2006).    
Frequency domain steganography techniques are expected to be more robust against 
active attacks. However, embedding secrets in the frequency domain of images are 
known to have several limitations including the limited payload capacity. Even the 
embedding of a small message is known to have a significant effect on the cover image 
quality (Chen, et al., 2006).  Furthermore, embedding a secret bit in the frequency 
domain may have an effect on more than one pixel. These known disadvantages of 
frequency based steganography are the main reason for our interest in spatial domain 
steganography. In particular, we would be aiming to improve security/un-detectability 
of the steganography technique, enhance embedding efficiency while maintaining the 
secret message quantity. In the next section, we shall have a more extensive review of 
spatial domain steganography for grayscale images.  
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Spatial Domain Steganography 
Many steganography approaches for embedding secret messages in images‘ spatial 
domain have been proposed, and it is evident that spatial domain based steganography 
is probably the most dominant approach in the literature. There are many aspects of this 
area of research that we need to review, and the next few introductory paragraphs are 
meant to highlight briefly these aspects that have greatly influenced the research we 
conducted in this thesis. The content of these paragraphs will be expanded in the 
following subsections for more substantive review of the literature.  
In general, image-based steganography approaches are often classified into adaptive 
and non-adaptive approaches (Agaian, et al., 2007). In adaptive approaches, the 
embedding capacity and positions depend on the statistical characteristics of the cover 
image (Westfeld, 2001), and this means that some of the regions are avoided for secret 
embedding. Whereas, in non-adaptive approaches, data embedding does not depend on 
the cover image content and every pixel is used. Thus, in non-adaptive based 
steganography approaches, the embedding rate is higher than in adaptive based 
approaches. However, adaptive steganography approaches are more robust against 
steganalysis techniques, since the message is embedded in noisy regions, but it has a 
limitation of capacity. 
Existing spatial domain embedding schemes are mostly designed to embed secret bit-
streams in places where there would be the least effect on stego-image quality and make 
least impact on perceptibility. The LSB plane of an image is the most obvious source of 
such places. However, there are also techniques that embed the secret message in higher 
bit-planes than LSB plane. There are some schemes that do not directly replace bit-
planes with the secret bits, but by modifying pixel values according to a particular 
(reversible) function (Picione, et al., 2006). An extensive review of these schemes will 
be presented in Section 3.1.1 where we also highlight advantages and disadvantages. 
Yet, other schemes apply similar techniques but using different decompositions of 
pixel value integers other than usual binary sequences. In Section 3.1.2, we will review 
the literation relating to steganography based on different decomposition schemes for 
cover pixel values.  
Security or message detectability is considered as the most important requirement for 
image-based steganography schemes. Chao Wang et al. identified two common ways to 
enhance steganography security: 1) reduce the embedding changes at a given 
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embedding rate, i.e., to increase the embedding efficiency; and 2) embed the secret bit 
into the cover pixels only in inconspicuous parts, e.g., the noisy regions of an image 
(Wang, et al., 2010). In 2013, Ker et al. discussed and highlighted the problems of 
steganography and steganalysis that are important to be addressed in the future research. 
The two main important problems that related to the spatial domain based image 
steganography are: 1) design efficient embedding schemes – sender hides the message 
while minimising an embedding distortion, and 2) design distortion functions relating to 
the statistical detectability – sender hides the message in the regions of the cover image 
that determined by the defined distortion function, e.g. noisy or textured regions (Ker, et 
al., 2013).  In Section 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, we will review the literation relating to the two 
security-related issues of region based embedding and embedding efficiency.  In this 
thesis, high embedding efficiency and message un-detectability will be of major concern 
to us, and to some extent, we focus on addressing the first problem mentioned in (Ker, 
et al., 2013).   
3.1.1 LSB\higher LSBs (Bit-Planes) based embedding Approaches 
The common theme in these schemes is to embed the secret message bits into, a 
priory selected and agreed with the receiver, bit-plane(s) of the cover image. The 
embedding could take the form of replacing the bits of the chosen bit-plane with the 
secret bit-stream according to agreed order of the image pixels. The most common 
algorithm belonging to this class is the scheme that selects and uses the LSB of the 
binary representation of the cover pixels to represent the message bit was first suggested 
by (Bender, et al., 1996) and explained by (Chan & Cheng, 2004) (Thien & Lin, 2003). 
In the literature, this scheme is referred to as the Least Significant Bit Replacement 
(LSBR) and its popularity is due to its simplicity, ease of implementation, and visual 
imperceptibility. Moreover, LSBR supports full payload in the sense that every cover 
pixel can be used to carry a secret bit, and it is difficult to notice a change in the value 
of the pixel by the naked eye. LSBR was first used by embedding the secret bits into 
cover pixels in sequential order, and it is referred to as LSBR sequentially. This scheme 
is not secure, since attackers can simply retrieve the LSB plane to quickly recover the 
hidden information (Hempstalk, 2006).   
The security problem of the LSBR sequentially can be partially mitigated by the use 
of pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) to randomly distribute the hidden message 
across the cover image according to a seed that is specified by the sender instead of 
embedding the message in sequential order (Hempstalk, 2006).  This is called LSBR 
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randomly embedding technique (Provos & Honeyman, 2003). Using the same PRNG at 
the receiver part, the secret bits can be extracted from the stego pixels‘ LSB.  
Both LSBR sequentially and LSBR randomly, increase (decrease) even (odd) pixel 
values either by one or leave unchanged. This creates an imbalance in the embedding 
distortion in the stego-image as a result of distorting the statistical distribution in the 
pixel values (0, 1); (2, 3); . . . (254, 255) (Luo, et al., 2010). This imbalance is called 
asymmetry problem, which can be exploited to detect the existence of a hidden message 
using certain targeted steganalysis techniques, even at a low embedding rate.  
To overcome the undesirable asymmetry problem of LSBR schemes, the decision of 
changing the least significant bit is randomized, i.e. if the message bit does not match 
the cover pixel‘s LSB, then cover pixel value is randomly either increased or decreased 
by 1. This technique is popularly known as LSB Matching (LSBM), also called ± 
embedding, and was proposed by (Sharp, 2001).  After embedding the secret message, 
LSB of the stego pixel represents a secret bit and by extracting it at the receiver part, the 
message can be obtained. LSBM based embedding technique does not suffer from the 
asymmetry problem and has the same payload capacity of the LSBR scheme with good 
visual imperceptibility property, i.e. not noticeable by the naked eye. Andrew Ker in 
(Ker, 2005), has pointed out that the LSBM approach is dealing with the asymmetric 
problem by randomizing the change, unfortunately, result in creating another problem; 
designed a steganalysis tool to defeat it.  The reported disadvantage is concerned with 
changes to the DFT of the histogram when the image is down-sampled. In theory, 
down-sampling images should not have changes to their histograms significant enough 
to affect the DFT of the histograms (see Section 3.2). 
In order to avoid the above mentioned vulnerabilities of the LSBR and LSBM 
schemes and possibly increase payload capacity, new steganography approaches 
emerged whereby the secret bits are not only embedded in the cover image LSB plane 
but also embed in higher bit-planes. However, such kinds of techniques are expected to 
have degrading effects on the quality of the stego-image compared to the LSB-only 
schemes. We shall now review few such schemes.  
A digital steganography scheme that embeds two secret bits into the first two LSBs 
of the pixels of a cover image, called 2LSB, was developed in (Ker, 2007). The 
advantage of the 2LSB techniques is the doubling of payload capacity compared to 
LSBR and LSBM schemes. In the worst case, pixel values could change by 3, and this 
leads to distorting the stego-image quality more comparing to LSBR and LSBM based 
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embedding techniques. Although Ker proposed a steganalysis technique to detect the 
secrets embedded in 2LSB (Ker, 2007), but 2LSB embedding techniques is still harder 
to be detected by steganalysis techniques that are designed to detect the embedded 
secrets in LSB-only schemes (Ker, 2007).  
LSB-Witness embedding technique is proposed by Rashid et al. in which the secret 
message is already present in the LSB plane but instead of changing the cover image 
LSB values, the second LSB plane will be changed as a witness/informer to the receiver 
during message recovery. For the extraction purpose, only second bit-plane needs to be 
checked, if the value of the second bit-plane is 0 then the secret bit is equal to the LSB 
plane bit value, otherwise the secret bit is inverse of LSB plane value. Although this 
approach may affect the stego-image quality, it eliminates the weakness of the LSBR 
schemes that exploited by steganalysis techniques that designed to detect the secret bits 
embedded in LSB (Rashid, et al., 2013). 
Wang et al. proposed an embedding algorithm that embeds the secret bit in the 4
th
 
LSB by applying bit-plane substitution method and a local pixel adjustment process to 
reduce the cover pixel degradation (Wang, et al., 2000). If the secret bit replaced 
directly the 4
th
 LSB, then the cover pixel value either not change or it will change by ± 
8, and this significant change leads to degrading stego-image quality. The local pixel 
adjustment procedure proposed by Wang et al, is applied when the secret bit does not 
match the 4
th
 LSB of the cover pixel by modifying the other bit-planes (from 1
st
 to 3
rd
) 
according to some assumptions/cases reported in (Wang, et al., 2000). The receiver can 
retrieve the secret bits only by extracting from the 4
th
 LSB of the stego-image pixels. 
The following example illustrates this adjustment: 
 
The authors claimed that this embedding technique improve the stego-image quality 
comparing to the directly replace the secret bit with 4
th
 LSB, and illustrated this by 
embedding a secret in all pixels of Lenna image using the direct replacement of the 4
th
 
LSB and the proposed embedding technique and showing that the value of PSNR has 
increased from 33.02 to 38.75. However, if    = 31 = 000111112 and the secret bit be 0, 
then the error becomes -8. 
Let the cover pixel value    = 8 = 000010002 and the secret bit be 0. Replacing the 4
th
 LSB 
by the secret bit makes the corresponding stego pixel value    
  = 0 = 000000002, i.e. an error 
  =   
  -    = -8. Instead, the pixel value is adjusted to    
   =7 = 000001112, which reduces the 
error to   =   
   -    = -1. 
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In 2001, Chan and Chen improved the above scheme by embedding the secret bit in 
the 4
th
 LSB but based on special look-up table reported in (Chan & Cheng, 2001), that 
instead of only modifying the 1
st
 to 3
rd
 LSBs it modifies all of the bit-planes except 4
th
 
LSB. It is claimed this scheme improved the PSNR of the stego Lenna image to 42.352. 
The following example illustrates this approach: 
 
In (Chan & Cheng, 2004), a new embedding scheme has proposed, called optimal 
pixel adjustment process (OPAP), that embeds 3 bit secrets in the first 3 LSBs of a 
single cover pixel and then uses a modification of the above local adjustment. It is 
aimed to enhance the stego-image quality obtained by simple bit-plane substitution 
method. The main idea of OPAP is to minimise the error between the cover and stego-
image based on three cases determined by a partition of the    between    and   
 
 into 3 
subsets and adjusting the bits beyond the 3
rd
 LSB in a way that depends on the subset 
that the error    belongs to. The following example illustrates the working of the OPAP: 
 
 As a result, the authors claim that the stego-image quality can be improved while the 
number of secret bits that can be embedded has increased three times of that in LSBR 
and LSBM based embedding techniques.  
Daneshkhah et al. proposed an embedding technique that embeds two bits of 
information in a cover pixel in a way that not only the LSB of the cover pixel is allowed 
to change but also the second and fourth LSBs are allowed to be manipulated 
(Daneshkhah, et al., 2011). In this technique, for embedding two secret bits in a cover 
pixel, only one alteration in one bit-plane happens. To guarantee retrieval of the secret 
If the cover pixel value    = 31 = 000111112 and the secret bit be 0, then the scheme first 
replaces the 4
th
 bit with the secret makes the corresponding stego pixel value    
  = 23 = 
000101112 and calculates the error   =   
  -    = -8 which is high, then the scheme changes as 
many bits as necessary as long as the error is reduced. Hence, in this case, the corresponding 
stego pixel value    
   =32=001000002, i.e. an error of 1. 
 
Let    = 8 = 000010002 and the secret bits be 1112. The corresponding stego pixel value 
obtained by conventional substitution method   
  =15 = 000011112, i.e. an error of 7 and it 
falls into case 1 out of the cases reported in (Chan & Cheng, 2004). The OPAP embedding 
scheme makes the corresponding stego pixel value   
  = 7 = 000001112, i.e. an error   =   
   - 
   = -1. 
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bits from the stego pixels, the authors have designed a (3,1) convolution decoder circuit, 
which outputs three bits for every input of first four LSBs of the cover pixel. The 
highest output bit is ignored, and the other two output bits are replaced with the two 
secret bits which will then be used to represent the two secret bits. As the authors 
claimed, this proposed embedding technique has the advantages of capacity (two secret 
bits embedded in one cover pixel), and the detection of the embedded message became 
much harder for steganalysis compared to LSBR or LSBM techniques (Daneshkhah, et 
al., 2011). However, stego quality is degraded compared to LSBR and LSBM 
embedding techniques. 
In 2012, Janakiraman et al. proposed a new embedding technique by extending the 
idea of (Daneshkhah, et al., 2011). In this technique, a maximum of 1 or 2 bit-planes has 
been altered to embed four secret bits. This technique would not just embed the secret 
bit in LSB of the cover pixel, but also it might be embedding the secrets in the second, 
third, and fifth bit-planes or any one of the 15 possible combinations.  Besides improved 
capacity, the authors claim improved un-detectability. However, the stego-image quality 
can degrade since the fifth bit-plane might also be altered.  
In all the above schemes that embed in higher bit-planes, the changes are made 
regardless of knowledge of the surrounding of the next pixel to which a secret bit is to 
be embedded. However, the visible effect of such actions depends on whether the 
surrounding region is dark or very light. This idea was exploited by a Buckingham 
MSc. student in his project by designing an illumination-adaptive higher bit-plane 
embedding scheme (Abdullah, et al., 2014).  It is based on determining the recorded 
lighting condition and computed quality of the cover image prior to embedding. It 
divides the cover image into blocks and identifies blocks according to their lighting 
conditions. The most useful blocks for embedding are based on their entropy and 
average values. According to this, the scheme selects the right bit-plane for embedding. 
This kind of block selection made the embedding process scatters the secret messages 
randomly around the cover image. Different tests have been performed for selecting a 
proper block size, and this is related to the nature of the used cover image. Experimental 
results reported in (Abdullah, et al., 2014) demonstrate that different image quality used 
for the cover images will have an effect when the stego-image is attacked by different 
active attacks. Although the secret bits are embedded in higher bit-plane, they cannot be 
recognised visually within the stego-images. 
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In summary, hiding approaches reviewed in this section that embed secrets in higher 
bit-planes than LSB are aimed to increase the payload capacity by embedding more than 
one secret bit in each selected cover pixel and/or increase the un-detectability. However, 
if we only focus on increasing the data hiding capacity, the PSNR decreases, and the 
stego-image appears distorted which hampers the main aim of image steganography, i.e. 
stealth hiding. In the next section, different steganography approaches that are based on 
representing cover pixel values in other than the usual binary system will discuss.  
3.1.2 Pixel value decomposition based embedding Approaches 
In image processing, it is customary to represent pixel values of grayscale images as 
an 8-bit byte. Each greyscale integers in the range {0,1, …, 255} is decomposed 
uniquely in terms of its partition as the sum of powers of 2 in the sequence {2
0
, 2
1
, 
2
2,…, 27}. This is also influenced by the way computers process data, but as we saw in 
the last few examples embedding in higher bit-planes could result in significant changes 
in pixel values, compared to embedding in LSB, unless special mechanisms are used to 
avoid this such as changing different bits as in the case of (Chan & Cheng, 2001) 
scheme. However, in recent years, many steganography researchers recognised to the 
possibility of using other sequences of integers to decompose pixel values while 
adhering to use of binary strings but in other than 8-bits.  In particular, these researchers 
were interested in providing more bit-plane but with smaller changes in their actual 
values so that embedding in higher bit-planes do not lead to big changes in pixel values 
and thus has less impact on visibility in comparison to the binary decomposition. In this 
section, we will review steganography approaches based on different decomposition 
techniques such as Fibonacci, prime, Lucas, Catalan-Fibonacci, and the natural. 
In 2006, Picione et al. proposed the first decomposition technique used for 
embedding purposes over binary decomposition technique based on representing the 
grayscale values in terms of set {1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 233} of Fibonacci 
sequence (Picione, et al., 2006). This scheme, referred to as the Fibonacci integer 
decomposition and each grayscale image is represented by 12 bit-planes. The extra bit-
planes are called virtual bit-planes. Embedding techniques based on the Fibonacci 
decomposition can benefit from embedding in higher bit-planes with less stego quality 
distortion compared to the binary based embedding techniques. However, unlike the 
binary decomposition, the Fibonacci representation is not unique, i.e., more than one 
bit-stream can represent the same pixel value (Picione, et al., 2006). For example, the 
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number 5 can be coded in 4-bit Fibonacci number system as 1000 or 0110.  The non-
uniqueness of Fibonacci representation, however, can be avoided by applying the 
following theorem: 
Zeckendorf theorem Each positive integer can be represented as the sum of distinct 
numbers in the sequence of Fibonacci numbers using no two consecutive Fibonacci 
numbers. 
 Accordingly, 0110 is not valid Zeckendorf code. While the uniqueness of 
representation is solved by the above theorem, Fibonacci based embedding techniques 
faces another problem in that the act of embedding could result in violating the theorem. 
The following example illustrates this problem: 
Hence, cover pixels for which embedding certain secret bits cause a violation of the 
Zeckendorf theorem cannot be used for embedding and are skipped. To retrieve the 
secret data, the selected stego pixel value is first decomposed into Fibonacci 
representation, and then it needs to be checked whether it is a good candidate or not, if it 
is, then the secret bit is extracted from the agreed bit-plane.  
The skipping of bad pixel candidates for embedding result in reduced capacity. 
Although, some authors have proposed to overcome the capacity limitation by 
embedding in other than the LSB plane, but the usual binary based embedding 
techniques, reviewed in the previous section, that embed in higher bit-planes do not face 
this problem. Note that embedding in the higher bit-planes still has the limitation of 
payload capacity. In Chapter 4, this problem will be considered, and an innovative 
solution will be proposed.  
Battisti et al. improved the above scheme by using generalized Fibonacci 
decompositions instead the classical Fibonacci (Battisti, et al., 2006). The most common 
generalization of Fibonacci is the p-number (also called p-code) Fibonacci sequences, 
where p is the distance between the i
th 
element in the Fibonacci sequence and the 
previous element (i-p)
th
. Such decomposition schemes provide more places for 
Let the cover pixel value    = 7 = (000000001010)Fib and the secret bit be 1. Replacing the 1
st
 
LSB by the secret bit makes the Fibonacci representation of the corresponding stego pixel 
value becomes (000000001011)Fib and by returning this stream of bits back into decimal the 
corresponding stego pixel value becomes 8. At the receiver, the Fibonacci representation of 
the stego pixel value 8 = (000000010000)Fib. Extracting from the stego pixel‘s LSB, the bit 0 is 
obtained, which is not the original embedded secret bit.  
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embedding, by increasing the number of bit-planes and thereby reducing the amount of 
changes in integer values of consecutive bit-planes. In Battista et al. scheme, the 
randomly selected pixel value is first decomposed into bit-planes using p-number 
Fibonacci, and then the selected bit-plane is chosen for embedding as long as the 
Zeckendorf theorem is valid. In their experiments, a comparison between this proposed 
scheme and classical binary embedding is done in term of quality and capacity. When 
embedding in bit-planes higher than the LSB, the proposed scheme has less effect on 
stego-image quality when compared to classical binary embedding, but not in terms of 
capacity. 
Battista et al. scheme has then been modified by adding a key made up of two 
parameters p and r (Mammi, et al., 2008) to increase the security of the whole system; 
without their knowledge it is not possible to perform the same decomposition used in 
the embedding process and to extract the embedded information. The decomposition is 
based on adding the previous r elements starting from a distance p, and for the sake of 
uniqueness of representation the following constraints must be satisfied (Mammi, et al., 
2008): 
1. A valid (p,r) Fibonacci coefficient vector c must contain less than p-1 zeros 
between two ones. 
2. A valid (p,r) Fibonacci coefficient vector c cannot contain more than r 
consecutive groups, being constituted by one symbol equal to 1 followed by p-1 
symbols equal to 0.  
Obviously, when p=0, we obtain the classical binary sequence, and when p=1, we 
obtain the classical Fibonacci sequence. Apart from the security strength, this version of 
Fibonacci sequence has the same advantages and limitations of the above scheme.  
The prime decomposition of integers in terms of sequence {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 
19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43} provides another decomposition based embedding technique, 
that was proposed by (Dey, et al., 2007). Here, each cover pixel value is decomposed 
into 15 bit-planes.  In this embedding scheme, it is possible to embed secret bits in 
higher bit-planes, than possible with the binary and Fibonacci schemes, without making 
big changes to actual pixel values.  Again representation is not unique, but a unique 
prime representation can be obtained by selecting the string with lexicographical highest 
value, discard all other representations. For example, pixel value 5 can be encoded in 4-
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bit prime number system as 1000 or 0110 so we should select 1000 being 
lexicographically higher than 0110.  
The example, below, illustrates that the prime-based scheme has similar problem 
suffered by the Fibonacci schemes in relation to capacity as a result of having unsuitable 
pixel values which would violate the uniqueness condition post embedding. Therefore, 
to retrieve the secret data, the selected stego pixel value is first decomposed into prime 
representation, and then it needs to be checked whether it is a good candidate or not, if it 
is, then the secret bit is extracted from the agreed bit-plane (Dey, et al., 2007). 
 
The authors of the prime scheme developed a similar scheme using the sequence {1, 
2, 3, 4, … , 23} of natural (Dey, et al., 2007). However, this scheme has the same 
structure, aims, advantages as well as disadvantages in terms of capacity and stego-
image quality.   
The Catalan-Fibonacci (CF) pixel value decomposition was proposed by (Aroukatos, 
et al., 2012) to improve the Fibonacci scheme by using a sequence of numbers formed 
by the union of subset of Fibonacci numbers and subset of Catalan numbers. Catalan 
numbers are defined in terms of the combinatorial formula for randomly selecting n 
objects out of 2n ones. For n>0, it is defined as    
 
  
 
 
   
    and the set {1, 2, 5, 14, 42, 
132} are the first few Catalan numbers. The CF sequence used Aroukatos et al. for pixel 
representation and embedding is {1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 14, 21, 34, 42, 55, 89, 132, 144, 233} 
and again to ensure uniqueness among different CF codes the scheme is based on 
selecting the lexicographically highest code. Any grayscale image has 15 bit-planes CF-
decomposition. Unfortunately, this scheme is only different from the above 
decomposition techniques in the sequence, but otherwise it has the same advantages and 
disadvantages, discussed earlier in terms of capacity and stego-image quality.  
Yet another pixel value decomposition technique has been proposed called Lucas 
decomposition which decomposes a grayscale image into 12 bit-planes (Alharbi, 2013). 
Let the cover pixel value    = 7 = (000000000001010)Pr and the secret bit be 1. Replacing the 
1
st
 LSB by the secret bit makes the prime representation of the corresponding stego pixel value 
becomes (000000000001011)Pr and by returning this stream of bits back into decimal the 
corresponding stego pixel value becomes 8. At the receiver, the prime representation of the 
stego pixel value 8 = (000000000010000)Pr. Extracting from the stego pixel‘s LSB, the bit 0 is 
obtained, which is not the original embedded secret bit.  
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The Lucas sequence is defined using the same Fibonacci recurrence formula but is 
initiated by the L0=2 and L1=1, i.e. the sequence is {2, 1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 18, 29, 47, 76, 123, 
199}.  Unfortunately, this scheme is not different to the others in relation to objectives, 
structure, advantages and disadvantages in terms of capacity and stego-image quality.  
All these different schemes, that share the same objectives and structure, have been 
based on using sequences that have been of interest in mathematics and number theory, 
and we noted that they share the same theoretical disadvantages in terms of capacity. 
One might ask whether the choices of mathematically interesting sequences have played 
any significance in these choices and whether there are any unforeseen advantages that 
could be exploited in steganography. One could also ask whether decomposition 
schemes can be exploited for different objectives in steganography.   
Faced with these, I first investigated a 16-bit planes image decomposition sequence 
{1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32}, which is not known for its 
mathematical significance beyond a trivial observation that all but the first one are even 
integers, and defined an embedding technique to embed secrets in high bit-planes 
(Abdulla, et al., 2014). Unlike all the above schemes, we can embed in all pixels if we 
only use the LSB, i.e. capacity is the same as the LSBR.  Otherwise, it has most of the 
other disadvantages.   
To test where there are unforeseen advantages in the decomposition scheme, in 
Chapter 6, we shall revisit these schemes and test their performance for various 
purposes that relate embedding efficiency and security, and we shall design a new 
decomposition scheme outperform all the existing decomposition schemes in terms of 
these objectives.  
3.1.3 Location\Region based embedding Approaches 
In the above two sections, no specific criteria were used to adapt the embedding of 
the secret bits in the sense that the pixel of the cover to have the next bit embedded into 
could be anywhere in the image. In fact, in most schemes, the choice of embedding 
positions within a cover image mainly depends on a PRNG without considering the 
relationship between the cover image content itself and the size of the secret message. 
Even when some pixels skipped in the schemes reviewed in Section 3.1.2, this was not 
done because of the cover image content but the pixel value decomposition.  
For improved security in terms of un-detectability, embedding techniques have been 
developed to hide secret bits in textured regions and regions that could be confused with 
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noise, but perhaps at the expense of limiting payload capacity. However, region-based 
schemes also include embedding in both edge regions as well as smooth regions with 
different proportions so that more secret bits are embedded in textured regions. In other 
words, the regions of edges present more complicated statistical features and are highly 
dependent on the image content; therefore, it is more difficult to observe changes at the 
edges than those in smooth regions. Images that have more edge areas can overcome the 
limitation of capacity. Embedding in smooth/flat regions of the cover images, results in 
poor visual quality and low security especially for those images with many smooth 
regions (Luo, et al., 2010).  
The Sobel, Prewitt, Canny, and Laplacian are the most popular edge detection 
techniques that can help in identifying edge pixel regions to be used for embedding, but 
some researchers use other variants of gradient method for edge detection. The 
embedding scheme proposed in (Chen, et al., 2010), uses Canny edge detector, and the 
authors argue that this yields increased capacity because more edge pixels are detected 
compared to other edge detectors. Chen et al. scheme uses higher bit-planes for 
improved capacity, but their claim on security and robustness against statistical 
steganalysis tools is not substantiated by experimental evidence. However, edge based 
embedding techniques have a problem with determining the same edge area by the 
receiver because the act of embedding in an edge area could change the original edge 
pixels into a non-edge pixels. In other words, a pixel that is detected as an edge point 
before embedding the secret bit may not be detected as an edge point after message 
embedding. Thus, some parts of a secret message may be lost. In the literature, different 
approaches have been suggested to dealing with this problem, but in any case when an 
edge pixel is selected for embedding a secret bit one must make sure that the act of 
embedding will not make a non-edge pixel. It has been suggested that embedding more 
secrets in sharp edges than in faint/blur edges (Iranpour, 2013).  
In 2007, (Singh, et al., 2007) proposed an embedding technique where each pixel is 
labelled as an edge pixel if the Laplacian operator applied to its 3x3 neighbours is larger 
than a fixed threshold  . The scheme then embeds 1 bit in each edge pixel not by LSB 
replacement but using a probabilistic model to guarantee that the pixel remains an edge 
pixel after embedding. The authors calculate the maximum embedding capacity to be 
relatively low (1/9   11.1%).  
Hempstalk proposed the FilterFirst hiding scheme which aims to overcome the 
problem of extracting the secret bit from the correct edge pixels by first setting the LSB 
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of every cover image pixel to 0, then extracting edges pixels using Sobel (or any edge 
detector) and use LSBR for embedding in the edge pixels (Hempstalk, 2006). They also 
extended this scheme whereby the edge pixels are determined after vanishing the first 2 
or more LSB‘s. As a result, FilterFirst can guarantee to retrieve the secret information 
from the same edge pixels used for hiding, because the bit-planes used for filtering are 
not changed by the hiding process. Although this technique can embed most secret data 
along sharper edges and can achieve more visually imperceptible stego-images, but 
again it has lower capacity than LSBR.  
Geetha and Giriprakash proposed an embedding technique that adopts a Variable 
Embedding Ratio (VER) approach to embed secrets with higher ratio in edge regions 
with the aim of improving capacity, increasing the secrecy and un-detectability of the 
embedded message (Geetha & Giriprakash, 2012). For increased capacity, the Canny 
edge-detector is repeated three times to detect more edge regions and embeds 4 secret 
bits in edge pixels and two secret bits in non-edge pixels. The constant VER ratio of 4:2 
does not distinguish between sharp edges and not so sharp ones. However, this scheme 
assumes the receiver has the original cover to recover secrets that are lost during 
embedding.  
The use of VER goes back to 2003, when Wu and Tsai proposed the pixel value 
differencing (PVD) steganography scheme that embeds more secret bits in edge areas 
than in smooth areas (Wu & Tsai, 2003). The authors claim that their technique 
provides an easy way to produce a more secure result than those yielded by simple LSB 
replacement methods. Instead of using edge detectors, PVD first partitions the cover 
image into non-overlapping blocks of two consecutive pixels,    and     , and process 
these pairs in a zigzag manner. For each block, the absolute difference               
is calculated, with           . Split the interval of   values into a number of 
contiguous ranges,    (         . A block with   close to 0 is considered to be an 
extremely smooth block, whereas a block with   close to 255 is considered as a sharply 
edged block. The number of bits to be embedded in each block varies and depends by 
the range that   belongs to. Less secret bits are embed in blocks that have a smaller 
index (i.e. smooth blocks) and more secret bits are embed in blocks that have higher 
index (i.e. edge blocks). Finally, the difference value is replaced by a new value to 
embed the value of a sub-stream of the secret bits, the sub-stream of secret message 
converts to decimal value then replaced with the value of  . To illustrate this rather 
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complicated procedure that depends on certain equations, we present an example and 
readers interested in the details are referred to (Wu & Tsai, 2003) 
The method is designed in such a way that the modification is never out of the range 
interval. The secret bits can be retrieved at the receiver side by first segmenting the 
stego-image into non-overlapping blocks of two consecutive pixels, and then calculating 
the absolute difference between the two pixels in the block. The value of  , and its 
range, determines the number of secret bits to be extracted. The PVD steganography 
technique has higher capacity but lower stego-image quality comparing to the LSBR 
(cover pixels‘ value might change by more than 1) and has poor resistance to some 
statistical steganalysis tools (Luo, et al., 2010). The most important drawback of PVD 
based approaches is that only horizontal differences, i.e. vertical edges are used for 
embedding, while there are also many horizontal edges in the cover images which are 
not used in this approach, reported in (Iranpour, 2013). 
Another elaborate steganography technique is presented by (Chang & Tseng, 2004) 
that associate with each pixel  , the difference   between value at   and the average 
value of its upper and left neighbours. The first row and the first column of the cover 
image are excluded for data embedding. Larger   indicates sharper edge pixel. The 
scheme embeds more bits in pixels whose   values are higher using a different formula 
than that used in the PVD scheme, to decide the number of bits to be embedded. The 
number of bits, say  , which can be embedded in the pixel   is calculated by   
        if      , otherwise only one bit is embedded. This scheme has a higher 
capacity than LSBR but less capacity than the PVD. In addition, the stego quality is 
lower than that for LSBR, since cover pixels value might change by more than 1.  
(Luo, et al., 2010) use a similar idea of thresholding neighbouring pixel value 
differences to select edge pixels. However, the threshold is dependent on the size of the 
secret and cover image content.  Prior to determining the neighbouring pixel value 
differences, the cover image is divided into 4 blocks, and each is rotated by a random 
degree selected from the set of {0, 90, 180, 270}. The transformed cover image is 
Assume the two-pixel block    and      are 50 and 65. The difference                = 15, 
which is in the range of 8 through 23. Based on this range, the   can be used to embed 4 secret 
bits. If the 4 secret bits is 1010, then add its decimal value to the lower bound value of the 
range which becomes 18. The algorithm uses a special equation to change the two pixel values 
to the pixel values become 48 and 66. The receiver calculate the difference    =18 and uses 
another equation to recover the decimal 10 of the secret. 
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divided into non-overlapping blocks of two pixels, and the absolute differences between 
adjacent pixels, are thresholded, to select the embedding regions.  The secret bits are 
embedded in the pixels of the selected region/edges areas using LSB matching revisited 
(LSBMR) scheme.  This scheme is adaptive: For lower embedding rate, only sharper 
edge regions are used for embedding, and as embedding rate increases more edge 
regions can be released adaptively for data hiding by adjusting just a few cover image 
content-based parameters. These parameters and the angles of rotation becomes a side 
information (i.e. a key) that need to be transmitted (by hiding) to the receiver.  Using the 
side information, the receiver identifies the selected regions, and the secret bits are 
retrieved using the extraction process of LSBMR embedding algorithm. The embedding 
algorithm has been shown to be robust against statistical steganalysis techniques such as 
RS compared to LSBR based and PVD.  However, the stego quality is more affected 
comparing to LSBR, since in some cases cover pixels value may change by more than 
1.   
Huang and Ouyang state that beside of smooth areas, some edge areas are also 
sensitive to be used for hiding data (Huang & Ouyang, 2010). Their algorithm avoids 
embedding in pixels belonging to fragile regions in a cover image (pixels for which 
embedding one bit results in changes to its differences with many of its neighbours). 
Regions, such as smooth or frequent figure patterns, a region with regular changes in 
pixel values are called fragile region. The algorithm extends the use of absolute 
difference to all the 8 neighbour of a candidate pixel. It counts the number of 
surrounding pixels for which differences with centre exceeds a given threshold T, and if 
the count is greater than a constant C, then a secret bit can be embedded. In other words, 
this algorithm tries to maintain local texture in the stego-image, and thereby it is secure 
because of less chance of detectability.   After region selection, Huang and Ouyang use 
LSBMR for embedding in the non-fragile pixels. The receiver detects non-fragile pixels 
in the same way and extracts the secret from these pixels. The scheme is more robust 
against the steganalysis technique of (Ker, 2005) compared to usual LSBMR 
embedding technique, but it has a limitation of payload capacity. Moreover the 
thresholds T and C must be exchanged. 
In 2013, Iranpour modified the FilterFirst scheme, by using a special method to 
determine the sharpness of edges that are extracted using the Sobel edge detector after 
they ignore the first p bit-planes (Iranpour, 2013). The other difference with FilterFirst 
is that the embed up to p-bits in the first p bit-planes depending on the level of 
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sharpness of the edge pixels so that the number of bits embedding in the sharper edges 
should be more than the ones in the weaker edges.  The sharpness threshold T depends 
on the length of the secret message, and embedding is first done in the sharper edges 
before embedding in the weaker edges and the smooth regions. They claim that this 
algorithm has significantly enhanced the security against RS steganalysis, increased 
capacity, and has almost the same stego-image quality as the LSBR.  
Finally, in the recent years, Fridrich and her group has developed a strategy to 
constrain secret embedding to noisy or textured regions (determined by appropriately 
defined distortion functions) and avoiding smooth and clean edge regions (Holub & 
Fridrich, 2012) (Holub, et al., 2014). The idea is based on the fact that complex texture 
or noisy areas are difficult to model directly, but their distortion can be approximated by 
certain functions that relate a pixel to its surrounding region. This approach improves 
resistance to steganalysis techniques that use rich models such as (Fridrich & 
Kodovsky, 2012). In their latest approach, they proposed a steganography technique 
based on a defined distortion function called UNIWARD, which stands for universal 
wavelet relative distortion (Holub, et al., 2014), which is similar to their previous 
proposed approach in (Holub & Fridrich, 2012) but it is suitable for embedding in an 
arbitrary domain, namely spatial and frequency domain, and it is an extended version of 
(Holub & Fridrich, 2013). This proposed distortion function is defined as the sum of the 
relative changes of all wavelet coefficients with respect to the cover image. In other 
words, it is a sum of relative changes between the stego and cover images represented in 
the wavelet domain (Holub, et al., 2014). The UNIWARD function depends on a bank 
of wavelet multiple directional high-pass filters called filter bank to obtain the so called 
directional residuals, which are related to the predictability of the pixel in a certain 
direction. By measuring the impact of embedding on every directional residual, the 
predictable in at least one direction is considered as smooth or clean edge pixel, while 
unpredictable in every direction that is considered as textured or noisy pixel. Next, the 
Syndrome Trellis Codes embedding technique (Filler, et al., 2011) is used to embed the 
secret bits after textured, or noisy pixels are identified.  
Steganography schemes based on designing distortion functions to identify the 
texture and noisy regions have a property of increasing the security for the 
steganography systems, but limit the capacity when the cover image contains high ratio 
of smooth regions. Furthermore, currently, all the steganography techniques based on 
defined distortion functions proposed by Fridrich and her group are un-detectable only 
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when the amount of embedded payload not exceeds 0.5 bpp. To overcome these 
limitations, namely capacity and detectability, it would be ideal to design steganography 
techniques that produces fewer changes and has high embedding efficiency without the 
need to exclude smooth regions or clean edge pixels. Ker et al. highlighted this problem, 
i.e. design efficient embedding schemes, as an important open problem to address in 
future research (Ker, et al., 2013). In the next section, image-based steganography 
approaches that concern on improving embedding efficiency are reviewed.  
3.1.4 High Embedding Efficiency Approaches  
In image-based steganography, embedding efficiency is defined by (Fridrich & 
Soukal, 2006) as the ratio of number of cover image pixels whose value change as a 
result of embedding to the size of a secret message. The concept of embedding 
efficiency has been first introduced by (Crandall, 1998), and was first adopted by 
(Westfeld, 2001) for embedding in DCT domain. It has since been accepted as an 
important attribute of steganography schemes that directly influencing their security, 
because smaller number of embedding changes is less likely to disrupt statistic 
properties of the cover image (Fridrich, et al., 2007). Thus, schemes that employ high 
embedding efficiency generally have better security, and they produce stego-images 
with minimal distortion while maintaining payload capacity.  
A formal definition of steganography security was given by (Cachin, 1998) in terms 
of detectability of the hidden data in a stego-image, and the concept of embedding 
efficiency is an essential indicator of steganography security. The detectability of a data 
hidden in a stego-image is influenced by many factors, such as the choice of the cover 
object, the selection rule used to identify individual elements of the cover that could be 
modified during embedding, the type of the embedding operation that modifies the 
cover elements, and the number of embedding changes relative to the secret message 
length. Assuming two embedding techniques share the same source of cover object, the 
same selection rule and embedding operation, the one that introduces fewer embedding 
changes will be less detectable as it decreases the chance that any statistic used by the 
warden will be sufficiently disturbed to mount a successful steganalysis attack (Fridrich, 
et al., 2007).   
For the LSBR or LSBM schemes, the probability of pixel change is 0.5, i.e. on 
average, such algorithms add 0.5p of the noise in the cover image pixels, where p is the 
embedding rate in bits/pixel. In other words, the embedding efficiency of LSBR or 
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LSBM embedding based techniques is 2 (Westfeld, 2001). Ker et al. highlighted the 
open problems in steganography and steganalysis in future research, and design efficient 
embedding schemes is addressed as an important problem (Ker, et al., 2013). So far, 
steganography approaches that focused on designing a high embedding efficiency and 
minimising the noise due to message embedding are very limit. Therefore, achieving 
high embedding efficiency is a fundamental objective that we aspire to achieve in this 
thesis. 
The matrix encoding technique proposed by (Crandall, 1998) was probably the first 
attempt to improve embedding efficiency. In matrix encoding, to embed k bits secret 
message, it needs to employ 2
k
 – 1 pixels in the cover image and at most one pixel is 
changed by one from each group. The following example illustrates how the matrix 
encoding algorithm hides 2 bits secret message m1 and m2 into 3 cover pixels (Note that 
only one of three cover pixels is meant to change). Let a=[a1 a2 a3] be the LSB of the 3 
cover pixels. Embedding works by changing one of the values as follows: 
          m1 =  a1 ⊕ a3 , m2 = a2 ⊕ a3    ⇒  change nothing 
m1 ≠  a1 ⊕ a3 , m2 = a2 ⊕ a3    ⇒  change a1 
m1 =  a1 ⊕ a3 , m2 ≠ a2 ⊕ a3    ⇒  change a2 
m1 ≠  a1 ⊕ a3 , m2 ≠ a2 ⊕ a3    ⇒  change a3 
In all four cases, we do not change more than one bit. The most important advantage 
of using matrix encoding is that it decreases the number of necessary pixels which must 
be changed, 25% are changed when k =2, while it limits the payload capacity, 67% on 
average. In general, embedding k bits using this method, increases embedding 
efficiency to 2
k
 but limits the capacity to k/(2
k
 – 1).  Thus, such kinds of embedding 
techniques are not useful for those applications that require full capacity, i.e., 
embedding one secret bit per cover pixel.  
To further improve efficiency while maintaining payload capacity, Mielikainen 
proposed a variant of LSBM, called  LSB matching revisited (LSBMR), which employs 
the binary function in equation (3.1) to embed two secret bits, namely mi and mi+1, in a 
pair of pixels xi and xi+1.  
                 
  
 
                (3. 1) 
This results in two stego pixels, yi and yi+1, where at most one is different from the cover 
pair using the procedure in Figure 3.1 (Mielikainen, 2006). After embedding message, 
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the LSB of the i
th
 stego pixel yi represents the i
th
 secret bit mi, and the LSB of the result 
of the binary function represents the (i+1)
th
 secret bit mi+1.  Theoretically, this function 
reduces the probability of changing pixel values from 0.5 to 0.375, i.e. the embedding 
efficiency has been increased to 2.66 compared to LSBR and LSBM. However, these 
improvements come at the expense of limited payload capacity because LSBMR 
algorithm cannot be performed on saturated pixels, i.e. pixels that have either a minimal 
or maximal allowable value (0 or 255). But this limitation is negligible compared to the 
matrix encoding embedding technique. Moreover, LSBMR has better resistance to 
steganalysis techniques comparing to LSBM embedding technique. Furthermore, 
LSBMR does not have LSBR style imbalance. LSBMR also has a property of visual 
imperceptibility, since the cover pixel‘s value should change by one. Thus, it is difficult 
to notice by the naked eye.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Pseudo-Code of the LSBMR embedding technique. 
In 2009, Chan proposed another embedding scheme that aims to further reduce the 
number of modified cover pixels, and like above scheme uses a binary function defined 
consecutive pixels but it attempts to embed a number of secret bits by successive 
application of the function on a number of consecutive pixels until the output of the 
function is different to the secret bit aligned with the last pixel (Chan, 2009). Figure 3-2 
illustrates this method. The function is defined in equation (3.2) by XORing the 2
nd
 bit 
of the previous pixel with the LSB of the current pixel, if the result matches the next 
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secret bit then continue to the next pixel without making any change otherwise either 
add 1 or -1 according to whether the outcome of the function applied to the next pixel is 
a match or not.   
              
    
 
  ⊕           (3. 2) 
where     represents the pixel value at the position  , and ⊕ is the exclusive OR 
operator. 
This proposed approach is not only superior to Mielikainen‘s approach in terms of 
higher embedding efficiency but also it has higher capacity since every cover pixel can 
be used for embedding. Figure 3-2 presents the decision tree of the data embedding 
procedure and an example of data embedding. In this figure,    is the first position with 
different values,    is the original pixel at position  ,    is the secret bit,    is the 
modified pixel value at position   , and the symbol          indicates the complement 
of the least significant bit of   . In the data extraction procedure, the secret bits can be 
obtained by computing        where    represents the pixel value at position   of the 
stego-image. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3-2: Chan‘s approach (a) The decision tree of the data embedding procedure (b) An example. 
The experimental results reported in (Chan, 2009) demonstrated that this scheme 
achieves higher embedding efficiency than LSBMR. They report that embedding a 
secret Lenna image of size 256 x 128 ( i.e. 262144 bits) in a Lenna cover image of size 
512 x 512, only 87374 cover pixels are changed; while the LSBMR results in 98176 
changed pixels. This improvement may be dependent on the secret and the cover 
images. Again, when a cover pixels change, its values either increase or decrease by 1, 
and hence it does not have the asymmetry problem as LSBR has, i.e. has better 
resistance to steganalysis techniques comparing to LSBR based embedding techniques. 
     =      
 =  -  +   
Yes No 
Case 1 
Yes No 
  =   - 1   =  + 1 
Case 2 
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In 2013, Iranpour and Farokhian generalise the last two schemes and increases the 
embedding efficiency by using three binary functions to embed three secret bits in three 
cover pixels in a similar way to the LSBMR schemes (Iranpour & Farokhian, 2013). 
Note that the secret bits themselves are not directly embedded/extracted into/from the 
cover/stego pixels‘ LSB, but they are embedding or extracting from the results of the 
following three defined functions: 
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     (3. 5) 
 
For embedding three secret bits into three cover pixels, eight cases may occur with 
any combination of three secret bits with the results of three defined functions. When 
there is no match, the scheme either adds 1 or -1 based on equations (3.6), and (3.7).    
Figure 3-3 presents the eight occurred cases when three secret bits (mi, mi+1, and mi+2) 
are embedded in three cover pixels (xi, xi+1, and xi+2) based on the following two defined 
rules for modifying the value of a pixel: 
 
       
                 
                 
    (3. 6) 
 
       
                 
                 
  (3. 7) 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Illustration of the (Iranpour & Farokhian, 2013)  for the eight cases. 
From Figure 3-3, you can notice that except for one case, in all other cases at most 
one pixel out of three pixels is modified, either increased or decreased by one. Although 
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all three cover pixels should be modified in only one case, it is not sever drawback of 
this proposed technique, because the probability of this happening is estimated 
experimentally to be <4.2% (Iranpour & Farokhian, 2013). Furthermore, theoretically, 
in this embedding technique the probability of changing cover pixel value is 0.375, i.e. 
the embedding efficiency is 2.66, which is the same as LSBMR embedding technique 
(Mielikainen, 2006). However, the authors demonstrate higher efficiency in practice. 
Thus, this approach sets a new state of the art in terms of embedding efficiency. 
Additionally, this embedding technique has good visual imperceptibility. Finally, this 
proposed embedding technique does not have LSBR style imbalance, namely, 
asymmetry problem.  The only limitation of this embedding technique is capacity, since 
pixels that have either a minimal or maximal allowable value cannot be used for 
message embedding. Moreover, this embedding technique allows the same amount of 
embedding as LSBMR (Mielikainen, 2006) but with fewer changes to the cover image 
pixels. 
3.2 Image-based Steganalysis Approaches 
Whilst steganographers aim to design steganography techniques; steganalysers 
attempt to defeat the goal of steganography by detecting the presence of a hidden 
message, but not necessarily to retrieve the secret. There are number of existing image-
based steganalysis techniques to determine the presence/absence of a hidden message 
and estimate the size of the embedded secret message. In Chapter 2, we gave a brief 
description of the classifications of the steganalysis tools into targeted and universal, and 
statistical and structural. For robustness in terms of resisting steganalysis attacks, un-
detectability is the main success criteria (i.e. stego-images should be statistically 
undistinguishable from cover images) (Fridrich & Goljan, 2004). In this section, we 
review some of the most common steganalysis techniques that we used to test and 
examine the un-detectability/security of our steganography schemes. 
1. Pairs of Value (PoV) 
The PoV, also known as Chi-Square steganalysis, uses the statistical Chi-square test 
(Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 2000) to test if the LSB plane of a suspect image is statistically 
different from that of natural images in terms of changes in the pairs of consecutive 
grayscale values (i.e. 0 ↔ 1, 2 ↔ 3, …, 254 ↔ 255). This is based on the fact that 
LSBR schemes change the distributions of the pairs. Note that in LSBR schemes, pixel 
value 2 will never become 1 or vice versa after embedding the secret bit. Flipping the 
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pair of values     ↔        (i = 0, 1, …, 127), as a  result of embedding 1 bit may result 
in many pairs of pixels that have PoV (   ,      ) become of equal values and hence 
change the frequency distributions of these values.  As the number of pixels for which 
LSB has been replaced increases, the frequencies of both values of each PoV tend to 
become equal. But the sum of them (   ,     ) stays the same. Thus, the arithmetic 
mean of sum, as in equation (3. 8), can be taken as the theoretically expected frequency 
in the Chi-square test for the frequency of occurrence of     or      . Then the Chi-
square statistic may be given as in equation (3. 9) and the probability of embedded 
payload ( ) can be calculated by equation (3. 10).   
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Where    =     , and     is a degree of freedom. 
 
         
 
 
   
    
   
   
   
 
   
   
      
    
 
 
   (3. 10) 
 
Where,    is the probability of embedding the secret message, and   is the Euler 
Gamma function. 
Testing any suspect image against the PoV tool generates a plot from which one can 
determine an estimate of the embedded secret. For example, if the PoV steganalysis 
output a plot similar to that in Figure 3-4 then the image is considered as a natural 
image. But an output plot similar to those in Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6 indicate that with 
a high probability the image has been embedded with 50% and 100% capacity 
respectively.  
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Figure 3-4:Example of PoV plot for cover image Lenna (without embedding). 
 
                        
Figure 3-5:Example of PoV plot for stego image Lenna (50% embedding). 
 
                       
Figure 3-6:Example of PoV plot for stego image Lenna (100% embedding). 
To test robustness of any embedding scheme against PoV, most researchers use a 
small number of stego-images, since each tested image it has own plot.  
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2. Regular and Singular groups (RS) 
The RS steganalysis is a structural targeted tool that differs from the PoV in that it 
does not rely on the statistical analysis of the LSB plane. On its own, the LSB plane is a 
random variable but has no easily recognizable structure and its statistical parameters 
vary for different type of images, and cannot relied on to detect distortion of the LSB 
plane.  However, the LSB plane has known correlation with other bit-planes, which are 
exploited by the RS steganalysis technique for the detection of LSB embedding in 
grayscale images (Fridrich, et al., 2001).  
The RS tool is based on the analysis of the relative frequency between the so called 
Regular groups (R) and Singular groups (S) of image pixels depending upon some 
properties.  These groups are defined in terms of the effect of random flipping the LSB 
values using two pixel functions:    changes a pixel value so that 0 ↔ 1, 2 ↔ 3, 4 ↔ 
5,..., 254 ↔ 255 and     changes a pixel value so that  −1 ↔  0, 1 ↔  2, 3 ↔  4, ..., 255 
↔ 256. RM is the ratio of the groups of pixels for which the total number fluctuations 
increases when    is applied to the groups with the mask M = [0 1 1 0], and SM is the 
ratio of groups for which the total of fluctuations decreases when   is applied to the 
blocks with the mask M. Similarly, RM- and SM- are defined but with     , instead 
of   . Fridrich et al. found that the RS ratio of a natural image should satisfy the rule: 
RM   RM- and SM   SM- through a large number of experiments. If LSB of the cover 
pixel is changed, the difference between RM and RM- and the difference between SM 
and SM- increases and hence the above rule is violated; therefore, one could conclude 
that the tested image carries a secret message. Table 3-1 and Figure 3-7 respectively, 
illustrate an example of RS results and diagram of the cover and its stego-image 
carrying different payload ratios, using LSBR technique, for Lenna image. We note that 
when the payload capacity p = 0 %, i.e. cover without an embedded message, the value 
of RM is close to RM-, and the value of SM is close to SM-.  By increasing the rate of 
the embedded payload, the difference between RM and RM- is increased, and also the 
difference between SM and SM- is increased.  
Table 3-1: RS steganalysis for Lenna image. 
p  0 %  25 %  50 %  75 % 100 % 
RM 40.52 38.38 36.28 34.37 32.39 
SM 24.09 25.89 27.87 29.74 31.71 
RM- 40.06 42.13 44.24 46.29 48.29 
SM- 24.42 22.86 21.27 20.04 18.86 
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Figure 3-7: RS diagram for Lenna image. The x- axis is a ratio of flipped LSBs; the y-axis is the (RM, 
RM-, SM, SM-). 
3. Difference Image Histogram (DIH) 
This statistical steganalysis technique could not only detect the existence of the 
hidden messages in the cover image but also estimate the amount of hidden messages 
with extreme precision (Zhang & Ping, 2003). Difference image histogram (DIH) is 
defined as follows: For an image   define the difference image D as the horizontal 
gradient image: 
                         (3. 11) 
The DIH is defined as the histogram of the difference image . This technique works 
first by flipping all the bits in the LSB plane of the tested image, and second by setting 
zeros value to all the bits in the LSB plane of the tested image, and then doing a 
difference comparison based on DIH with the original image. Zhang and Ping found 
that there exist the difference between the DIH for natural images and images obtained 
after flipping the LSB plane (Zhang & Ping, 2003). Translation coefficients between 
difference image histograms are defined as a measure of the weak correlation between 
the LSB plane and the remaining bit-planes (Zhang & Ping, 2003). These translation 
coefficients are relationships between DIH of the original image and images obtained 
after flipping the LSB plane. This correlation can be used to construct classifiers that 
discriminate between cover and stego-image. They claim that translation coefficients for 
natural images there exists a weak correlation between the LSB plane and the remained 
bit-planes. As more and more secret bits are embedded, such correlation becomes 
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weaker and weaker, and finally the LSB plane becomes independent of remaining bit-
planes.   
When an image is submitted to this steganalysis technique, a real number between 0 
to 1 is the output which should indicate the probability of having a secret hidden with 
the output ratio, 0 means the tested image is a cover and 1 it means the tested image is 
considered as stego with embedding rate = 100%.  DIH values close to 0 indicates less 
suspicion of a stego and/or a very short secret is been estimated.       
4. Weighted Stego (WS) 
It is another targeted steganalysis technique proposed by (Fridrich & Goljan, 2004) 
and aims to estimate the secret message length embedded in a digital image using 
LSBR. This is done by defining an optimisation problem obtained by considering all 
possible pixel change ratios.  WS works as follows: 
 Let          
  be a column vector of integers in the range [0, 255] representing a 
grayscale cover image with           pixels. Let    be the value of     after 
flipping its LSB, i.e.  
                      (3. 12) 
 Let        denote the stego image after embedding qn bits, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, in qn pixels 
randomly selected from the cover image   and for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 define       
     as the 
weighted stego image:  
  
   
             
 
 
  (3. 13) 
The       is the closest weighted stego-image to   in the least square approximation 
among all weighted stego-images     . Here, only the stego-image is available and 
therefore, we need to use    instead of    and    instead of   . Therefore, one can 
estimate the secret message length as the solution of the above optimisation problem. 
The least square estimation formula is derived as follows: 
     
 
 
         
 
   
                
(3. 14) 
 
Where,         is the estimated pixel value of stego-image from the neighbourhood and 
the filter: 
         
 
 
                              
(3. 15) 
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When an image is submitted to this steganalysis technique, then again a real number 
between 0 to 1 is output which should indicate the ratio of having a secret message 
length proportion to the cover size, 0 it means the tested image does not carry a secret 
message and 1 it means the tested image is considered as stego with embedding rate = 
100 %.  Moreover, the WS output value close to 0 indicates the image is less suspecting 
to be a stego and/or the secret message length is estimated as a very short message.       
5. Revisiting Weighted Stego (RWS) 
This steganalysis technique is proposed by (Ker & Bohme, 2008) as an improvement 
version of the WS tool with improved accuracy. In this steganalysis technique, there is a 
consideration in which for the embedding rate 100%, there should 50% of the cover 
pixels‘ LSB are flipped. In other words, the proportion      of the cover pixels are 
flipped when embedding a payload of length  , where   is the number of cover pixels. 
They modified the WS by upgrading the method‘s three components: 1) cover pixel 
prediction, by using different filter from used in WS, 2) least square weighting, and 3) 
bias correction, either the new moderated weights should be used or no weights needed 
at all depending on the smoothness nature of the tested image. Based on their analysis, 
the new moderate weight detector is more accurate for the images that are flat with less 
noise and texture, and no weight (un-weighted detector) needed for the images that 
contain more noise or texture (Ker & Bohme, 2008).  In 2013, Fridrich and Kodovsky 
demonstrated the benefits of using RWS for many applications. Moreover, the RWS is 
still be the better choice since it does not require any training phase and keeps the high 
accuracy (Kodovsky & Fridrich, 2013). 
When an image is submitted to RWS steganalysis, the output is a real number 
between 0 to 0.5 indicating the ratio of flipped cover pixels, 0 it means the tested image 
does not carry a secret message and 0.5 it means the tested image is considered as stego 
with embedding rate = 100%.   
6. LSB matching Steganalysis (LSBMS) 
The steganalysis techniques discussed earlier are designed to attack LSBR based 
embedding techniques, but are unable to detect the LSBM techniques. The most reliable 
and well-known steganalysis technique that is designed to defeat LSBM was proposed 
by (Ker, 2005) called LSB matching steganalysis. This steganalysis technique strategy 
is based on the known information about the energy distribution      of the histogram 
characteristic function (HCF) which is the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of the 
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histogram of any tested image. The histogram characteristic function centre of mass 
(HCF-COM), denoted by       , which is calculated by equation (3. 16), gives a 
general information about the HCF, can be exploited to capture the effect of the additive 
noise.  
 
         
             
            
   (3. 16) 
 
Where, n = N/2 to avoid the redundant parts of the DFT, and N = 256 (number of 
intensity values for 8-bits grayscale image from 0 to 255), and k=0,.., N/2.  
The        can successfully detect the hiding schemes that act as additive noise. 
Ker's experimental results showed that the HCF-COM based steganalysis method 
performed quite well for colour images, but it turned out to have very poor performance 
for grayscale images due to the high variability of the cover images' HCF. Therefore, a 
down-sampled image by a factor of two in both dimensions and processed by a 
straightforward averaging filter was employed to calibrate the HCF-COM of the full-
sized image. In view of the variation between the magnitudes of the HCF-COM of a 
tested image, denoted by        , and that of the down-sampled image, denoted 
by         , the ratio                   is then proposed as a dimensionless 
discriminator.  
When                , the tested image is considered cover image, while if the 
tested image is stego, there should                . Another way of applying the 
HCF-COM is also introduced by computing the adjacency histogram. The author 
claimed that this designed steganalysis technique is also detect other types of 
steganography beside of LSBM based steganography techniques.  
7. Spatial Rich Model (SRM) 
This steganalysis technique differs from previous mentioned steganalysis techniques 
earlier in that it is a universal steganalysis while others were targeted steganalysis. 
Unlike the above steganalysis tools,  SRM steganalysis technique was not designed for 
real life application since it needs a large training sets and high dimensional feature 
spaces (Ker, et al., 2013) (Holub, et al., 2014).  Also, SRM steganalysis only detects 
whether the tested image is a cover or stego without estimating the embedded message 
length (Fridrich & Kodovsky, 2012). SRM is based on feature extraction, and the goal is 
to capture a large number of different types of features reflecting dependencies among 
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neighbouring pixels to give the model the ability to detect a wide variety of embedding 
algorithms. The process starts with assembling a rich model of the noise component as a 
union of many diverse sub-models formed by joint distributions of neighbouring 
samples from quantized image noise residuals obtained using linear and non-linear 
high-pass filters. Multiple noise residuals can be defined as representing the image 
using a feature computed from image spatial domain noise components, and is called 
spatial rich model (SRM). The quantization makes the residual more sensitive to 
embedding changes at spatial discontinuities in the image (i.e.  edges and textures). The 
sub-models will be constructed from computing the correlation between neighbouring 
pixels in the horizontal, vertical, and diagonal directions. In total, 34671 sub-models/ 
features are computed. Finally, the proposed machine learning ensemble classifier in 
(Kodovsky, et al., 2012) is used to classify whether the image is a cover or a stego. 
Ensemble classifier consists of multiple classifiers to predict more accurately the class 
labels of unknown examples by aggregating the predictions of multiple classifiers (Tan, 
et al., 2006). An ensemble classifier usually adopts a weighted/unweighted majority 
vote on the predictions of the base classifiers.  
Security/detectability is quantified using the ensemble‘s ―out-of-bag‖ (OOB) 
error     , which is an unbiased estimate of the testing error, averaged, over multiple 
bootstrap samples of the image source during training. The image database is randomly 
splitting into two equal size groups training and testing group. The SRM strategy is 
performed on a given cover source and its stego version embedded with a fixed payload. 
The final evaluation of steganography techniques, output by SRM, is based on how 
many stego-images are identified and how many pass through undetected. 
3.3 An Overview of our Approach 
 
This thesis is concerned with hiding secret image files in image files. The message 
embedding is done in the spatial domain by concealing the secret bits in the cover pixels 
LSB (and in some cases in the 2
nd
 LSB). Our main objective is to design image-based 
steganography scheme that has the advantage of high embedding efficiency, acceptable 
stego-image quality, and low secret message detectability without compromising payload 
capacity. Obviously, achieving a high embedding efficiency leads to achieving a high 
message un-detectability/security while maintaining capacity, because when the 
embedding efficiency increases, the less detectable traces will be introduced in the stego-
image. Therefore, in order to enhance embedding efficiency, our main innovative 
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approach is first to increase the probability of similarity between the secret bits value and 
the cover pixels‘ LSB value. This will be achieved in 2 novel steps involving 
manipulation of both the cover image and the secret image that results a higher ratio of 
both the secret bits and the cover pixels‘ LSB having a value of zero than one. For the 
first step three algorithms are proposed, in Chapter 5, to pre-process the secret image 
prior to embedding so that the resulting secret bit-stream contains a higher number of 0 
bits than 1, but one of these algorithms also reduces the length of the secret bit-stream 
without losing information. For the second step in our increased similarity strategy, we 
investigate a number of pixel value decomposition techniques, in Chapter 6, and 
determine the best decomposition that achieves the highest number of 0 bits in the cover 
LSB plane. Finally, in Chapter 7, we exploit the above two steps strategy to propose a 
bit-plane(s) mapping embedding technique, instead of bit-plane(s) replacement in order 
to make each cover pixel can be used for secret embedding. We shall demonstrate that 
the combination of the mapping-based embedding scheme and the above two-steps 
strategy produces stego-images that have minimal distortion, i.e. reducing the number of 
the cover pixels changes after message embedding and increasing embedding efficiency.  
Finally, in order to evaluate our proposed image-based steganography techniques in 
terms of detectability/security, different kinds of common and well-known steganalysis 
tools are applied on the produced stego-images. 
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3.4 Summary 
 In this chapter, different image-based steganography approaches have been reviewed 
to conceal secrets. The spatial domain approaches included: approaches to hide secrets 
in cover pixels‘ LSB or other bit-planes; approaches based on different pixel value 
decomposition rather than the usual binary decomposition; approaches that embed in 
specific regions of cover images based on texture criteria; and approaches that they have 
high embedding efficiency. Embedding in the spatial domain has advantages over 
embedding in the frequency domain in terms of higher payload capacity and better stego 
visual quality. We also reviewed the most common steganalysis tools and these tools 
are used to evaluate the performance of our proposed embedding schemes in terms of 
embedded message detectability. Currently, the most successful image-based 
steganography approaches are those employ high embedding efficiency by producing a 
stego-image with minimal distortion, in order to resist steganalysis attacks. Finally, we 
presented an overview of the approaches adopted in this thesis and the main 
contributions planned to achieve high embedding efficiency, and robustness against 
steganalysis tools while maintaining capacity when the secrets are images. 
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Chapter 4  
Multi Bit-planes Image-based Steganography 
In this chapter, we initiate our research investigations into spatial domain image 
based steganography by developing and testing schemes that manipulate more than one 
bit-plane including the LSB plane to embed one or two secret bits. The main objectives 
are to improve un-detectability of the secret and/or capacity of embedding. First, in 
Section 4.1, we introduce an Indexing-based hiding scheme that embeds one secret bit 
in a way that depends on the first two LSBs of the cover image pixels, which will be 
shown experimentally to have improved un-detectability compared to LSBR while 
maintaining the same capacity of LSBR.  In the second scheme, we shall attempt to 
double capacity and improve un-detectability of the Indexing-based scheme. This 
second scheme, introduced in Section 4.2, uses a Mapping-based embedding to embed 
two secret bits in three LSBs of the cover image pixels represented by the Fibonacci 
pixel value decomposition. We shall demonstrate that this Mapping-based does meet the 
stated objectives on capacity and un-detectability. We shall also test both schemes for 
robustness against the three well-known targeted steganalysis tools (RS, DIH and RWS) 
described in Chapter 3. 
4.1 Bit-plane Indexing-based Embedding Scheme  
In this section, we present the first proposal for hiding a secret image into the spatial 
domain of a cover image which works by embedding a single bit secret by manipulating 
multiple cover image bit-planes for increased security without undermining capacity. 
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The incentive for this approach comes from a desire to improve the visual quality of 
existing schemes that embed in more one bit-plane. This approach is based on bit-planes 
index manipulation confined to the first two LSBs of the cover image. We shall present 
the results of a sufficiently large experiment conducted to test the performance of this 
scheme in terms of un-detectability and robustness against targeted steganalysis tools.  
Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed technique is secure against 
steganalysis techniques such as DIH, and RWS, while RS detects it. The developed 
scheme has the same payload capacity of LSBR but at the expense lower stego-image 
quality, and it was published in (Abdulla, et al., 2013)  
4.1.1 Embedding and Extracting Procedures 
Like any steganography scheme, this algorithm consists of two components, the 
embedding procedure and the extracting procedure. Although, the main focus of this 
thesis is on embedding secret images, this algorithm is equally applicable to hide any 
type of secrets. However, in the presented experimental results, the secrets are images of 
size 128x256 resulting in a secret of length 262144 bits.  
Embedding Procedure 
1. The cover image is first pre-processed by modifying the 2LSBs of each pixel in the 
original image so that they are not equal, i.e. 
        
                                     
                                     
                                      
  
 
 
        (4. 1) 
 
 
2. One secret bit is embedded in each pixel. The secret bit is first compared with the 
first LSB of the modified cover pixel. If they are equal, then record the index of the 
first LSB plane. Otherwise, record the index of the second LSB plane (i.e., record 0 
if the secret bit matches the first LSB; record 1 if the secret bit matches the second 
LSB). 
3. For the next secret bit, check the same similarity. This time the record value of the 
index must be different from the previous one because resulting vector of indices 
must be in form of 10s or 01s, i.e. if the previous index value was 1, the next index 
value must be 0, otherwise swap the first two LSBs of the cover pixel. 
4. Finally, the vector of indices is either of form 1 0 1 0….1 0   or 0 1 0 1 …. 0 1, i.e., 
each index value differs from the previous one by a circular shift of size 1. This 
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vector must be sent to the receiver in a form n(10) or n(01), n is the number of 
repeating 10s or 01s in a vector. For example, if there are one thousand secret bits, 
then the receiver should get 500 (10) or 500 (01). 
This algorithm makes two possible changes to the cover image and informs the 
receiver of the index sequence. The first change, eliminate the possibility of pixels 
having their 2LSB bit equal. This would mean that the 2LSB‘s of any pixel are 
different. Now index of the bit in the 2LSB of the cover pixel that matches the secret is 
recorded but the system first the 2LSB are swapped if they match the 2LSB of the 
previous pixel. We shall also give a specific example for embedding a 4-bit short 
secret in a 4-pixel image. 
 Example                                                                                                                                
If we have the secret bits 0 0 1 0, and the first two LSBs of the four pre-processed 
cover pixels are 01, 01, 10, 10.  The first secret bit (which is 0 here) is compared with 
the first LSB (which is 1) of the first selected cover pixel. Because they are not equal 
then we compare the secret bit with second LSB (which is 0), now they are equal, and 
we record the index value 1 indicating that the secret bit is similar to the second LSB of 
the selected cover pixel. The next secret bit (which is 0) is compared with the first LSB 
of the next selected cover pixel (which is 1), because they are not equal then the secret 
bit must be compared with the second LSB (which is 0) and now they are equal but 
cannot record the index value 1 because the previous index value was 1, in this case do 
the swapping between the first and second LSB, i.e. change 01 to 10, and now the secret 
bit is similar to the first LSB then record index value 0. Continuing in this way we get a 
vector of indices such (1, 0, 1, 0). Now the sender should send 2(10) to the receiver 
indicating 2 pairs of 10s.  
Extracting Procedure 
1. Depending on the n(10) / n(01) the receiver creates the vector of indices. 
2. If the element of the vector of indices is 0, it means the secret bit must be extracted 
from the first LSB of the selected stego pixel, otherwise (i.e. the element is 1) the 
secret bit must be extracted from the second LSB. All bits can be extracted by 
repeating this procedure.  
The extraction is a fairly simple once you know the pattern. If the first pattern is 
received, then starting from the first stego pixel, the secret bits are retrieved in pairs 
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either the 2
nd
 LSB from the current pixel and the LSB of the next pixel, vice-versa  if 
you receive  n(10) or n(01), respectively.   
4.1.2 Experimental Setup and Results 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed Indexing-based steganography scheme, 
we need to use a sufficiently large set of different types of secret images to be 
embedded into different cover images and evaluate the various measures associated 
with some of the steganography success criteria (embedding efficacy, un-detectability, 
and stego-image quality). We shall do these for different embedding payloads.  
Setup 
In our experiments, the Miscellaneous Volume of Signal and Image Processing 
Institute (SIPI) database of University of Southern California (Viterbi, 1981) is used to 
evaluate our proposed steganography system. This database consists of 44 different size 
images of which 16 are colour, and 28 are monochrome images. This database includes 
some standard images such as Lenna, Baboon, Peppers, Jet, Tiffany, Couple, Bridge, 
Pirate, House and Lake. We created two versions of these 44 images by resizing to 512 
x 512, and 128 x 256; and convert them into grayscale images with 8 bits per pixel. The 
reason of resizing these images to 128 x 256 is to make the number of bits that represent 
a secret image (262144 bits) equal to the number of cover image pixels which are of 
size 512 x 512.   
Three sets of experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
steganography system: The first is to measure the embedding efficiency, the second is 
to test the stego-image quality, and the third one is to measure the detectability/security 
of the embedded message. 
Results 
In each of the three experiments, we use each of the SIPI database 44 images size 
128 x 256 as a secret, after transforming into a binary stream, which were embedded in 
each of the 44 images of size 512 x 512, once with our scheme and once using the 
LSBR scheme for comparison.  In each experiment, the test is based on 5 different 
payload ratio (20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%) of the size of the secret stream. Note 
that for each tested steganography technique we tested a total of (44 x 44 = 1936) stego-
images.   
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1. Embedding Efficiency Evaluation 
 The results in these experiments are presented in two equivalent ways: the ratio of 
changed pixels to the embedded secret size (in Figure 4-1), and the formal efficiency 
values (in Figure 4-2). In both cases, the results are the averaged values over all the 
1936 stego-images.  
 
 
Figure 4-1: Ratio of modified pixels for the LSBR and Indexing-based embedding technique. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Embedding efficiency for the LSBR and Indexing-based embedding technique. 
From Figure 4-1, it is noticeable that our Indexing-based embedding technique 
causes a higher number of cover pixels to be changed than the LSBR, and hence has 
lower embedding efficiency, as presented in Figure 4-2. This seems to reflect the pre-
processing on the cover image and swapping the first two LSBs of the cover pixel. In 
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order to improve efficiency, perhaps we need to think of how to avoid the effect of the 
pre-processing and/or the swapping.   
2. Stego-Image Quality Evaluation 
Figure 4-3 presents the average value of the PSNR of the two tested steganography 
techniques at different embedding payloads. It is noticeable that for all payloads, the 
PSNR of the proposed Indexing-based embedding technique is lower than PSNR of the 
LSBR. This is because, in the Indexing-based embedding technique, the 2
nd
 LSB is also 
may change after message embedding. Also, these results reflect the low efficiency 
achieved by the Indexing-based scheme. 
 
Figure 4-3: The PSNR for the LSBR and Indexing-based embedding technique. 
3. Detectability Evaluation  
Three well-known steganalysis techniques (detectors) have been used to evaluate the 
detectability of the proposed steganography technique. These steganalysis techniques 
are RS, DIH, and RWS. (The detailed descriptions of these steganalysis tools were 
given in Chapter 3). 
Robustness Against RS Detector 
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 are presenting the RS diagram for the LSBR and our 
Indexing-based embedding techniques. It is noticeable that embedding higher rate of 
secret bits lead to an increase in the differences between RM and RM-, SM and SM-, 
indicating the presence of a secret message. Therefore, both the LSBR and the proposed 
Indexing-based technique are not robust against the RS detector. The reason is that pre-
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processing the cover image prior to secret embedding cause to change the cover pixel 
value, even if the secret bit is similar to the cover pixel‘s LSB.  
 
 
Figure 4-4: RS diagram for LSBR technique. 
 
Figure 4-5: RS diagram for the Indexing-based embedding technique. 
 
Robustness Against DIH Detector 
For each embedding ratio, the chart of Figure 4-6 presents the average values 
representing the probability of having a secret hidden with the given embedding ratio.  
These probabilities are estimated by a classification of the differences between 
histograms obtained from image differences between the image and the two types of 
flipped LSB‘s.    
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Figure 4-6: DIH steganalysis for LSBR and Indexing-based embedding technique. 
From Figure 4-6, one can see that embedding the secret images using the Indexing-
based technique is robust against the DIH. In fact, DIH ability to detect our scheme 
diminishes the more payload is embedded, while DIH predicts the presence of a secret 
embedded by the LSBR at higher than the actual payload for 20%, 40%, and 60%. The 
robustness of our scheme is that some of the secret bits are embedded in the 2
nd
 LSB, 
while the DIH tool is designed to detect the secret message that embedded in the 1
st
 
LSB. 
Robustness Against RWS Detector 
Figure 4-7 presents the average values of the estimation results of the flipped cover 
pixels‘ LSB of each tested steganography techniques after message embedding.  
 
  
Figure 4-7: RWS steganalysis for LSBR and Indexing-based embedding technique. 
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Figure 4-7, demonstrates beyond any doubts the robustness of our Indexing-based 
scheme against the RWS tool.  For all payloads, the RWS returns nearly 0% flipping of 
pixels LSB. In contrast, the LSBR detectable by the RWS by reporting the percentage 
of flipped is nearly 0.5 of the embedded message size. The same reasons that we 
mentioned above as to you our scheme is robust against the DIH can equally explain its 
robustness against RWS steganalysis tool.  
In summary, we find that this rather primitive attempt to use 2 LSBs for embedding 
one bit secret succeeded in improving robustness against two targeted LSB steganalysis 
tools and not succeed against a third one. However, this success comes at the expense of 
poorer stego visual quality and lower embedding efficiency. This raises the question can 
we maintain this level of robustness against these steganalysis tools and yet improve 
efficiency and/or visual quality?  The experience with this scheme, indicate that using 
other than the LSB of the cover image has helped in fooling the steganalysis tools, 
although changes were made.    
4.2 Fibonacci-Mapping based Embedding Scheme  
In this section, we present a second approach which investigates and designs to 
exploit the good properties of the Fibonacci decomposition of elongating the pixel bit 
representation and reducing the effect of changes to the first few LSB‘s. These benefits 
of Fibonacci decomposition encourage us to embed more than 1 bit into the first 3 LSBs 
and thereby increasing embedding capacity not increasing the chances of pixel changes. 
Existing Fibonacci embedding schemes still relies on bit replacement which will 
reduces the ability to embed in every pixel due to the fact that the process of replacing 
any bit could lead to violating the Zeckendorf theorem, see Chapter 3 for more detail.  
Our approach is designed to solve this problem and make all cover image pixels usable 
as candidates for embedding using an innovative idea that extends Fibonacci-like 
steganography by bit-plane(s) mapping instead of bit-plane(s) replacement. 
Experimental results will demonstrate that the ability to double the embedding capacity, 
compared to LSBR, and it is secure against steganalysis techniques such as RS, DIH, 
and RWS, (Abdulla, et al., 2013). 
4.2.1 Embedding and Extracting Procedures 
This scheme is based on a mapping table for embedding. First, the cover image 
pixels are to be decomposed by the Fibonacci sequence {1, 2, 3, 5, 8,…,233} into 
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unique 12 bit strings that adhere to the Zeckendorf condition where no two consecutive 
1‘s are allowed.  According to the Zeckendorf theorem, the probabilities of first three 
LSBs of a cover pixel in Fibonacci representation are (000, 001, 010, 100, 101). The 
Fibonacci-Mapping steganography scheme embeds two secret bits at a time by changing 
the first 3 LSBs of the Fibonacci decomposed pixels according to Table 4-1, below.  
Table 4-1: Fibonacci-Mapping Table. 
Cover bits 
Secret bits 
00 01 10 11 
000 000 001 100 101 
001 000 001 100 101 
010 010 001 100 101 
100 010 001 100 101 
101 010 001 100 101 
 
Note that, mapping the two secret bits into the 3 LSB cover pixels will only result in 
changing the LSB in half of the cases. Having said that, the use of the table also results 
in changing the other bit-planes.  
Secret Embedding: 
1. Use the mapping table to change the 3LSB of the input Fibonacci code according 
to the two bits of the input secret. 
2. Check: If the Zeckendorf theorem is violated (i.e. the resulting Fibonacci code = 
x…x11xx) then replace it with the Zeckendorf-compliant Fibonacci code 
(x…x01xx).  
Example 
  Let P be a cover pixel with the Fibonacci code: 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 and the two 
secret bits 11.  The mapping table changes P into the Fibonacci code: 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
which violates the Zeckendorf theorem, the checking step will output  
     0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Secret Extraction:  
At the receiver end, the secret message can be simply extracted as the first and third 
LSBs of the Fibonacci representation of the selected stego pixel value.   
This proposed Fibonacci-Mapping based embedding has the advantage of doubling 
capacity, since every cover pixel is used for message embedding and each pixel can 
carry two secret bits. However, this may result in more degradation and low stego 
quality, because the secret bits are embedded in higher bit-planes of the cover pixel. The 
extent of which this approach leads to degradation will be determined experimentally in 
the next section. 
4.2.2 Experimental Results 
In this subsection, we test the performance of the proposed scheme for embedding 
secret images using the same 44 images from the SIPI database according to the same 
experimental strategy used for the Indexing-based scheme. We created three versions of 
these 44 images by resizing to 512 x 512, 256 x 256 and 128 x 256. Each image in the 
last two versions is used as secret images to be embedded in each of the 44 images in 
the 512 x 512 version. The inclusion of the 256 x 256 version images as secrets is 
necessitated by the fact that our scheme has double the capacity of the LSBR scheme 
which means that we could not realise a full capacity embedding only by using the 128 
x 256 images. Our experiments will be conducted by embedding 5 payloads (20%, 40%, 
60%, 80%, 100%) for the LSBR and our scheme, but we will include an extra payload 
experiment for our Fibonacci-Mapping scheme at 200%. For each payload then we have 
a total of (44 x 44 = 1936) stego-images for each tested steganography technique. 
As before, three sets of experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed steganography system: The first is to measure the embedding efficiency, the 
second is to test the stego-image quality, and the third one is to measure the 
detectability/security of the embedded message. 
1. Embedding Efficiency Evaluation 
Figure 4-8 presents the average value of the ratio of modified pixels to the length of 
the secret bits, for both tested steganography techniques, and Figure 4-9 presents the 
average value of the embedding efficiency of the tested steganography techniques. 
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Figure 4-8: The ratio of the modified pixels for the LSBR and Fibonacci-Mapping based embedding 
technique. 
 
 
Figure 4-9: The embedding efficiency for the LSBR and Fibonacci-mapping based embedding technique. 
From Figure 4-8, it is clear that our Fibonacci-Mapping based embedding technique 
causes lower number of changed cover pixels after secret embedding compared to the 
LSBR, and consequently it has higher embedding efficiency, as presented in Figure 4-9. 
These improved results, compared to the performance of our earlier Indexing-based 
scheme, are achieved due to embedding two secret bits in one cover pixel.  
2. Stego-Image Quality Evaluation 
Figure 4-10 presents the average of the PSNR values of the stego-images relative to 
the cover images computed for the tested steganography techniques. Unfortunately, for 
all embedded message rate, the PSNR of the Fibonacci-Mapping embedding technique 
is lower than that achieved by the LSBR scheme. This is because, in the Fibonacci-
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Mapping scheme, the higher bit-planes may also change after message embedding. 
However, the PSNR achieved by this scheme is only marginally lower than achieved by 
the previous Indexing-based scheme, and yet we increased doubled the capacity. 
 
Figure 4-10: The PSNR for the LSBR and Fibonacci-Mapping based embedding technique. 
3. Detectability Evaluation 
Again, the three well-known steganalysis detectors (RS, DIH, and RWS) have been 
used to evaluate the detectability of the proposed steganography scheme.  
Robustness Against the RS Detector 
Figure 4-11 displays the RS diagram for the Fibonacci-Mapping scheme, from which 
it is clear that for all payloads, including the double capacity load, there are hardly any 
differences between RM and RM-, SM and SM-, demonstrating the robustness of the 
proposed scheme against the RS detector. The reason is that in this case, lower numbers 
of cover pixels are changed after secret embedding compared to LSBR and the 
Indexing-based scheme, since only one cover pixel may change by embedding two 
secret bits. Moreover, the LSB of most changed pixels remain unaffected and therefore 
RS is unable to detect significant changes. In fact, the combined of the effect of using 
the Fibonacci cover pixel decomposition and the mapping table show that only 10 out 
20 combinations result in changed LSB, i.e. probability of changed LSB is ≤ 50%. 
However, this upper bound of the probability of LSB change reduces significantly to 
about 18.3%, because for all embedding payloads only 36.6% of pixels change after 
embedding.  
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Figure 4-11: RS diagram for Fibonacci-Mapping scheme. 
 
Robustness Against DIH Detector 
For each embedding ratio, the chart of Figure 4-12 presents the average values 
representing the probability of having a secret hidden with the given embedding ratio.   
 
Figure 4-12: DIH steganalysis for LSBR and Fibonacci-Mapping based embedding technique. 
From Figure 4-12, we see that embedding the secret images using the Fibonacci-
Mapping technique is robust against the DIH. Similarly to the case of the Indexing-
based scheme, DIH ability to detect the secrets embedded by the Fibonacci-Mapping 
scheme diminishes the more payload is embedded. However, the detection probabilities 
are slightly higher than that reported for the Indexing-based scheme. As discussed 
before, DIH predicts the presence of a secret embedded by the LSBR at higher than the 
actual payload for 20%, 40%, and 60%.  
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Robustness Against RWS Detector 
Figure 4-13 presents the average values of the estimation ratios of the flipped cover 
pixels‘ LSB of our Fibonacci-Mapping scheme against the LSBR at different 
embedding ratios. Note that, the 200% payload here is only possible by our mapping 
scheme. 
 
Figure 4-13: RWS steganalysis for LSBR and Fibonacci-Mapping based embedding technique. 
Figure 4-13, demonstrates beyond any doubt the robustness of the Fibonacci-
Mapping against this LSB-based steganalysis tool.  As before, this is due to the fact that 
this scheme results in flipping the LSB of fewer cover pixels than the LSBR. However, 
the detected ratios are slightly higher than that reported for the Indexing-based scheme. 
This yet another evidence that our scheme achieves high robustness against all LSB-
targeted steganalysis tools. 
In summary, the use of Fibonacci decomposition of cover pixels resulted in reducing 
the number of different first 3 LSB pattern from the normal 8 to 5, which encouraged 
the use of these 3 bit-planes for embedding two secret bits and thereby doubling the 
payload capacity. The use of a mapping table helped reduce the number of possible LSB 
changes and increase the embedding efficiency compared to the LSBR and the 
Indexing-based scheme. Consequently, it improved robustness against the three well-
known steganalysis tools.   
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4.3 Discussion 
In this chapter, we designed two rather simple embedding approaches and tested their 
performances in terms of embedding efficiency, stego-image quality and robustness 
against steganalysis tools. In both cases, we attempted to include more than the LSB 
plane for hiding the secret. The first scheme, embeds only one bit in each pixel and uses 
a combination of pre-processing the image pixels to eliminate the possibility of having 
equal bits in the 2LSB planes, followed by a system that report the index of the bit that 
matches the secret bit. Compared to the LSBR, this scheme resulted in lower stego 
quality and embedding efficiency, but it is robust against two of the steganalysis tools. 
The second approach extends Fibonacci-like steganography by bit-plane(s) mapping 
instead of bit-plane(s) replacement to embed two secret bits in three Fibonacci bit- 
planes. Unlike the original Fibonacci scheme, no cover pixels are excluded from 
embedding because actions are taken to comply with Zeckendorf theorem.  
Consequently, this scheme has double the embedding capacity of LSBR.  Furthermore, 
it is secure against steganalysis techniques such as RS, DIH, and RWS.  The improved 
capacity and robustness seems to come at the expense of further reduction of stego-
image quality compared to the Indexing-based scheme. Considering the structure of the 
mapping table, may help in finding ways of improving stego quality of the Fibonacci-
Mapping scheme while preserving the gains made in robustness against steganalysis 
tools and the embedding efficiency. We note that 6 out of the 10 cases where LSB is 
changed as a result of embedding are coming from the case where the two embedded 
secret bits are 01 or 11. In the next chapter, we shall investigate secret image pre-
processing to transform secret images to increase the number of 0 bits value in its bit-
stream representation, which will reduce the number of occurrences of 01 and 11.   
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Chapter 5  
Secret Image Pre-Processing 
In the previous chapter, we demonstrated the benefits of using a combination of 
Fibonacci decomposition of cover image pixel values and a mapping table for 
embedding a secret bit-stream, in terms of doubling capacity, higher efficiency of 
embedding and improved robustness against steganalysis tools. However, the stego-
image quality was less than desirable and slightly lower than what was achieved by the 
simple Indexing-based scheme as well as the LSBR. However, we noted that the 
structure of the mapping table may explain this degradation in quality, because changes 
of LSB in the cover image pixels occur 6 times out of 20 in the table entries under the 
secret columns labelled by 01 and 11. Therefore, a possible way of improving the stego 
quality is to pre-process the secret image with the aim of increasing the ratio of 0 to 1 
(0:1) in its bit-stream. This is feasible due to the fact that the secret image bit-stream is 
not random and existing local spatial correlations. This would the main task for our 
investigations in this chapter, which could provide motivation for moving the focus of 
steganography research into content-based schemes.  
Different from existing approaches for enhancing embedding efficiency and security 
of the steganography techniques, our approach‘s idea is to exploit our knowledge of 
secret image information content to increase the probability of similarity between the 
secret bits value and the cover pixels‘ LSB value. The rest of this thesis is devoted to 
investigate and develop image processing schemes that can be used to achieve high 
similarity between secret image bits and the cover pixels‘ LSB, and increase the ratio of 
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0:1 for both secret bits and cover image LSB plane. In this chapter, we shall focus on 
processing the secret image prior to embedding and propose three algorithms that result 
in bit-streams containing a higher number of 0s than 1s. The three algorithms differ 
slightly in the objectives, in that the third one doesn‘t only increase the ratio of 0:1, but 
will reduce the length of the secret bit-stream, which the first two algorithms don‘t 
compress the secret bit-stream but achieve higher ratio of 0:1. The first two algorithms 
are similar in their structure except that the first is a spatial domain based manipulation 
while the second is in the Integer Wavelet domain. These three algorithms are presented 
in Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. In Section 5.4, we shall test the performance of the 
Fibonacci-Mapping embedding scheme post each of these three secret image processing 
schemes to demonstrate their positive impact on the stego-image quality as well as 
embedding efficiency and message detectability.  
5.1 Secret Image Manipulation (SIM) 
The SIM algorithm, exploits the structure of the secret image histogram to define a 
grayscale transform that maps secret pixel values according to the descending order of 
their frequencies so that more frequent pixel values are mapped into bytes with lower 
number of 1s. When two or more pixel values have the same frequencies, then they are 
mapped in according to their appearance in the sorted frequency vector. It is simply a 
substitution function on the histogram of the secret image, which means no loss of 
information as long as the receiver applies the inverse grayscale transform. This 
approach has similarity with statistical coding, but instead of assigning shorter codes to 
most frequent pixel values we keep the length and assign bytes of the lower number of 
1s to the more frequent pixel values.  
 To simplify the process, we create an ordered table of the grayscale values in the 
ascending order of the number of 1s in the binary representation, see Table 5-1. We 
shall now describe the SIM forward and backward steps. 
5.1.1 SIM Forward Procedure 
The SIM forward includes the following steps that could be used for any 
steganography scheme:  
 
1- Load the secret image  , and let   is the histogram of   . 
2- Let    is the sorted version of   in descending order of pixel value frequency. 
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3- Based on   , do replace the first highest repeated pixel value in the image   with 
the first new value in the Table 5-1. This step is continued by replacing the next 
highest repeated pixel value by the next new value, till all pixel values in the 
image   are replaced. This results in producing a new image   .   
4- Covert    into binary to create the secret bit-stream. 
5- Construct a side information bit-stream of length (9 + (8  )) bits, where   
refers to the number of pixel values present in the image  , to inform the receiver 
about the start of the secret image data. The first 9 bits of the side information 
represent . The next 8   bits of the side information, lists the original pixel 
values in descending order of frequencies.  
6- Append the bit-stream of the secret image    to the side information bit-stream, 
and embed in the chosen cover image using the given hiding scheme.   
Note that for the SIM algorithm, the maximum possible number of bits for the 
side information part is (9 + 256 * 8 = 2057). This will reduce the payload capacity, 
but only by a very negligible proportion. The second part of the bit-stream 
represents the modified secret image    and each 8 bits represent a pixel value that 
need to be inverted using side information. Figure 5-1 below, displays a secret 
image   (Lenna) and its SIM modified version    .  
  
Figure 5-1: Lenna image and its modified version using SIM algorithm. 
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Table 5-1: Grayscale values (0-255) in descending order of number of 1s in its binary representation. 
value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. 
0 00000000 82 01010010 135 10000111 174 10101110 
1 00000001 84 01010100 139 10001011 179 10110011 
2 00000010 88 01011000 141 10001101 181 10110101 
4 00000100 97 01100001 142 10001110 182 10110110 
8 00001000 98 01100010 147 10010011 185 10111001 
16 00010000 100 01100100 149 10010101 186 10111010 
32 00100000 104 01101000 150 10010110 188 10111100 
64 01000000 112 01110000 153 10011001 199 11000111 
128 10000000 131 10000011 154 10011010 203 11001011 
3 00000011 133 10000101 156 10011100 205 11001101 
5 00000101 134 10000110 163 10100011 206 11001110 
6 00000110 137 10001001 165 10100101 211 11010011 
9 00001001 138 10001010 166 10100110 213 11010101 
10 00001010 140 10001100 169 10101001 214 11010110 
12 00001100 145 10010001 170 10101010 217 11011001 
17 00010001 146 10010010 172 10101100 218 11011010 
18 00010010 148 10010100 177 10110001 220 11011100 
20 00010100 152 10011000 178 10110010 227 11100011 
24 00011000 161 10100001 180 10110100 229 11100101 
33 00100001 162 10100010 184 10111000 230 11100110 
34 00100010 164 10100100 195 11000011 233 11101001 
36 00100100 168 10101000 197 11000101 234 11101010 
40 00101000 176 10110000 198 11000110 236 11101100 
48 00110000 193 11000001 201 11001001 241 11110001 
65 01000001 194 11000010 202 11001010 242 11110010 
66 01000010 196 11000100 204 11001100 244 11110100 
68 01000100 200 11001000 209 11010001 248 11111000 
72 01001000 208 11010000 210 11010010 63 00111111 
80 01010000 224 11100000 212 11010100 95 01011111 
96 01100000 15 00001111 216 11011000 111 01101111 
129 10000001 23 00010111 225 11100001 119 01110111 
130 10000010 27 00011011 226 11100010 123 01111011 
132 10000100 29 00011101 228 11100100 125 01111101 
136 10001000 30 00011110 232 11101000 126 01111110 
144 10010000 39 00100111 240 11110000 159 10011111 
160 10100000 43 00101011 31 00011111 175 10101111 
192 11000000 45 00101101 47 00101111 183 10110111 
7 00000111 46 00101110 55 00110111 187 10111011 
11 00001011 51 00110011 59 00111011 189 10111101 
13 00001101 53 00110101 61 00111101 190 10111110 
14 00001110 54 00110110 62 00111110 207 11001111 
19 00010011 57 00111001 79 01001111 215 11010111 
21 00010101 58 00111010 87 01010111 219 11011011 
22 00010110 60 00111100 91 01011011 221 11011101 
25 00011001 71 01000111 93 01011101 222 11011110 
26 00011010 75 01001011 94 01011110 231 11100111 
28 00011100 77 01001101 103 01100111 235 11101011 
35 00100011 78 01001110 107 01101011 237 11101101 
37 00100101 83 01010011 109 01101101 238 11101110 
38 00100110 85 01010101 110 01101110 243 11110011 
41 00101001 86 01010110 115 01110011 245 11110101 
42 00101010 89 01011001 117 01110101 246 11110110 
44 00101100 90 01011010 118 01110110 249 11111001 
49 00110001 92 01011100 121 01111001 250 11111010 
50 00110010 99 01100011 122 01111010 252 11111100 
52 00110100 101 01100101 124 01111100 127 01111111 
56 00111000 102 01100110 143 10001111 191 10111111 
67 01000011 105 01101001 151 10010111 223 11011111 
69 01000101 106 01101010 155 10011011 239 11101111 
70 01000110 108 01101100 157 10011101 247 11110111 
73 01001001 113 01110001 158 10011110 251 11111011 
74 01001010 114 01110010 167 10100111 253 11111101 
76 01001100 116 01110100 171 10101011 254 11111110 
81 01010001 120 01111000 173 10101101 255 11111111 
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5.1.2 SIM Backward Procedure 
The receiver receives a bit-stream which contains two parts, the first part is the side 
information and the second part is the SIM modified secret image    bit-stream. Based 
on the side information, the receiver is able to reconstruct the original secret image from 
the extracted bit-stream from stego-image using the following steps: 
1- Extract the side information and the SIM modified secret image   . 
2- Let    is the histogram of    .  
3- The original image   can be reconstructed by replacing the pixel values in the 
image    that has the ith value in the    with the ith value of the reconstructed 
original pixel values from the side information.  
Note that the histogram   is already started from the highest to the lowest frequency 
in the same order of Table 5-1.  
5.1.3 Performance of SIM  
To test the performance of the SIM algorithm in terms of ratio of 0:1 bits in secret 
image bit-stream before and after modification, we conducted experiments on the 
following image databases: 
o 44 images from the Miscellaneous volume of Signal and Image Processing 
Institute (SIPI) database of University of Southern California (Viterbi, 1981). 
This database consists of 16 colour images and 28 monochrome images. It 
includes some standard images such as Lenna, Baboon, Peppers, Jet, Tiffany, 
Couple, Bridge, Pirate, House and Lake. We resized these 44 images to 512 x 
512, 256 x 256, and 128 x 256; and converted them into grayscale images with 8 
bits per pixel.  
o 1000 images from BOSSBase version 1.0 database of grayscale images with a 
size 512 x 512 with 8 bits per pixel (Bas, et al., 2011). This database including 
images of, but not limited to, landscapes, people, plants, and building. This 
database consists of 10000 images; in our experiments the first 1000 images are 
used. These images are also resized to 256 x 256, and 128 x 256. 
Experimental Results 
Results of the experiments conducted for three different image sizes are shown in 
Table 5-2 and Table 5-3 for the SIPI and BOSSBase databases, respectively. Tables 
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include statistical parameters (mean µ, standard deviation σ, minimum  , and 
maximum  ) of the ratios of 0:1 before and after SIM modification as well as length 
of the side information over all images in the respective database. Here   refers to the 
0:1 ratio before SIM,    refers to the 0:1 ratio post SIM,   refers to the length of the side 
information. 
Table 5-2: SIPI database - Ratio of 0:1 in the secret images and SIM modified secret images   . 
 
Image size 128 x 256 Image size 256 x 256 Image size 512 x 512 
                        
µ 0.49 0.71 1639 0.49 0.71 1676 0.49 0.73 1565 
σ 0.08 0.07 279 0.09 0.07 273 0.10 0.08 499 
   0.12 0.61 993 0.12 0.60 993 0.11 0.60 25 
   0.65 0.93 2057 0.66 0.94 2057 0.66 0.99 2057 
Table 5-3: BOSSBase database - Ratio of 0:1 in the secret images and SIM modified secret images   . 
 
Image size 128 x 256 Image size 256 x 256 Image size 512 x 512 
                        
µ 0.54 0.68 1815 0.54 0.68 1850 0.54 0.68 1912 
σ 0.07 0.05 278 0.07 0.05 260 0.07 0.05 228 
   0.17 0.57 385 0.16 0.57 537 0.15 0.56 777 
   0.85 0.93 2057 0.86 0.93 2057 0.86 0.92 2057 
 
From Table 5-2, we note that on average the ratio of 0:1 of the SIM modified images 
is increased by about 45% of the corresponding ratio for the original images. Similarly, 
the results of Table 5-3 show an increase of 26% in the ratio of 0:1 post SIM. The 
difference between the percentages of changed ratio reflects the variation in the nature 
of images in the two databases.  In fact, the statistical parameters (µ and σ) in Table 5-3 
are constant and independent of the image sizes, while this is not the case in Table 5-2. 
The minor changes are unlikely to be due to SIM but due to the fact that resizing has 
some minor effects on the ratios of 0:1 in the original SIPI images. These results also 
demonstrate that the proposed SIM algorithm can be used for any secret image sizes. 
The only drawback of the SIM is the side information that needs to send to the receiver, 
and this results in slightly decreasing the capacity of embedding. Table 5-4 shows the 
average percentage of the length of the side information out of modified SIM secret 
images. The table demonstrates that the increase in the total embedded secret size, as a 
result of the side information, is negligible and diminishes for larger size secret images. 
Thus, the embedded capacity is reduced by minute percentages. 
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Table 5-4: Ratio of bits of the SIM side information. 
Image sizes SIPI BOSSBase 
128 x 256 0.006 0.007 
256 x 256 0.003 0.004 
512 x 512 0.001 0.001 
Two questions arise about the performance of SIM. Is it not possible to do the same 
with non-image secret bit-streams? And if not, what could be done to improve this 
performance even further? The answer to the first question is that the distribution of 
image pixel values are usually non-uniform which is exploited by SIM by mapping 
pixel values according to their non-uniform frequencies while other secret bit-streams 
are highly unlikely (or for security reasons are expected) to have uniform when it 
partitioned into 8-bits bytes. In fact, this also explains the significant differences 
between SIM‘s performance for different images in the two databases. This also points 
to the way of improving SIM performance for any image and in the next section we will 
develop an Integer Wavelet domain version of SIM which would help creating patterns 
of non-uniform distributions of certain Wavelet coefficients to be exploited for mapping 
the image bit-streams with higher 0:1 ratio.  
5.2 Integer Wavelet based Secret Image Manipulation (IWSIM) 
In Chapter 2, we described Discrete Wavelet Transforms (DWT) as multi-resolution 
frequency domain tools that analyse/split images into sub-bands of different frequencies 
ranges at different scales. The most important properties, for our purpose, of the 
Wavelet transformed image is that the histogram of the LL sub-band is an 
approximation of that of the original image, while the coefficients in each of the other 
high frequency sub-bands are have a Laplacian distribution (also known as Generalised 
Gaussian distributions), see Figure 5-2.  The Integer Wavelet Transform IWT is a 
special kind of Wavelet transforms for which all sub-bands coefficients are integers 
rather than real numbers (Calderbank, et al., 1997). An example of IWT sub-bands for 
one level of Lenna image is presented in Figure 5-2, together with the histogram for 
each of the Wavelet sub-bands. The computation of the Wavelet coefficients in the IWT 
sub-bands is based on the following formulae:   
          
       
 
 
  
(5. 1) 
 
Where    and      are two consecutive pixels. 
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Figure 5-2: Level one IWT sub-bands of Lenna image and histograms. 
 
IWSIM is an extended version of the SIM idea and objective. In contrast to SIM, 
IWSIM algorithm is not applied directly on the spatial domain of the secret image but in 
the Integer Wavelet domain. The IWSIM scheme first applies the IWT on the secret 
image only for one level, and then for each sub-band uses a SIM-like mapping 
depending on the range of coefficients in these sub-bands. Due to the fact, mentioned 
above, the coefficients in each of the three high frequency sub-bands have a Laplacian 
distribution. This implies that most of the coefficients in these sub-bands can be mapped 
using the similar approach to SIM to produce more 0s than 1s. However, the range and 
the number of present values differ from one sub-band to another. The IWT 
decomposed image will contain some coefficients whose values exceed 255 which 
require more than 8-bits to represent. At level 1, high frequency integer coefficients 
may require up to 10 bits to represent, and therefore for some high frequency sub-bands 
we need to expand the designed SIM mapping Table 5-1 and adjust the side information 
accordingly. At IWT decomposition level 2 or above, coefficients ranges usually 
expand and require even more than 10-bits to represent. This is why we apply the IWT 
only to level one, because at higher level decomposition requires much larger SIM-like 
mapping tables and increased size of side information that would reduce embedding 
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capacity. Another reason for avoiding level 2 of IWT is the number of sub-bands 
increase to 7 sub-bands, and then each sub-band needs its own side information, and 
this reflects on increasing the total side information size for the secret image. We shall 
now describe the IWSIM forward and backward procedures. 
5.2.1 IWSIM Forward Procedure 
The IWSIM first uses the one level IWT to decompose the secret image into four 
sub-bands: approximate   , horizontal  , vertical    , and diagonal   .  The number 
of different coefficients (C) present in the high frequency sub-bands are no longer 
guaranteed to be ≤ 256, and the range of coefficient values are no longer in the range 
[0..255]. For the   sub-band, IWSIM simply applies the SIM procedure, but for the 
other sub-bands, IWSIM requires two different procedures, IWSIM1 and IWSIM2. 
IWSIM1 is applicable when C ≤ 256 and in this case the SIM Table 5-1 is used but with 
different side information to cater for coefficients > 255.  The IWSIM2 is applicable to 
sub-bands for which C > 256. In this case, a new table is designed in the same way as in 
Table 5-1, but representing values in the range 0 to 511 arranged in ascending order of 
the number of 1s in their binary representation.  This table is rather long to be included 
in this chapter but will be shown as an appendix.  In IWSIM1, 8 bits are sufficient to 
represent each coefficient value even if >255, while in IWSIM2, 9 bits are sufficient. 
This compact representation of coefficients >255 is based on the fact that C≤ 512 and 
the two mapping tables facilitate this as described below.   
The IWSIM algorithm  
 Apply the IWT on the secret image  , and for the    sub-band call the SIM 
procedure. For each other sub-band   follow the steps below:  
1. Calculate  = min ( ). 
2. Let    be the modified of   after subtracting   from all coefficient values in 
the  .  
3. Compute the histogram   of   .  
4.  Sort   in descending order of coefficient value frequency, and denote the sorted 
version by   . 
5. Determine the number of different coefficient values   appearing in   . 
6. If (  ≤ 256), then call IWSIM1 procedure  
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Else call IWSIM2 procedure.   
Note that the side information needs to initiate with a 1 bit indicator, where 0 
indicate IWSIM1 is used and 1 to indicate that IWSIM2 is used. 
7. Based on   , replace the first highest repeated coefficient value in the    with the 
first new grayscale value. This step is continued by replacing the next highest 
repeated coefficient value with the next new suggested value, till all coefficient 
values in the   are replaced. This yields a new sub-band     .   
8. Covert      into binary to create the secret bit-stream. 
9. Append the side information bit-stream constructed by the appropriate procedure 
(described below). 
10. Append the secret bit-stream to the side information. 
IWSIM1 side information construction: 
1- Append 8 bits to represent  .  
2- Append 2 bits as an indicator of how many bits are needed to represent each 
coefficient in   :  00, 01, or 10 indicate that 8, 9, or 10 bits are needed to 
represent each coefficient value.  
The reason of having only three cases is that the maximum coefficient value 
in    does not exceed 1023, but in some sub-bands it does not exceed 255 or 
511.  
3- Append 9 bits to represent   .  
4- Append   * (8 or 9 or 10) bits to list the    values in descending order of 
frequencies.   
Note that, the maximum possible number of bits for the side information is (8 + 
2 + 9 + (256 * 10) = 2579).  
IWSIM2 side information construction: 
1- Append 8 bits to represent  .  
2- Append 1 bits as an indicator of how many bits are needed to represent each 
coefficient in   :  0 indicates that 9 bits are needed while 1 indicates that 10 
bits are needed.  
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The reason of having only two cases is that the maximum coefficient value in 
   does not exceed 1023 but in some sub-bands it does not exceed 511.  
3- Append 10 bits to represent   .  
4- Append   * (9 or 10) bits to list the    values in descending order of 
frequencies.   
Note that, the maximum possible number of bits for the side information is (8 + 
1 + 10 + (512 * 10) = 5139).  
5.2.2 IWSIM Backward Procedure 
 
After extracting the secret, in according with the embedding scheme, the receiver 
knows that this secret is not the image but it is made of 4 parts each representing the 
sub-band of the IWT decomposed secret image. The first part represents the    sub-
band processed by SIM.  Hence, the    sub-band can retrieve by the procedure 
described in the last section. The rest represent the other sub-bands in the order  ,    
and then    which could be reversed by the procedure below, one by one. Each bit-
stream of these sub-bands contains the following three parts: The first bit is an indicator 
that indicates whether IWSIM1 or IWSIM2 is applied. The second part is the side 
information consisting of: 8 bits for value of  , 2 bits or 1 bit indicating the number of 
bits needed to represent coefficients in   , 9 or 10 bits to give the size of  , followed by 
the distinct values in    in descending order of their frequencies. The size of the last part 
is determined depends on the previous sub-stream as well as the first bit. The third part 
is then the modified sub-band    . Then, the original sub-band   can be reconstructed 
from the received sub-band     by the following steps: 
1- Calculate the histogram    of     . Note that   is already sorted in descending 
order. 
2- Construct the sub-band     by replacing the coefficient values in     that has the 
i
th
 value in the    with the ith value of the reconstructed original coefficient 
values from the side information.  
3- Add  to all coefficient values of   , to retrieve the original sub-band   .  
Finally, after extracting   ,  ,   , and   , apply the inverse of the IWT to 
reconstruct the original secret image  . 
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5.2.3 Performance of IWSIM 
To test the performance of the IWSIM algorithm in terms of ratio 0:1 of bits in the 
secret image bit-stream before and after modification, the same databases and image 
sizes in which used for testing SIM are used. 
Experimental Results 
Results of the experiments conducted for three different image sizes are shown in 
Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 for the SIPI and BOSSBase databases, respectively. As in the 
case of SIM, these tables include statistical parameters (mean µ, standard deviation σ, 
minimum  , and maximum  ) of the ratios of 0:1 before and after IWSIM 
modification as well as length of side information and resulted sub-band bit-stream over 
all images in the respective database. Here   refers to the ratio of 0:1 before IWSIM,    
refers to the ratio of 0:1 post IWSIM,    refers to the length of side information needed, 
and   refers to the number of bits of the bit-stream that represent the secret image after 
IWSIM is applied. 
Table 5-5: SIPI database - Ratio of 0:1 in the secret images and IWSIM modified secret images   . 
 
Image size 128 x 256 Image size 256 x 256 Image size 512 x 512 
                                 
µ 0.49 0.81 5171 262703 0.49 0.81 5358 525405 0.49 0.84 5238 2113536 
σ 0.08 0.06 1590 2736 0.09 0.06 1607 5471 0.10 0.06 2272 34980 
   0.12 0.73 1188 262144 0.12 0.73 1268 524288 0.11 0.76 334 2097152 
   0.65 0.99 11054 278528 0.66 1.00 10629 557056 0.66 0.99 11212 2228224 
 
 
Table 5-6: BOSSBase database - Ratio of 0:1 in the secret images and IWSIM modified secret images   . 
 
Image size 128 x 256 Image size 256 x 256 Image size 512 x 512 
                                 
µ 0.54 0.80 5277 262341 0.54 0.81 5829 525418 0.54 0.83 6781 2124153 
σ 0.07 0.03 1286 1307 0.07 0.03 1432 5032 0.07 0.04 1781 54159 
   0.17 0.70 1220 262144 0.16 0.72 1644 524288 0.15 0.74 1756 2097152 
   0.85 0.94 9081 278528 0.86 0.95 10039 573440 0.86 0.97 12015 2293760 
 
 
From Table 5-5, we note that on average the ratio of 0:1 of the IWSIM modified 
images is increased by about 66% of the corresponding ratio for the original images. 
Similarly, the results of Table 5-6 show an increase of 49% in the ratio of 0:1 post 
IWSIM. Again, the difference between the percentages of changed ratio reflects the 
variation in the nature of images in the two databases. As in the case of SIM, the 
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statistical parameters (µ and σ) in Table 5-6 are constant and independent of image size, 
while is not the case in Table 5-5. Resizing seems to explain the minor effects on the 
ratios of 0:1 in the original SIPI images. These results also demonstrate that the 
proposed IWSIM algorithm can be used for any secret image sizes.  
Again, there are two drawbacks of the proposed IWSIM algorithm; the first one is 
that the side information that need to be sent to the receiver and this results in slightly 
decreasing the capacity of any adopted steganography technique. Table 5-7 shows the 
average percentage of the number of bits, for the side information in proportion to the 
number of bits that represent the secret images for both used SIPI and BOSSBase 
databases. Clearly bigger size images require a lower ratio of side information to the 
actual secret image size.  
Table 5-7: Ratio of bits of the side information using IWSIM. 
Image sizes SIPI BOSSBase 
128 x 256 0.020 0.020 
256 x 256 0.010 0.011 
512 x 512 0.002 0.003 
 
The second drawback is for those sub-bands for which IWSIM2 is applied; the 
number of bits that represent the sub-band is increased. This increment happened 
because, in the case of using IWSIM2, each coefficient value needs 9 bits to represent in 
binary form, and this leads to reducing the capacity slightly. Table 5-8 shows the 
average percentage of the number of increased bits to represent all sub-bands in 
proportion to the number of bits that represent the secret images for both used SIPI and 
BOSSBase databases.  
Table 5-8:Ratio of increased bits to represent the modified sub-bands. 
Image sizes SIPI BOSSBase 
128 x 256 0.002 0.001 
256 x 256 0.002 0.002 
512 x 512 0.008 0.013 
 
The combined effect of these two drawbacks of IWSIM is a negligible reduction in 
embedding capacity of any embedding scheme to an estimate of (1 – (0.020 + 0.002) = 
0.978 for the SIPI database) and (1 – (0.020 + 0.001) = 0.979 for the BOSSBase 
database) of the actual capacity of the embedding scheme.   
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To compare the performance of the IWSIM with that of the SIM, we present in 
Figure 5-3 the ratio of 0:1 for images size 128 x 256 in both SIPI and BOSSBase 
databases.  Figure 5-3, reveals that the both SIM and IWSIM algorithms increase the 
ratios by significant percentages, but the IWSIM procedure significantly outperforms 
the SIM. However, from Figure 5-4, it is clear that the capacity limitation of the IWSIM 
is slightly more than the capacity limitation of the SIM. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Ratio of zero-bits of SIM and IWSIM. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4: Ratio of side information bits of SIM and IWSIM. 
5.3 Secret Image Size Reduction (SISR) algorithm 
In the last two sections, we developed two schemes that increase the ratio of 0:1 in 
the secret image bit-stream without changing the size of the secret. As mentioned 
earlier, the SIM and IWSIM tables are organised and used seem to be fitting for use for 
compressing the size of the secret. Reducing the secret bit-stream length while 
increasing the ratio of 0:1 in the shorter bit-stream can provide opportunities for 
improving image quality.  The SISR is our new spatial domain encoding algorithm 
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designed to achieve reduced secret length without loss of information and high 0:1 ratio 
(Abdulla, et al., 2014). SISR aims primarily to improve stego-image quality but may 
also increase embedding efficiency. The SISR algorithm is a block based, and the image 
is first partitioned into non-overlapping blocks of equal sizes. In our experiments, the 
SISR algorithm is applied on blocks from both the original secret image   and its 
complement version     (i.e. the negative of I). The selected secret image bit-stream is 
the one that achieves highest 0:1 ratio. In this case, the side information is a single bit to 
inform the receiver about the source of the selected bit-stream (0 for    and 1 for         
The encoding and decoding steps for the SISR algorithm, applied to both   and    , are 
explained in the Section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, respectively.  
5.3.1 SISR Encoding Procedure 
The encoding steps for the SISR algorithm work as follows: 
A. Partition the secret image   into non-overlapping blocks of size       . Here we 
take A=4, 8, or 16.  
B. For each block     , i, j ϵ {1,...,  }, do the following steps: 
1. Let   = min (   ), and let i*, j* be the indices of the element in     achieving  
with smallest j, then smallest i. 
2. Let    =     – , be the difference between each pixel and . 
3. Set     = maxi j (   ), be the maximum difference value.  
4. Let T be a set of possible thresholds to determine the number of bits that 
represent   . 
                                                 T = {     | 0 ≤   ≤ 8} 
5. Let t ≡ tij = min (z), where z ϵ T and z ≥ Dmax. Here, t is the smallest element in T 
which is ≥     .  
6. Encode each block as follows:  
a) If t = 255, record 1 and then append the original 8-bit pixel values in the 
given order, i.e. total number of bits representing such a block is increased by 
1 to (1 + 8   (     )) bits. 
b) Else record 0, append the 8-bit value of , and do:  
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If t = 0, (i.e. if all pixel values in the block are equal), then append 3-bit 
representation of t and stop. In such a case, only 12 bits are needed.  
Else 
      Append 3-bit representation of t. 
Append log2 (     ) bits for position of   
Append the bit representations of the pixels‘ differences Di j in the given 
order. 
In this case, the block requires: (1 + 8 + 3 + log2 (     ) + ((     ) -1) 
  log2 (t+1)) bits.    
Note that the 3-bit representations are arranged based on frequently occurring t 
values.  The four most frequently occurring t values are represented by 3 bits with two 
or more 0s. While the three remaining 3-bit strings represent the three least frequent t 
values. For example, the 3-bit that has a higher number of 1s, namely 111, represent the 
t = 255 which is least frequent in the blocks.  This arrangement of 3-bit representation is 
a factor for increasing the ratio of 0:1 in the SISR bit-stream. Finally, the sender sends a 
bit-stream that represent either the image   or    , the bit-stream is the concatenation of 
all blocks sub-streams.   
Note that the 8 bits that represent   and the 3 bits that indicate the value of t is 
needed when the image pixel value is between 0 and 255. It is also possible to extend 
SISR algorithm for different pixel value ranges, for example if the image pixel value is 
between 0 to 511, we can extend the algorithm to be applicable by representing the   in 
9 bits instead of 8 bits and the value of t in 4 bits instead 3 bits. 
Table 5-9, illustrates the number of obtained bits and the number of reduced bits 
depending on the value of t for 4x4 block of pixels. It is clear that only in the case t= 
255, the SISR procedure increases the number of bits by 1; otherwise, the algorithm 
reduces the number of bits to represent the block of 16 pixels. Although the main 
focus in this thesis of proposing SISR algorithm is to reduce the secret image size 
prior to embedding, but this can also use to reduce the required image storage in a 
lossless way. 
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Table 5-9: Number of obtained bits from proposed SISR algorithm for block size 4x4. 
t 
Number of bits 
Obtained Original Reducing 
0 12 128 116 
1 31 128 97 
3 46 128 82 
7 61 128 67 
15 76 128 52 
31 91 128 37 
63 106 128 22 
127 121 128 7 
255 129 128 -1 
5.3.2 SISR Decoding Procedure 
This procedure receives as input the blocks sub-streams bi, all concatenated in one 
bit-stream. For each bi, follow the steps below: 
If  bi[1] = 1, convert the remaining bits in the sub-stream bi to a decimal by 
taking 8 bits at a time.  
Else: 
1. m= decimal (bi[2..9]) and  t= decimal (bi[10..12]). 
2. s=log2 (t+1). 
3. Index of  = decimal (bi[13 ..13+ log2 (     ) -1]). 
4.    = be the matrix of decimals obtained by converting each s bits into 
decimals, starting with the first s-bits of the remainder of bi until the last 
s-bits.  
5.      =    + .  
Assembling all the reconstructed blocks will either produce the original secret 
image or its complement. This is determined by the 1-bit side information. 
5.3.3 Example Application of SISR Algorithm 
The example 4x4 block of pixel intensities in Table 5-10 will be used to illustrate the 
SISR encoding and decoding steps. 
Table 5-10: Block of 16 pixels 
30 25 26 35 
35 22 29 28 
31 24 22 29 
30 34 32 30 
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SISR Encoding steps 
1. The minimum pixel value is 22 (00010110 in 8 bits), and its index is 5 (0101 in 4 
bits). 
2. The differences between pixels value and the minimum pixel value are presented in 
Table 5-11.  
3. The maximum value of the subtraction, see 3rd column of the Table 5-11, is 13. 
4. The nearest value in set T that should be equal or greater than the maximum value of 
the subtraction, which is 13, is 15 (i.e. t= 15). 
5. Now this stream of bits represents the block of Table 5-10: 
The first bit 0 indicates that the algorithm has been done on the block, i.e. t is not equal 
to 255.  
The 8-bits 00010110 represent the value of m, and the 3-bits 100 is the value of t. 
The next 4-bits 0101 represent the index of the minimum pixel value. 
The bits 1000, 0011, 0100, 1101, 1101, 0111, 0110, 1001, 0010, 0000, 0111, 1000, 
1100, 1010, 1000 represent the difference values (see 3
rd
 column of Table 5-11) 8, 3, 4, 
13, 13, 7, 6, 9, 2, 0, 7, 8, 12, 10, 8, respectively.  
Therefore, the 4x4 block of Table 5-10 is represented by the following 76-bits instead of 
the original 128-bits 
bi =(0 00010110 100 0101 1000 0011 0100 1101 1101 0111 0110 1001 0010 0000 0111 
1000 1100 1010 1000).  
Table 5-11: Differences between pixels value and minimum pixel value. 
          
 
Binary of       
 
30 22 8 1000 
25 22 3 0011 
26 22 4 0100 
35 22 13 1101 
35 22 13 1101 
29 22 7 0111 
28 22 6 0110 
31 22 9 1001 
24 22 2 0010 
22 22 0 0000 
29 22 7 0111 
30 22 8 1000 
34 22 12 1100 
32 22 10 1010 
30 22 8 1000 
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In Table 5-11, the 1
st
 column     displays the pixel values of Table 5-10 (excluding 
the minimum value 22). The 2
nd
 column is the minimum pixel value , and the 3rd 
column,    is the subtraction of the minimum pixel value from each pixel value. The 
4
th
 column represents    in binary form. 
SISR Decoding steps 
From the received bit-stream bi, the original 4x4 block of pixels can be recovered as 
follows: 
1. Take the first bit; which is 0, and then go to the next step. 
2. Convert the next 8 bits into decimal, which is 22, that represents the . 
3. The next 3 bits, 100, represent the value of t, i.e. t=15.  
4. The next 4 bits, 0101, represent the index of . 
5. Since t= 15, take each next 4 bits 15 times and convert them into decimal to 
represent     as illustrated in Table 5-12. 
6. Add  to   , then original pixels     are obtained (see 4
th
 column of Table 5-12). 
7. Sequentially insert each value in the 4th column of Table 5-12 to its position in the 
block; the block in Table 5-10 is recovered exactly as it is. 
Table 5-12: Producing original pixels value from the recovered   . 
b           
1000 8 22 30 
0011 3 22 25 
0100 4 22 26 
1101 13 22 35 
1101 13 22 35 
0111 7 22 29 
0110 6 22 28 
1001 9 22 31 
0010 2 22 24 
0000 0 22 22 
0111 7 22 29 
1000 8 22 30 
1100 12 22 34 
1010 10 22 32 
1000 8 22 30 
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5.3.4 Performance of SISR 
In this section, the same evaluation protocol used for SIM and IWSIM algorithms is 
used to evaluate the performance of the SISR algorithm. In other words, both SIPI and 
BOSSBase databases with three different image sizes, 128 x 256, 256 x 256, and 512 x 
512 are used in the experiments. 
First of all, the effect of using the image complement on the ratio of 0:1 in the SISR 
4x4 block bit-stream are tested, and the results are presented in Table 5-13 for the SIPI 
and BOSSBase databases.    and    refer to the average 0:1 ratio of SISR bits for the 
original secret image   and their complement     , respectively. Moreover, max(  ,    
 ) 
refers to the 0:1 ratio of the selected image version. During our experiments, we 
observed that the reduction ratio RR values for the SISR with original images and their 
complements are the same, but they have different 0:1 ratio. We note that for both 
databases, the SISR results in the same average of 0.57 for all image sizes, and this is 
more than the actual maximum of both which could be explained by the fact for each 
secret image the procedure selects the best individually. In fact, these results justify the 
processing of both versions of secret images. From previous sections, the original 
average 0:1 ratio was 0.49 for SIPI and 0.54 for BOSSBase which means that SISR 
perform better on the images in SIPI. This can be explained by the huge variations of 
structures in the BOSSBase database.   
 
Table 5-13: Average of 0:1 ratio before and after applying the SISR for 4x4 block size. 
SIPI database 
 
Image size 128 x 256 Image size 256 x 256 Image size 512 x 512 
        max(  ,   )         max(  ,   )         max(  ,   ) 
µ 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.57 
σ 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 
   0.35 0.52 0.55 0.34 0.47 0.53 0.25 0.45 0.51 
   0.60 0.71 0.71 0.59 0.71 0.71 0.64 0.72 0.72 
BOSSBase database 
µ 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.57 
σ 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
   0.49 0.46 0.54 0.48 0.46 0.55 0.47 0.45 0.54 
   0.65 0.67 0.67 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.65 
 
 
 Table 5-14 show the results of the experiments conducted to test the performance of 
the SISR, on the images in SIPI and BOSSBase databases, in terms of the 0:1 ratio for 
the three different image sizes and the three different block sizes.  Again, the results 
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demonstrate that for both SIPI and BOSSBase databases and all block sizes, the SISR 
algorithm produces a higher 0:1 ratio than in the original secret image bit-streams. 
However, it is clear that the 4x4 SISR has better performance than other block sizes. 
This can be seen by comparing the standard deviations for the different block sizes and 
image sizes. 
Table 5-14: Ratio 0:1 SISR algorithm for different block sizes. 
SIPI database 
 
Image size 128 x 256 Image size 256 x 256 Image size 512 x 512 
4x4 8x8 16x16 4x4 8x8 16x16 4x4 8x8 16x16 
µ 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 
σ 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 
   0.55 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.52 
   0.71 0.77 0.82 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.72 0.84 0.88 
BOSSBase database 
µ 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.56 
σ 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
   0.54 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.52 0.52 
   0.67 0.71 0.76 0.66 0.70 0.75 0.65 0.67 0.72 
 
In comparison to SIM and IWSIM, the average 0:1 ratio achieved by the SISR is 
certainly lower than that achieved by the other two schemes (approximately 0.73 and 
0.80). However, SISR also reduces the secret image size bit-streams, without losing 
information. Hence, the comparison needs to take into account the number of 0s relative 
to the size of the original secret image bit-stream. But first we need to determine the 
extent to which SISR compresses secret images.   
To evaluate the reduction efficiency (i.e. compression) of SISR algorithm, we use the 
following reduction ratio measure: 
    
                                            
                                     
         (5. 2) 
Table 5-15, shows the average RR after applying the SISR algorithm for three 
different block sizes (4 x 4, 8 x 8, and 16 x 16) on the databases SIPI and BOSSBase of 
images for three different sizes (128 x 256, 256 x 256, and 512 x 512). These results 
show that the best RR is achieved with 4x4 blocks. In other words, the smaller the block 
size used in the proposed SISR, the better RR is, and this is what we should expect 
because in small blocks pixels; values are more homogeneous, and this results in lower 
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number of bits needed to represent such block of pixels. Furthermore, the bigger the 
image size, the better RR value is. Note that, the lower RR is, the better reduction in 0:1 
ratio when the original image size is taken into account. 
Table 5-15: Average RRs for SISR algorithm for different image and block sizes. 
SIPI database 
 
Image size 128 x 256 Image size 256 x 256 Image size 512 x 512 
4x4 8x8 16x16 4x4 8x8 16x16 4x4 8x8 16x16 
µ 0.70 0.75 0.84 0.67 0.73 0.81 0.63 0.67 0.76 
σ 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.16 
   0.21 0.25 0.44 0.17 0.16 0.28 0.13 0.10 0.15 
   0.92 0.97 1.00 0.86 0.96 0.98 0.85 0.88 1.00 
BOSSBase database 
µ 0.68 0.74 0.82 0.66 0.71 0.79 0.63 0.67 0.74 
σ 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 
   0.29 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.29 
   0.92 0.96 1.00 0.90 0.96 0.99 0.86 0.93 0.99 
Since SISR does not lead to loss of information, then it acts as a lossless 
compression. However, SISR aims differ from general lossless image compression 
systems, because SISR not only reduce the number of bits to represent the image but 
also results in bit-streams with higher 0:1 ratio. Nevertheless, we shall now compare its 
performance against three standard lossless image compression techniques: Run Length 
Encoding (RLE), Huffman, and Lempel-Ziv-Welch (LZW). For details see (Gonzalez & 
Woods, 2002). Table 5-16, shows the average RR for our block size 4x4 SISR against 
the RLE, Huffman, and LZW.   
Table 5-16: Average RRs for SISR, RLE, Huffman, and LZW for different image sizes. 
 
Databases 
SIPI BOSSBase 
Image size 
128 x 256 
Image size 
256 x 256 
Image size 
512 x 512 
Image size 
128 x 256 
Image size 
256 x 256 
Image size 
512 x 512 
SISR 0.70 0.67 0.63 0.68 0.66 0.63 
RLE 1.22 1.25 1.22 1.29 1.31 1.33 
Huffman 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.88 0.88 0.88 
LZW 0.90 0.95 0.94 0.99 1.05 1.08 
It is clear that the reduction ratio RR of the SISR is significantly improved compared 
to the RLE, Huffman, and LZW. Note that the RR values achieved by the RLE 
technique is very high, because some images may have less repetitions of neighbouring 
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pixel values, and this could increase the size of the next value indicators.  This also 
happens sometime in the case of Huffman and LZW techniques.  
Earlier we have seen that SISR performance on the 0:1 ratio is much lower than what 
was achieved by SIM and IWSIM. However, such a comparison does not take into 
account the combined effect of reduction in bit-stream size as a result of achieving 0.7 
RR and 0.57 of 0:1 ratio. When we take these two factors into account, then the number 
of 0s produced by SISR would be equivalent to getting 0.8125 (0.57/0.7) 0s out of the 
original image bit-stream size.    
Although, computation time is not an issue in steganography, we shall compare the 
time cost of the SISR, RLE, Huffman, and LZW in Table 5-17.  These averages are 
measured in seconds. It is clear that the only drawback of the proposed SISR is time 
consumption compared to Huffman, and LZW, but not with RLE. 
Table 5-17: Average time cost for SISR, RLE, Huffman, and LZW for different image sizes. 
 
 
Databases 
SIPI BOSSBase 
Image size 
128 x 256 
Image size 
256 x 256 
Image size 
512 x 512 
Image size 
128 x 256 
Image size 
256 x 256 
Image size 
512 x 512 
SISR 3.57 7.11 27.53 3.46 6.88 29.17 
RLE 5.77 11.70 43.53 5.28 10.78 45.53 
Huffman 3.42 6.70 24.71 2.73 5.24 20.60 
LZW 3.15 6.51 25.13 3.18 6.56 27.85 
5.4 Performance of Fibonacci-Mapping based scheme post SIM, 
IWSIM, and SISR  
In this section, we test and evaluate the effectiveness of each of the proposed pre-
processing algorithms SIM, IWSIM, and SISR, on the steganography requirements 
when the resulting secret image bit-streams are embedded into cover images using the 
Fibonacci-Mapping based embedding technique that was proposed in Chapter 4. In line 
with the experimental setup of Chapter 4, we use each of the 44 SIPI size 128 x 256 
images as a secret image, and we use the same 44 images but of size 512 x 512 as cover 
images. First we apply the three pre-processing schemes on each secret image and use 
the output bit-streams, separately, for embedding into each cover image using the 
Fibonacci-Mapping based scheme at 5 payloads, namely (20%, 40%,60%, 80%, 100%) 
of the size of the resulting bit stream. Note that the SISR bit-stream is shorter than those 
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output by SIM and IWSM. For each payload, then we have a total of (44 x 44 = 1936) 
stego-images. The various performance factors will be compared to that of Fibonacci-
Mapping based when the original secret bit-stream are embedded at these 5 payloads. 
Note that, in the following experiments, Mapping-based refers to embedding the secret 
image (without pre-processing), while Mapping-based-SIM, Mapping-based-IWSIM, 
and Mapping-based-SISR refers to embedding of the resulting  bit-stream after the SIM, 
IWSIM, and SISR algorithm is applied on the secret image, respectively.  
Three performance factors are measured in these experiments. The first is to measure 
the embedding efficiency, the second is to test the stego-image quality, and the third 
measure is the detectability/security (i.e. robustness against the targeted steganalysis 
tools) of the embedded message. Note that in the case of embedding the SIM bit-stream, 
the average capacity is 0.994 (since 0.006 of bits are needed for the side information), 
and in the case of embedding IWSIM bit-stream, the average capacity is 0.978. 
1. Embedding Efficiency Evaluation 
Figure 5-5 and Figure 5-6 presents the average value of the ratio of modified pixels 
to the size of the secret message and the embedding efficiency for Fibonacci-Mapping 
based embedding techniques. 
 
Figure 5-5: Ratio of modified pixels for the Fibonacci-Mapping based techniques. 
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Figure 5-6: Embedding Efficiency for the Fibonacci-Mapping based techniques. 
From these two figures, it is noticeable that for all payloads, all the proposed pre-
processing schemes yield lower ratio of changed cover pixels and higher embedding 
efficiency than what is achieved by the original Mapping-based scheme that have no 
pre-processing. The best performance is achieved by the Mapping-based-IWSIM 
scheme. This is obviously due to the high 0:1 ratio achieved by these pre-processing 
schemes. In addition, for all embedding rates, SIM provides the same embedding 
efficiency, while the embedding efficiency of the IWSIM algorithm increases as the 
embedding rates increases. This can be explained by the effect of the side information 
on the efficiency value. In both cases, the side information does not necessarily have the 
same property on 0:1 ratio as their actual bit-stream. Moreover, due to the fact that the 
side information of the IWSIM is almost 4 times that of the SIM, the proportion of 
embedded side information to the embedded actual bit-stream decreases faster for 
IWSIM than for the SIM, as we increased the payload. 
2. Stego-Image Quality Evaluation 
To determine the effect of each of the pre-processing schemes on stego-image 
quality at each payload rate, we computed the PSNR of the stego-images relative to 
their source cover image for all the embedded bit-streams of the 44 secret images in 
SIPI.  Here we tested all the stego-images obtained from all the 44 SIPI cover images, 
Figure 5-7 presents the average value of the PSNR of all the tested Fibonacci-Mapping-
based embedding techniques at different embedding payloads. 
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Figure 5-7:The PSNR for the Fibonacci-Mapping based techniques. 
For all payloads, embedding the original secret image without pre-processing the 
secret bit-streams yields the lower average PSNR than that achieved by all the three pre-
processing algorithms, IWSIM being the best performing scheme on stego-image 
quality at the high payloads of 80% and 100%, whereas the SISR perform better at low 
payloads and at 20% payload SIM has higher PSNR than the IWSIM. This can be 
explained by the effect of the embedded side information on the PSNR value. The SISR 
has only 1 bit side information, whereas SIM and SIWSIM side information consist of 
0.006 and 0.022 proportion to the actual bit-stream size, respectively. In all cases, the 
side information does not necessarily have the same property on 0:1 ratio as their actual 
bit-stream. Moreover, the proportion of embedded side information to the embedded 
actual bit-stream decreases faster for IWSIM than for the SIM, as we increased the 
payload. 
3. Detectability Evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of all the pre-processed based schemes 
against the three targeted RS, DIH, and RWS detectors at all payload rates in 
comparison. We note that the original scheme which does not pre-process the secret bit-
stream was shown to be robust against these schemes.   
Robustness Against RS Detector 
Figure 5-8, Figure 5-9, and Figure 5-10 displays the RS diagram for the Mapping-
based-SIM, Mapping-based-IWSIM, and Mapping-based-SISR embedding techniques, 
from which it is clear that for all embedding techniques and for all payload, there are 
hardly any differences between RM and RM-, SM and SM-, demonstrating the 
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robustness of the proposed schemes against the RS detector. However, one can notice 
that the SISR has slightly better robustness. Recall that, the Fibonacci-Mapping based 
embedding technique in Chapter 4 is also robust against RS detector, see Figure 4-11. 
 
 
Figure 5-8: RS diagram for Mapping-based-SIM. 
 
 
Figure 5-9: RS diagram for Mapping-based-IWSIM. 
 
 
Figure 5-10: RS diagram for Mapping-based-SISR. 
Robustness Against DIH Detector 
For each embedding ratio, the chart of  Figure 5-11 presents the average probability 
of having a secret hidden with the given embedding payload.  From Figure 5-11, we see 
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that embedding the secret images using all Fibonacci-Mapping based embedding 
techniques are robust against the DIH. 
 
Figure 5-11: DIH steganalysis for the Fibonacci-Mapping based techniques. 
Robustness Against RWS Detector 
Figure 5-12 presents the average values of the estimation ratios of the flipped cover 
pixels‘ LSB of our Fibonacci-Mapping based embedding schemes at different 
embedding payloads. Figure 5-12 demonstrates the robustness of the all Fibonacci-
Mapping based schemes against this steganalysis tool.  As before, this is due to the fact 
that this scheme results in flipping the LSB of fewer cover pixels than the LSBR.  
 
 
Figure 5-12:RWS steganalysis for the Fibonacci-Mapping based techniques. 
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5.5 Discussion 
This chapter was devoted to pre-process the secret image prior to embedding with the 
aim of increasing the 0:1 ratio of the secret image bit-stream. This was a follow up on 
the conclusion made in Chapter 4 on the need to reduce the number of pixel changes 
post embedding in order to improve stego-images quality. It was realised that a potential 
solution is to increase similarities between the secret bit-stream and the LSB plane of 
the cover image. The work in this chapter was focused on the secret image side, and we 
developed three algorithms that encode the original secret image bit-stream into another 
bit-stream with significantly increased 0:1 ratio. The first two algorithms, SIM and 
IWSIM, are based on the similar strategy adopted in statistical coding by exploiting the 
structure of histograms of the secret image spatial domain and Integer Wavelet sub-
bands, respectively. Both algorithms map secret pixel values (sub-band coefficients) 
according to the descending order of their frequencies so that more frequent values are 
mapped into bit-strings with the lower number of 1s. The third algorithm, SISR, is 
directly applied on the spatial domain of the secret image, by first reducing the range of 
values in blocks as result of subtracting the block‘s minimum value and thereby 
reducing the number of bits needed to represent each block. We have demonstrated that 
the IWSIM provides highest 0:1 ratio (80% on average), outperforming both SIM and 
SISR. Our experiments demonstrated that embedding the resulting bit-stream from these 
three pre-processing algorithms into cover images using the proposed Fibonacci-
Mapping based scheme in Chapter 4 result in gaining higher embedding efficiency with 
maintaining un-detectability, but the improvement in stego-image quality still falls short 
of our expectation. This is due to the fact that higher bit-planes are changed during 
secret embedding. Therefore, from now, we consider designing the steganography 
technique that embeds in only LSB plane (or avoid embedding in other than LSB). To 
overcome this challenge, in Chapter 7, we design a new Mapping-based embedding 
scheme that embeds one secret bit per cover pixel.  
In addition, in the next chapter, we develop a new cover pixel value decomposition 
technique, called Extended-Binary, that has results in the cover image LSB plane having 
one of the highest 0:1 ratio among a variety of pixel decomposition schemes. 
Embedding a secret image bit-stream with higher 0:1 ratio, obtained by one of the above 
pre-processing schemes, into in the cover LSB plane that also has high 0:1 ratio would 
be expected to increase the probability of similarity between the secret bits and the 
cover pixels‘ LSB bits. This strategy, discussed at the end of Chapter 4, aims to produce 
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stego-images with minimal distortions by minimising the number of changed cover 
pixels post secret image embedding. 
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Chapter 6  
Cover Pixel Value Decomposition Schemes 
In order to increase the probability of similarity between the bits value in the secret 
image bit-stream and the cover pixels‘ LSB value, three proposed algorithms were 
presented in the last chapter that produce bit-streams with high 0:1 ratio. Those three 
algorithms are applied on the secret image prior to embedding. In this chapter, we turn 
our attention to the representation of the cover images‘ pixel values in order to realise 
the second part of the declared strategy of increasing similarity between the secret 
image bit-streams and the cover images LSB plane. In Chapter 4, we found that the 
Fibonacci pixel value decomposition of any image pixel result in eliminating all but one 
case of having more 1s than 0s within the lowest 3 bit-planes. In fact, there are only 5 
possible 3-bit patterns in the 3 lowest significant planes and only 2 of which have 1 as 
the LSB value. Hence, in the current investigation we study existing decomposition 
techniques such as binary, Fibonacci, prime, natural, Lucas, and Catalan-Fibonacci (CF) 
in terms of the ratio of 0:1 in the cover pixels‘ LSB plane. All these methods extend the 
number of bit-planes beyond the 8 bit-planes of binary decomposition. But the inclusion 
of some odd numbers in their base sequences together with the restrictions that need to 
be imposed to guarantee unique decomposition (e.g. the Zeckendorf theory) may 
unintentionally increase the number of 0s in LSB plane. The ultimate objective of this 
chapter is not to introduce new and more decomposition schemes, but to see if there are 
other decomposition schemes that provide a higher ratio of 0:1 of LSB than existing 
schemes.  
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In Section 6.1, we describe the background of pixel value decomposition. In Section 
6.2, we introduce a simple pixel value decomposition scheme that extending the number 
of bit-planes but has no effect on 0:1 ratio in the LSB, but it may useful for embedding 
in higher bit-planes. In Section 6.3, we introduce a new pixel value decomposition 
scheme, called the Extended-Binary, and demonstrate that it outperforms all the above 
schemes, except the natural scheme, in terms of 0:1 ratio in the LSB plane. In Section 
6.4, we shall investigate the effect on the performance of the usual LSB embedding 
scheme when we combine the use of the Extended-Binary decomposition scheme to 
represent cover pixels‘ value with the 3 pre-processing algorithms to transform the 
secret images.   
6.1 Background 
In most spatial domain steganography schemes, grayscale cover images are in most 
cases decomposed into 8 bit-planes by expressing each pixel value in the range 0..255 
as a binary linear sum of the sequence {1,2,4,8,16,32,64,128}.  In recent years, few 
other pixel value decomposition techniques have been used, using different sequences 
to a different representation of cover images prior to embedding the secrets. A review of 
several non-binary decomposition techniques was conducted in Chapter 3 including 
Fibonacci (Picione, et al., 2006), prime (Dey, et al., 2007), natural (Dey, et al., 2007), 
Lucas (Alharbi, 2013), Catalan-Fibonacci (CF) (Aroukatos, et al., 2012).  In general, 
these decomposition techniques are aimed to provide more bit-planes so that embedding 
in higher bit-planes do not lead to big changes in pixel values and thus has less impact 
on visibility in comparison to embedding in higher binary-decomposed cover images 
bit-planes. One could ask is the decomposition schemes can be exploited for different 
objectives in steganography.  
The intensity values of the typical grayscale images range from 0 to 255 require 8 
bits to represent them in binary, whereas Fibonacci, prime, Lucas, Catalan-Fibonacci, 
and natural representation require 12, 15, 12, 15, and 23 bits respectively.  Unlike the 
binary decomposition technique, the non-binary decomposition techniques do not result 
in a unique bit-stream representation of pixel values. This problem is resolved by 
careful selection of a unique bit-stream for each grayscale value. For example, a unique 
Fibonacci representation is obtained by applying Zeckendorf's theorem, while for the 
other non-binary decomposition techniques uniqueness is imposed by selecting the bit-
stream of lexicographically highest value. Examples of valid and non-valid 
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representation were presented in Chapter 3 for all studied decomposition techniques. 
Consequently, all these decomposition techniques have a common capacity limitation in 
that not every cover pixel is suitable for embedding.  
All these different decomposition schemes share similar objective and structure, and 
are based on using sequences of positive integers that are obtained by some interesting 
mathematical process. Here a question needs to be asked, if the choice of 
mathematically interesting sequences plays any unforeseen advantages, beyond 
increasing the number of image bit-plane that could be exploited in steganography? And 
if so, how strict, these processes need to be? Our interest, in relation to the first 
question, is related to our aim of using a representation of cover image pixels whose 
LSB plane has optimally high 0:1 ratio. Since the original steganography-related 
objective for using these different decomposition schemes was to increase the number 
of image bit-planes, another question arises as to whether the 0:1 ratio has a clear 
relationship, or not, to the increased number of bit-planes. In Section 6.2, we shall 
introduce a simple decomposition scheme, called the SS scheme, which results in 16 
bit-planes (i.e. higher number of bit-planes than all but one of the existing schemes) but 
has the same 0:1 ratio as the binary scheme which is lower than all above 
decomposition schemes. Table 6-1 illustrates the number sequences for each 
decomposition techniques, including the simple one, their number of bit-planes and the 
corresponding weights of these bit-planes. The weight of a bit-plane is linked to the 
effect of changing the corresponding bit on image quality and hence is dependent on 
their element in the adopted decomposition sequence. In Section 6.3, we introduce and 
investigate the performance of a new decomposition scheme, called the Extended-
Binary, obtained by a simple modification to the binary scheme resulting in 9 bit-planes 
only. For comparison, the above mentioned decomposition techniques will also be 
investigated and studied in terms of the ratio of 0:1 in cover image LSB plane in order 
to determine their suitability for our purpose. We shall demonstrate that there are 
noticeable variations in their performance in terms of 0:1 ratio, and that our Extended-
Binary scheme outperforms all but the natural one. In this respect, we shall demonstrate 
that the ratio of 0:1 is influenced more by the composition of the adopted sequence and 
perhaps the frequencies of the odd pixel values that are missing from the adopted 
sequence. In Section 6.3, we also compare the performance of the various 
decomposition techniques, including our schemes, in terms of payload capacity. In 
Section 6.4, we test the performance of our Extended-Binary scheme when it is 
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combined with/without the 3 pre-processing secret images of Chapter 5 in an LSBR-like 
steganography scheme. 
6.2 Simple Sequence based cover pixel value decomposition scheme 
(SS) 
In this section, a new pixel value decomposition scheme (Abdulla, et al., 2014) based 
on a specific representation is used to decompose pixel intensity values into 16 bit-
planes that has less impact on stego-image quality when embedding in bit-planes 
beyond the first 3 bit-planes. The new pixel value decomposition scheme is based on a 
set of numbers SS and can be defined as: 
SS = {1}   {2n | 1 ≤ n ≤ 16,   where n ≠ 9}                        (6. 1) 
In other words, SS = {1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32}. The 
reason for excluding number 18 in the sequence is to make the summation of the set SS 
equal to 255. All natural numbers between 0-255 can be represented using this proposed 
scheme. Using the SS sequence, each pixel value P is decomposed into 16 bit-planes, 
and the weight of the bit-planes can be defined as: 
 
P       
  
                           (6. 2) 
 
If any pixel value has more than one representation in this number system, the 
lexicographically highest of them is always taken, to assert invertible property (e.g., the 
number 12 has two different representations, namely 0000000000100010 and 
0000000000010100 since there are: 
(1 * 10) + (0 * 8) + (0  * 6) + (0  * 4) + (1  * 2) + (0  * 1) = 12 
 (0 * 10) + (1 * 8) + (0  * 6) + (1  * 4) + (0  * 2) + (0  * 1) = 12 
As 0000000000100010 lexicographically (from left to right) is higher than 
0000000000010100, then the valid SS representation of 12 will be 0000000000100010.  
 
where        {0,1}  and      =  
                                            
                               
                                             
  
 
    (6. 3) 
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This decomposition scheme differs from the existing non-binary schemes is that 
every cover pixel can be used for embedding when the 1
st
 LSB is used for secret hiding. 
The number of bit-planes and their corresponding weights for different pixel value 
decomposition schemes including the proposed SS scheme are presented in Table 6-1.   
It is clear that the competition between the non-binary decomposition techniques is 
increasing the number of bit-planes as well as reducing their weights in order to embed 
the secret bit in the higher bit-planes with less effect on the cover pixel value. 
Differences in weights associated to a given bit-plane between two schemes are related 
to differences in stego quality between these schemes when secrets are embedded in that 
bit-plane. For example, embedding a secret bit in 4
th
 bit-plane of the binary scheme may 
change the pixel value by 8, while embedding the secret bit in the 4
th
 bit-plane by the 
natural or Lucas may change the pixel value by 4. The only advantage of SS scheme 
over the binary scheme is that SS scheme could yield a better stego-image quality when 
the secrets are embedded in higher bit-planes (from 4
th
 bit-plane onward), due to the fact 
that SS assigns smaller weight to the 4
th
 bit-plane than the binary scheme. However, 
unlike the binary scheme, the SS scheme has a limitation in that not every cover pixel 
can be used for message embedding in the 2
nd
 or higher bit-planes.  An examination of 
the weights of the bit-planes beyond the 6
th
 for all the listed sequences that except for 
natural sequence, the stego-image quality (when embedding secrets in the 6
th
 bit-plane 
of cover images expressed by the SS scheme) is the best. But in this case, the quality 
could hardly be acceptable unless the embedded secret bits have large similarity the 6
th
 
bit-plane of the cover image. This discussion indicate that designing decomposition 
schemes for the sake of increasing the number of bit-planes is of limited interest 
confined to the desire of embedding secrets in higher bit-planes which can only be done 
at the expense of reduced stego-quality.   
It is clear that the SS scheme and the binary scheme have exactly the same 0:1 ratio 
in the LSB plane of any image. Where all other schemes could have higher 0:1 ratio in 
the LSB due to the fact that the ratio can be reduced by expressing the odd pixel values 
without necessarily using 1. Only SS and the binary have no odd numbers >1 present in 
their sequence.   
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Table 6-1: Number of bit-planes and their corresponding weights for different pixel value decomposition 
techniques 
Bit-plane # Binary Fibonacci Lucas prime CF SS Natural 
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 
3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 
4 8 5 4 5 5 6 4 
5 16 8 7 7 8 8 5 
6 32 13 11 11 13 10 6 
7 64 21 18 13 14 12 7 
8 128 34 29 17 21 14 8 
9  55 47 19 34 16 9 
10  89 76 23 42 20 10 
11  144 123 29 55 22 11 
12  233 199 31 89 24 12 
13    37 132 26 13 
14    41 144 28 14 
15    43 233 30 15 
16      32 16 
17       17 
18       18 
19       19 
20       20 
21       21 
22       22 
23       23 
 
In short, the SS is of no interest to the objectives of this thesis beyond using it here to 
illustrate that increasing 0:1 ratio in the LSB plane of cover images is not dependent on 
increasing number of bit-planes but rather the ability express as many odd pixel values 
as possible without using 1 in their partition.  In the next section, we use this conclusion 
to develop a new pixel value decomposition technique so called Extended-Binary is 
presented that aims to provide a higher 0:1 ratio of cover image LSB plane.  This will 
contribute to guiding us in our effort to increase the probability of similarity between 
both the cover pixels‘ LSB value and the secret bits value.  
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6.3 Extended-Binary cover pixel value decomposition scheme 
The defining sequence K of any pixel value decomposition scheme includes {1}. The 
above discussion show that increasing 0:1 ratio for any decomposition scheme can only 
be possible if pixel values that are expressed in the form k1+…+kr +1>1 with {k1,…,kr} 
can be expressed in an equivalent way without using 1. This cannot be done with the 
usual binary decomposition scheme, or any scheme whose defining sequence does not 
include any odd number >1, because 1 is the only odd value in its sequence. The only 
way to increase the 0:1 ratio for such decomposition schemes is to extend their defining 
sequences by adding odd integer. The question is which odd number is needed to 
achieve an optimal increase in 0:1 ratio. It is clear that the answer to such question is 
image dependent. For example, if an image consist of even pixel values only or very 
few odd pixel values then very little or no benefits can be gained in terms of 0:1 ratio by 
adding any odd number. However, in such a case, the LSB plane consists of very few 1s 
anyway. On the other hand, images whose pixel values are predominantly odd, their 
LSB plan has proportionately 1s and could greatly benefit from extending the binary 
decomposition scheme, or any scheme whose defining sequence does not include any 
odd number >1, to include odd integers. We shall focus first on extending the defining 
sequence of the binary decomposition scheme to deal with images where the ratio of 
odd pixel values is not marginal. 
Let I be an image of size N and let hist(I) be its histogram. The amount of increase in 
the 0:1 ratio as a result of adding an odd number x to the defining sequence B={1, 2, 4, 
8, 16, 32, 64,128} is dependent on hist(x) and hist(y) for all y > x that can be expressed 
without using the first element in the defining sequence. To determine which odd 
number can achieve best 0:1 ratio when added to the defining sequence of the binary 
scheme, we first observe that adding odd number n > 1 for which n+1≠ 2i cannot be a 
good candidates. Due to the use of lexicographically highest decomposition for the sake 
of uniqueness of representation will mean that beside several odd numbers, some even 
numbers will also have 1 as their LSB. For example, adding 5 will result in having 1 as 
the LSB of the even numbers in the set {6, 6+8, 6+(2x8), …, 6+(31x8)} besides some 
odd numbers such as 3, 9,11,17, and 19.  The smallest odd number for which n+1= 2
i
 is 
3 and in this case all odd numbers of the form 3+4k, for some k>0, will have 0 LSB, 
whereas the LSB of all other odd numbers >3 is 1. Therefore, including odd number 3 
increases the 0:1 ratio in the LSB plane by: 
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Based on the above discussion, a new cover image pixel value decomposition 
scheme that expands the binary scheme will be proposed and tested for suitability for 
embedding in terms of increased 0:1 ratio in the LSB plane. The proposed new is an 
extended version of the usual binary that adds only one bit-plane with the weight of odd 
(prime) number 3, and it will be referred to as Extended-Binary. The defining sequence 
of the Extended-Binary scheme is the set of numbers S defined as: 
                                                                                        (6. 5) 
In other words, S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128}. Using the set S, each pixel value P is 
decomposed into 9 bits and the weight of the bit-plane can be defined as: 
                                        
                                             P       
 
    
         
(6. 6) 
                                                              
  where        {0,1}  and      =     
                                              
                                           
  
           
(6. 7) 
If any pixel value has more than one representation in this number system, then we 
select the lexicographically highest such numbers to assert uniqueness of 
representations and the invertible property. For example, the pixel value 12 has two 
different representations in the Extended-Binary number system, namely 000011000 
and 000010101 such as: 
(1   8) + (1   4) + (0  3) + (0   2) + (0   1) = 12 
(1   8) + (0   4) + (1   3) + (0   2) + (1   1) = 12 
Since 000011000 is lexicographically (from left to right) is higher than 000010101, and 
then it will be chosen to validly representing 12 in the Extended-Binary number system, 
and 000010101 will be discarded. Table 6- 2 illustrates the valid representation of the 
Extended-Binary decomposition system for the pixel values from 0 to 255.  
In general and from our experiments, the number of cover pixels that their values are 
even is almost equal to those that their values are odd. This means by decomposing the 
cover pixel value using usual binary, the number of pixels that their LSB value is zero is 
almost equal to those that their LSB value is one, see Figure 6-2. Therefore by adding 
                  
 
 
    (6. 4) 
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only the one bit-plane with weight 3, results in increasing the 0:1 ratio in the LSB bit-
plane by the amounts discussed above in equation (6. 4).  For example, the odd pixel 
value 11 in binary decomposition = (8+2+1)    (00001011), while in the proposed 
Extended-Binary = (8+3)   (000010100). Thus, the set of numbers of the proposed 
decomposition technique is not designed randomly, but the reason of adding only a bit-
plane with weight of 3 is to make the LSB value of the some odd pixel value becomes 
zero. This results in increasing the ratio of cover pixels with LSB value zero. 
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Table 6- 2: Pixel values and their decomposition using Extended-Binary scheme. 
value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. 
0 000000000 64 010000000 128 100000000 192 110000000 
1 000000001 65 010000001 129 100000001 193 110000001 
2 000000010 66 010000010 130 100000010 194 110000010 
3 000000100 67 010000100 131 100000100 195 110000100 
4 000001000 68 010001000 132 100001000 196 110001000 
5 000001001 69 010001001 133 100001001 197 110001001 
6 000001010 70 010001010 134 100001010 198 110001010 
7 000001100 71 010001100 135 100001100 199 110001100 
8 000010000 72 010010000 136 100010000 200 110010000 
9 000010001 73 010010001 137 100010001 201 110010001 
10 000010010 74 010010010 138 100010010 202 110010010 
11 000010100 75 010010100 139 100010100 203 110010100 
12 000011000 76 010011000 140 100011000 204 110011000 
13 000011001 77 010011001 141 100011001 205 110011001 
14 000011010 78 010011010 142 100011010 206 110011010 
15 000011100 79 010011100 143 100011100 207 110011100 
16 000100000 80 010100000 144 100100000 208 110100000 
17 000100001 81 010100001 145 100100001 209 110100001 
18 000100010 82 010100010 146 100100010 210 110100010 
19 000100100 83 010100100 147 100100100 211 110100100 
20 000101000 84 010101000 148 100101000 212 110101000 
21 000101001 85 010101001 149 100101001 213 110101001 
22 000101010 86 010101010 150 100101010 214 110101010 
23 000101100 87 010101100 151 100101100 215 110101100 
24 000110000 88 010110000 152 100110000 216 110110000 
25 000110001 89 010110001 153 100110001 217 110110001 
26 000110010 90 010110010 154 100110010 218 110110010 
27 000110100 91 010110100 155 100110100 219 110110100 
28 000111000 92 010111000 156 100111000 220 110111000 
29 000111001 93 010111001 157 100111001 221 110111001 
30 000111010 94 010111010 158 100111010 222 110111010 
31 000111100 95 010111100 159 100111100 223 110111100 
32 001000000 96 011000000 160 101000000 224 111000000 
33 001000001 97 011000001 161 101000001 225 111000001 
34 001000010 98 011000010 162 101000010 226 111000010 
35 001000100 99 011000100 163 101000100 227 111000100 
36 001001000 100 011001000 164 101001000 228 111001000 
37 001001001 101 011001001 165 101001001 229 111001001 
38 001001010 102 011001010 166 101001010 230 111001010 
39 001001100 103 011001100 167 101001100 231 111001100 
40 001010000 104 011010000 168 101010000 232 111010000 
41 001010001 105 011010001 169 101010001 233 111010001 
42 001010010 106 011010010 170 101010010 234 111010010 
43 001010100 107 011010100 171 101010100 235 111010100 
44 001011000 108 011011000 172 101011000 236 111011000 
45 001011001 109 011011001 173 101011001 237 111011001 
46 001011010 110 011011010 174 101011010 238 111011010 
47 001011100 111 011011100 175 101011100 239 111011100 
48 001100000 112 011100000 176 101100000 240 111100000 
49 001100001 113 011100001 177 101100001 241 111100001 
50 001100010 114 011100010 178 101100010 242 111100010 
51 001100100 115 011100100 179 101100100 243 111100100 
52 001101000 116 011101000 180 101101000 244 111101000 
53 001101001 117 011101001 181 101101001 245 111101001 
54 001101010 118 011101010 182 101101010 246 111101010 
55 001101100 119 011101100 183 101101100 247 111101100 
56 001110000 120 011110000 184 101110000 248 111110000 
57 001110001 121 011110001 185 101110001 249 111110001 
58 001110010 122 011110010 186 101110010 250 111110010 
59 001110100 123 011110100 187 101110100 251 111110100 
60 001111000 124 011111000 188 101111000 252 111111000 
61 001111001 125 011111001 189 101111001 253 111111001 
62 001111010 126 011111010 190 101111010 254 111111010 
63 001111100 127 011111100 191 101111100 255 111111100 
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From Table 6- 2, it is noticeable that out of 256 values, 192 values have 0 LSB value. 
In other words, 75% of the values are their LSB value is zero. While for the same 
values, using usual binary decomposition technique, 50% of the values have LSB value 
of zero.  
6.3.1 Performance of Extended-Binary 
In this section, the performance, over our 2 experimental databases, of the Extended-
Binary pixel value decomposition technique will be investigated in terms of the ratio of 
0:1 ratio of the cover pixels‘ LSB plane. 
Results 
Table 6-3 and Table 6-4 present the 0:1 ratio of the cover pixels‘ LSB plane when we 
use the proposed Extended-Binary decomposition technique for the original cover 
images and their complement versions for the SIPI and BOSSBase databases, 
respectively. In the tables,    and    refer to the average 0:1 ratio, over all images in 
the databases, of original cover images    and their complement version      respectively, 
while max (  ,     ) refers to the selecting either    or     based on the maximum 0:1 
ratio for the images   and      .  
 
Table 6-3: Ratio of the cover pixels‘ LSB zero value of the Extended-Binary decomposition technique 
for SIPI database. 
         max(  ,   ) 
µ 0.756 0.770 0.774 
σ 0.071 0.055 0.054 
   0.440 0.701 0.701 
   1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
Table 6-4: Ratio of the cover pixels‘ LSB zero value of the Extended-Binary decomposition technique 
for BOSSBase database. 
         max(  ,   ) 
µ 0.753 0.753 0.756 
σ 0.021 0.014 0.014 
   0.424 0.667 0.702 
   0.892 0.906 0.906 
 
 
From Table 6-3 and Table 6-4, its noticeable that the    and     are different from 
each other, and selecting the one, either    or    , that has higher ratio of zero bits 
value has led to the improved result for the proposed Extended-Binary.  Interestingly, 
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the achieved 0:1 ratio is almost the same ratio obtained by counting the number of 
grayscale values whose LSB Extended-Binary bit value was 0 in Table 6- 2. This is 
particularly true for the larger database BOSSBase but to less extent for the SIPI.  These 
results also demonstrate that the proposed Extended-Binary achieves higher 0:1 ratio 
that can be estimated reasonably well from the translation tables. Furthermore, the result 
of max (  ,     ) is mostly greater than of    and    , and this proof that applying the 
proposed Extended-Binary on both the original image and its complement results in 
increased the 0:1 ratio. In other words, applying the Extended-Binary on both the cover 
image and its complemented version is better than applying on only the cover image in 
terms of providing higher 0:1 ratio of LSB plane.   
To determine whether adding other odd numbers >3 to the binary defining sequence 
can yield better performance. We expanded our experiments by testing different 
extended sequences by adding different prime numbers in the binary sequence to 
investigate whether provide more LSB = 0 or not. The following are the tested extended 
binary sequences: 
 
                   S1 = {1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128}      (6. 8) 
                   S2 = {1, 2, 4, 8, 11, 16, 32, 64, 128}      (6. 9) 
                   S3 = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 23, 32, 64, 128}     (6. 10) 
                   S4 = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 47, 64, 128}     (6. 11) 
                   S5 = {1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 97, 128}     (6. 12) 
Figure 6-1 presents the 0:1 ratio for the above different sequences of numbers plus 
the sequence S in equation (6. 5) used to decompose cover pixels value. The results are 
obtained for the same two experimental databases. 
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Figure 6-1: Ratio of cover pixels‘ LSB = 0 for the different sequences of numbers. 
 Figure 6-1 shows that compared to all the different versions of the Extended-Binary 
pixel value decomposition technique, the S version has the highest 0:1 ratio of the LSB 
plane for both databases, SIPI and BOSSBase. Adding prime number in higher bit-
planes of the usual binary, results in reducing the 0:1 ratio.  
Moreover, Figure 6-2 presents the results of the experiments conducted to test the 
performance, in terms of 0:1 ratio, of the different decomposition techniques including 
the S-version of the Extended-Binary, for both databases, SIPI and BOSSBase. 
Although our objectives in introducing the various decomposition schemes was about 
increasing the 0:1 ratio in the LSB plane, but we know that in the case of the Fibonacci 
decomposition scheme the drawback is in reduced payload capacity. This is due to the 
fact that not every cover pixel is suitable to embed the secret bit, because the embedding 
scheme may result in violating the Zeckendorf property.  Figure 6-3 presents the results 
of the same experiments in terms of remaining ratio of payload capacity for all 
decomposition techniques including ours, for all cover images in the two experimental 
databases, SIPI and BOSSBase.  
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1.0 
S S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
R
at
io
 o
f 
LS
B
 =
 0
 
Different Sequences 
SIPI 
Boss 
 133 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Ratio of LSB = 0 for different decomposition techniques. 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Ratio of capacity for different decomposition techniques. 
From Figure 6-2, it is noticeable that lowest 0:1 ratio in the LSB plane is obtained by 
decomposing the cover pixel values using the SS and binary schemes, both have exactly 
the same ratio. While the highest ratio is obtained when using the natural decomposition 
technique, and our S version of our Extended-Binary provides second highest 0:1 ratio 
compared to all other decomposition techniques.  
The idea of using image complement, in Chapter 5, to improve the 0:1 ratio of the 
secret image can be exploited to further improve the 0:1 ratio of the LSB plane cover 
images. We have modified our Extended-Binary and the Fibonacci decomposition 
schemes which would be referred to as the Extended-Binary_C, and the Fibonacci_C. In 
each case, we apply the decomposition scheme on both the image as well as its 
complement, and then select the image version that has the highest 0:1 ratio as the cover 
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image. The following table shows the effect of using both the image and its complement 
on the 0:1 ratio in the LSB plane, for the modified schemes. The table also includes the 
previously established performance of the other unmodified decomposition schemes. It 
is clear that the performance of the both modified schemes has improved over their 
unmodified versions. In fact, the improvement in the case of the Fibonacci_C scheme is 
somewhat significant, and it became better than the CF scheme. 
            
Table 6-5: Ratio of 0:1 LSB for different decomposition techniques. 
 Decomposition technique 
Databases 
SIPI Boss 
SS 0.47 0.49 
binary 0.47 0.49 
Fibonacci 0.59 0.61 
CF 0.60 0.61 
Fibonacci_C 0.65 0.63 
prime 0.67 0.65 
Lucas 0.70 0.71 
Extended-Binary 0.76 0.75 
Extended-Binary_C 0.77 0.76 
natural 0.94 0.94 
 
The effect of using the various pixel value decomposition schemes on the payload 
capacity, as shown in Figure 6-3, is in the opposite direction of their effect on the 0:1 
ratio. In fact, both SS and binary decomposition techniques have full capacity, i.e. every 
cover pixel is used for message embedding, while the worst capacity ratio results from 
using natural decomposition technique. The capacity ratio of the S-version of the 
Extended-Binary is only better than that of the natural decomposition technique. In 
Chapter 4, we have demonstrated that using a mapping-based has led to increasing the 
payload capacity for the Fibonacci decomposition scheme. In the next chapter, we shall 
demonstrate that the capacity drawback of using the Extended-Binary scheme, and some 
other schemes, can be remedied by adopting mapping-based embedding procedure 
instead of directly replacing the LSB bits of the cover pixel value.  
6.4 Experimental Results 
In this section, we test the performance of a simple embedding scheme that simply 
embeds secret image bit-stream into the LSB of an Extended-Binary decomposed cover 
image. The performance of this scheme is tested in terms of embedding efficiency, 
stego-image quality, and robustness against targeted steganalysis tools. In these 
experiments, we will use the 44 images the SIPI database by creating two size versions 
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of these images: a 512 x 512 to be used as cover images after decomposing their pixel 
values by the Extended-Binary, and a 128 x 256  for use as secret image. In our 
experiments, we test the performance of four embedding schemes: (1) Original_EB  by 
embedding the secret image bit-stream without pre-processing;  (2)  SISR_EB by 
embedding the secret images SISR bit-stream; (3)  SIM_EB by embedding the secret 
images SIM bit-stream, and (4) IWSIM_EB by embedding the secret images IWSIM bit-
stream. In total, for each of the 4 cases, we have 1936 stego-images. The experimental 
results will be presented in the next 3 parts and each case evaluation parameters 
represent the average value of the 1936 images in each case. 
1. Embedding Efficiency Evaluation 
Figure 6-4 presents the average value of the ratio of modified pixels to the length of 
the secret bit-stream, for the 4 embedding schemes, while Figure 6-5 presents the 
average value of the corresponding embedding efficiency. From Figure 6-4, it is clear 
that, for all embedding payloads, the IWSIM_EB causes the lower number of modified 
cover pixels after secret embedding compared to the others, and consequently it has 
higher embedding efficiency. Together the results in the two figures demonstrate that 
performance of the 4 schemes in terms of efficiency are in the order IWSIM_EB, 
SIM_EB, SISR_EB and Originl_EB from best to worst. This was to be expected 
because the corresponding 0:1 ratio in their secret bit-streams is 80%, 73%, 57%, and 
49% (see Chapter 5). Note that a higher 0:1 ratio reflects a higher similarity between the 
secret bits values and the cover pixels‘ LSB values, and in all schemes the 0:1 ratio of 
the Extended-Binary LSB is fixed at 77% (see Table 6-5). However, the achieved 
efficiency by IWSIM_EB is still lower than what is desired, this may have happened 
because of the skipping of bad cover pixels candidates and the majority of the skipped 
pixels may have a 0 LSB value. Note that in the Extended-Binary decomposition 
scheme, 47% of the cover pixels are skipped for embedding on average, see Figure 6-3. 
This limitation of skipping cover pixels of Extended-Binary decomposition scheme will 
be investigated and overcame in the next chapter. 
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Figure 6-4: The ratio of the modified pixels for the Original_EB, SISR_EB, SIM_EB, and IWSIM_EB 
schemes. 
 
 
Figure 6-5: The embedding efficiency for the Original_EB, SISR_EB, SIM_EB, and IWSIM_EB 
schemes. 
2. Stego-Image Quality Evaluation 
Figure 6-6 presents the average PSNR values of the stego-images relative to the 
cover images computed for the 4 tested embedding schemes. It is clear that for all 
embedding payload rate, PSNR of the SISR_EB embedding scheme is higher than that 
for all 3 other schemes, which is due to the fact that the length of the SISR bit-stream is 
always less than the length of the other bit-streams. While the PSNR values for other 
embedding schemes are almost the same. 
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Figure 6-6: The PSNR for the Original_EB, SISR_EB, SIM_EB, and IWSIM_EB schemes. 
3. Detectability Evaluation 
The detectability evaluation experiments carried out, in this section, for all the four 
embedding schemes and all payload rates determine their robustness against the three 
well-known steganalysis detectors (RS, DIH, and RWS). The experimental results again 
represent average values when the 1936 stego-images were tested by the three tools. 
Robustness Against RS Detector 
Figure 6-7 displays the RS diagram for tested embedding schemes, from which it is 
clear that for all tested embedding schemes, there are big differences between RM and 
RM-, SM and SM-, demonstrating that the tested schemes are not robust against the RS 
detector. However, the SIM_EB and the IWSIM_EB are slightly more robust against 
the RS at higher embedding rates. The reason is that in all tested schemes, the cover 
pixels‘ LSB value are flipped when the secret bit not match, and this cause asymmetry 
problem. Therefore, the embedded message can be detected by RS detector. In the next 
chapter, the asymmetry problem of Extended-Binary decomposition scheme will be 
sorted out. 
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Figure 6-7: RS diagram for the Original_EB, SISR_EB, SIM_EB, and IWSIM_EB schemes. 
 
Robustness Against DIH Detector  
For each embedding rate, the chart of Figure 6-8 presents the average values 
representing the probability of having a secret hidden at the given embedding ratio.  We 
can see that for the higher embedding rates, the IWSIM_EB is more robust against DIH 
compared to other tested embedding schemes. This is achieved due to a lower ratio of 
cover pixels are modified after secret embedding, see Figure 6-4. It is also clear that for 
all embedding rate, schemes that embedded the pre-processed secret image bit-streams 
are more robust than the one that embeds the original unprocessed secret image bit-
stream. This is because in all manipulated schemes in Chapter 5, SISR, SIM, and 
IWSIM, the ratio of 0:1 in their bit-streams are higher than the original secret image bit-
stream, reflecting on increasing the probability of similarity between the secret bit-
stream and the LSB of the Extended-Binary representation of the cover pixel value. 
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Figure 6-8: DIH steganalysis for the Original_EB, SISR_EB, SIM_EB, and IWSIM_EB schemes. 
Robustness Against RWS Detector  
Figure 6-9 presents the average values of the estimation ratios of the flipped cover 
pixels‘ LSB of the 4 tested embedding schemes at different embedding rates. These 
results that all schemes are robust against the RWS especially at high payload rates > 
40% with a maximum detection rates < 0.19.  As for the DIH detector, it is clear that at 
higher embedding rate, the IWSIM_EB is more robust against RWS compared to other 
tested embedding schemes. This is achieved due to the same reason discussed in DIH 
detector.  It is also clear that for higher embedding rate, schemes that embedded the 
manipulated secret image bit-stream are more robust than the one that is embedding the 
original secret image bit-stream.  
 
Figure 6-9: RWS steganalysis for the Original_EB, SISR_EB, SIM_EB, and IWSIM_EB schemes. 
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6.5 Discussion 
This chapter was devoted to complement the pre-processing of secret images by 
attempting to improve the similarity between the LSB plane of cover images with the 
preprocessed secret image bit-streams. Having found in Chapter 4 that the use of 
Fibonacci pixel decomposition scheme resulted in increasing the number of 0 LSB‘s 
within the three first decomposed bit-planes, was the main motive in investigating 
various decomposition schemes for their impact on 0:1 ratio in the LSB plane. We 
investigated existing schemes for cover pixel value decomposition such as binary, 
Fibonacci, prime, natural, Lucas, Catalan-Fibonacci (CF), and SS and introduced a new 
technique, Extended-Binary which decomposes cover pixel intensity values into 9 bit-
planes suitable for embedding purposes. Experimental results demonstrate that the 
Extended-Binary cover pixel value decomposition technique offers the 2
nd
 highest 0:1 
ratio (approximately 77% on average). The best performing decomposition scheme is 
based on the 23 bit-plane natural defining sequence which is not practical to use. The 
experimental work carried out on a sufficiently large number of natural images from 
two databases, and demonstrates the success of our approach to improve similarity 
between secret image bit-streams and the cover image LSB plane for improved stego-
image quality.  
The limitation of the Extended-Binary scheme is payload capacity, since not every 
pixel is usable for message embedding when the secret bit is embedding in the cover 
pixel‘s LSB and this is the case in all other pixel value decomposition schemes except 
binary based and SS based embedding techniques. Mapping based embedding technique 
can be used to remedy this drawback on the payload capacity. Moreover, these proposed 
processes, namely Extended-Binary and image complement, help achieve a 
steganography system that has high embedding efficiency, when pre-processed secret 
bit-streams are embedded. Furthermore, embedding the bit-stream, which contains 
higher ratio of bits that their values are zero in the cover image that higher ratio of its 
pixels‘ LSB has a value of zero, results in reducing the number of necessary cover 
pixels to be changed after message embedding.  
We have tested the performance of an embedding scheme that simply embeds secret 
image bit-stream into the LSB of an Extended-Binary decomposed cover image. The 
performance of this scheme is tested in terms of embedding efficiency, stego-image 
quality, and robustness against targeted steganalysis tools. Unfortunately, the 
embedding efficiency obtained by the IWSIM_EB is still lower than our objective; this 
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may have happened because of the skipping the bad candidate cover pixels.  Moreover, 
the majority of the skipped pixels seem to have 0 LSB value while the corresponding 
IWSIM secret bit-stream bits were 1‘s, i.e., dissimilarity. Note that in the Extended-
Binary decomposition scheme, 47% of the cover pixels are skipped for embedding on 
average, see Figure 6-3. This limitation of skipping cover pixels of Extended-Binary 
decomposition scheme is exacerbated by the fact that in this chapter our schemes simply 
embed in the LSB by replacement. In the next chapter, we shall demonstrate that using 
mapping tables, rather than replacement will help overcome this limitation. All the 
schemes have been shown to be robust, especially high embedding rates, against the 
DIH and the RWS steganalysis tools, but not so against the RS tool. This is somewhat 
similar to the robustness of the Fibonacci-Mapping based scheme proposed in Chapter 
4. 
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Chapter 7  
Mapping based Steganography for Hiding Secret 
Images in Cover Images  
In Chapter 4, we introduced the Fibonacci-Mapping based scheme to embed two 
secret bits in the first three bit-planes of the Fibonacci decomposed cover image using a 
mapping table rather than bit replacement for embedding. It increased capacity, had 
reasonable embedding efficiency, good robustness against two of the LSB targeted 
steganalysis tools, but had less than desirable stego-image quality. It helps set out a 
strategy to increase similarity between secret image bit-stream and the cover image LSB 
plane. For the secret image, we developed three successful algorithms (SIM, IWSIM, 
and SISR) in the Chapter 5 to be applied on the secret image prior to embedding which 
increased 0:1 ratio in the secret image bit-streams. Embedding pre-processed secret 
image bit-streams into cover images using the Fibonacci-Mapping based scheme 
resulted in improved embedding efficiency and maintaining un-detectability, but stego-
image quality still falls short of our expectation. In Chapter 6, we designed a new pixel 
value decomposition scheme (Extended-Binary) which resulted in achieving a 77% ratio 
of 0:1 in the cover images‘ LSB plane, and thereby the combined effects of this scheme 
and those in Chapter 5 contributed to increasing the probability of similarity between 
the secret image bit-stream and the cover image LSB plane. We tested the performance 
of an embedding scheme that directly replaces the LSB of the decomposed cover image 
pixel with a single bit of the pre-processed secret image bit-stream. Though, the various 
schemes performed well on almost all criteria, the embedding efficiency of our schemes 
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were still lower than what is achievable. LSB replacement based embedding seem to 
force the skipping of many bad candidate cover pixels, while mapping based embedding 
does not suffer from this problem. Extending the Fibonacci-Mapping table to other 
decomposition schemes may results in low stego-image quality due to the fact that we 
had to modify higher bit-planes. To overcome this drawback, in this chapter, we extend 
the proposed mapping based embedding table that presented in Chapter 4 by embedding 
one secret bit in each the decomposed cover pixel. In Section 7.1, we design mapping 
tables for the various decomposition schemes. In Section 7.2, we describe the various 
mapping based embedding schemes designed by pairing a secret pre-processing 
algorithm with a cover pixel decomposition model.  In Section 7.3, we shall test the 
performance of various Mapping-based combination schemes in terms of the above 
stated objectives of this thesis. 
7.1 Single bit Mapping Tables for pixel value decomposition schemes   
When secret bits are embedded by directly replacing the cover image LSB bits and 
the cover image pixels are decomposed by a non-binary technique,  many cover pixel 
values will violate the uniqueness representation rule have to be skipped. To avoid this, 
and maintain capacity, we use mapping table for embedding single secret bits.  In this 
section, we shall introduce a mapping table for each cover image pixel decomposition 
scheme use to implement embedding of single bits. These mappings are defined in 
terms of the first 3 bit-planes of the corresponding decomposition scheme. The structure 
of the investigated decomposition schemes results in reducing the number of possible 3 
bit patterns into 4 or 5 out of 8 different random 3-bit patterns. In order to present these 
tables in a compact and informative manner, we shall divide the rest of the section into 
two subsections depending on the number of rows in these tables.  
7.1.1 The 5-rows Mapping Tables (Fibonacci, prime, natural, and CF)  
The first three LSBs of a cover pixel value in Fibonacci, prime, natural and CF 
representation belong to the set {000, 001, 010, 100, 101}. Based on the mapping in 
Table 7-1, a secret bit embeds into a cover pixel by mapping it onto the first 3 LSBs. 
Note that all mentioned decomposition techniques have the same table. 
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Table 7-1: Mapping for Fibonacci, prime, natural, and CF. 
Cover bits 
Secret bit 
0 1 
000 000 001 
001 010 001 
010 010 001 
100 100 101 
101 100 101 
From Table 7-1, we observed the following points: 
1. The mapping table is applicable for the Fibonacci representation, and the 
receiver only extracts from the first LSB of the Fibonacci representation of the 
stego pixel value to get the message.  
2. The mapping is not applicable on the prime based embedding techniques 
because it is not feasible with some cover pixel values. For example, for the 
cover pixel value 16, its prime representation is (000000001000100) and after 
the secret bit value 1 is embedded based on the mapping presented in Table 7-1,  
the stego pixel value becomes 17.  Once the receiver decompose the stego pixel 
value based on prime decomposition technique, this bit-stream 
(000000010000000) represents the stego pixel value 17, and by extracting from 
the first LSB, the secret bit value 0 is obtained which is not equal to the 
embedded bit at the sender.  
3. The mapping is not applicable on the natural based embedding techniques 
because it is not feasible with some cover pixel values. For example, for the 
cover pixel value 4, its natural representation is (00000000000000000001000) 
and after the secret bit value 1 is embedded based on the mapping presented in 
Table 7-1,  the stego pixel value becomes 5.  Once the receiver decompose the 
stego pixel value based on natural decomposition technique, this bit-stream 
(00000000000000000010000) represents the stego pixel value 5, and by 
extracting from the first LSB, the secret bit value 0 is obtained which is not 
equal to the embedded bit at the sender.  
4. The mapping is not applicable on the CF based embedding techniques because it 
is not feasible with some cover pixel values. For example, for the cover pixel 
value 13, its CF representation is (000000000100000) and after the secret bit 
value 1 is embedded based on the mapping presented in Table 7-1,  the stego 
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pixel value becomes 14.  Once the receiver decompose the stego pixel value 
based on CF decomposition technique, this bit-stream (000000001000000) 
represents the stego pixel value 14, and by extracting from the LSB, the secret 
bit value 0 is obtained which is not equal to the embedded bit at the sender.  
7.1.2 The 4-rows Mapping Tables (Lucas, and Extended-Binary) 
The first three LSBs of a cover pixel value in Lucas and Extended-Binary 
representation belong to the set {000, 001, 010, 100}. Based on the mapping in Table 7-
2, a secret bit embeds into a cover pixel by mapping it onto the first 3 LSBs. 
Table 7-2: Mapping for Lucas and Extended-Binary. 
Cover 3-LSBs 
Mapping for Lucas Mapping for Extended-Binary 
Secret bit Secret bit 
0 1 0 1 
000 000 001 000 001 
001 010 001 010 001 
010 010 001 010 001 
100 100 101 100 001 
From Table 7-2, we observed the following points: 
1. The mapping is applicable on the Lucas based embedding techniques, and all 
pixel values are feasible with the mapping presented in Table 7-2. The only 
drawback of the Lucas is the quality of the stego-image, because the first 
element in the Lucas sequence starts by 2 and modifying the first LSB leads 
to change the pixel value by 2. While in other decomposition techniques the 
pixel value change by 1, when the secret bit is embedded in the LSB.  
2. The mapping is applicable on the Extended-Binary based embedding 
techniques, and all pixel values are feasible with the mapping presented in 
Table 7-2. The only drawback of the our proposed steganography approach 
based on the mapping in Table 7-2 is the stego-image quality, since in the 
Table 7-2 when the first three LSBs of the Extended-Binary representation of 
the cover pixel value is 100 and the secret bit value is 1, the cover pixels 
value will be changed by 2 after secret embedding. In other words, 12.5% of 
the modified pixels‘ value may change by 2.    
The advantage of this mapping for Extended-Binary representation is not only 
overcome the drawback of the payload capacity but also it has the advantage that do not 
suffer from the asymmetry problem. For example, in the usual binary based embedding 
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techniques (i.e. LSBR), the even pixels value either increases by one or left unchanged, 
and odd pixels value are decreased by one or left unchanged. In other words, the odd 
pixel value either becomes an even value of left unchanged and the even pixel value 
either becomes an odd value of left unchanged. This creates an imbalance in the 
embedding distortion in the stego-image and this imbalanced is called asymmetry 
problem, normally grouping in the pixel values (0, 1); (2, 3); . . . (254, 255), and can be 
exploited to easily detect the existence of a hidden message in a stego-image using 
some designed steganalysis techniques, such as PoV, even at a low embedding rate. 
While in our proposed mapping in Table 7-2, the odd pixel value may increase, decrease 
or left unchanged. For example, the odd pixel value 1 (000000001 in Extended-Binary 
representation) becomes 2 (000000010 in Extended-Binary representation) after the 
secret bit 1 is embedded, while in LSBR becomes 0. Also for the odd pixel value 3 
(000000100 in Extended-Binary representation) becomes (000000001 in Extended-
Binary representation) after the secret bit 1 is embedded, while in LSBR becomes 2. 
Beside of the property of our proposed steganography approach of decreasing the ratio 
of modified pixels after message embedding that makes the stego-image less detectable, 
another factor that leads to make our proposed steganography approach less detectable 
against steganalysis is the stego-image has not asymmetry problem. 
7.2 Efficient Secure image-based steganography schemes 
By combining each of our three secret image pre-processing algorithms (see Chapter 
5) with the pixel Extended-Binary decomposition scheme and using the corresponding 
mapping table, we get three different schemes that referred to by EB_SISR, EB_SIM, 
and EB_IWSIM.  Here, we shall present a general format of the embedding and 
extracting procedures for each possible paired scheme.  
Embedding Procedure 
1. Apply the SISR, SIM, or IWSIM on the secret image prior to embedding 
producing the secret bit-stream of length . 
2. Let    be the complement image of the cover image  . 
3. Decompose pixels value using the S-version of the Extended-Binary 
decomposition technique for   and     
4. Calculate the 0:1 ratio   and   
  of the LSB plane of the decomposed image    
and   , respectively. 
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5. If   >=    
 , then the image   is chosen as a cover, otherwise, image    is chosen 
as a cover. 
6. PRNG is used to select the cover pixel    randomly to be used for message 
embedding using an agreed seed. 
7. Based on the proposed mapping in Table 7-2, the secret bit    is embedding 
in    . 
Note that one bit is needed to be added to the secret bit-stream to indicate to the 
receiver whether the secret is embedded in the decomposed version of   or in that of   . 
In the first case, the bit is set to 0 otherwise it is set to 1. The flow chart below displays 
the embedding procedure of our proposed image-based steganography schemes 
(EB_SISR, EB_SIM, and EB_IWSIM). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7- 1: Embedding procedure for our image-based steganography schemes. 
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Extracting Procedure 
On receiving the perceived stego-image    first the indicator bit should be extracted 
from the agreed pixel location. 
1. If the indicator bit is 0, then extract the secret from  , else extract it from the 
complement image   . 
2. Use the same PRNG to select the random stego pixel   
  . 
3. Extract the secret bit    from the LSB of the Extended-Binary representation of 
   
  using the appropriate mapping table. 
4. The reverse procedure (decoding) of the SISR, SIM, or IWSIM is applied on the 
extracted bit-stream to reconstruct the embedded secret image. 
For comparison reasons, we also create two other mapping based embedding 
schemes using the above procedures for the IWSIM pre-processing but instead of the 
Extended-Binary the cover images will be decomposed by Fibonacci and Lucas. We 
refer to these schemes as Fib_IWSIM and L_IWSIM.  The flow chart below displays 
the extracting procedure of our proposed image-based steganography schemes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Extracting procedure for our image-based steganography schemes. 
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7.3 Experimental Setup and Results 
In this section, the performance evaluation of the proposed image-based 
steganography schemes (EB_SISR, EB_SIM, EB_IWSIM, Fib_IWSIM, and L_IWSIM) 
is presented. Four sets of experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed steganography schemes: The first is to measure payload capacity, the second 
is to measure the embedding efficiency, the third is to test the stego-image quality, and 
the fourth one is to measure the detectability/security of the embedded message. In each 
of the four experiments, the results are compared with the well-known steganography 
techniques of LSBR, LSBM, LSBMR, and ILSBMR. The last two techniques have the 
best embedding efficiency among existing schemes in the literature. Our experimental 
datasets in these tests are: 
1. SIPI database: 44 images of size 512 x 512 are used as cover images. For each 
cover image, we embedded 44 versions of these images but resized to 128 x 256 
as secrets resulting in 1936 stego-images for each tested steganography technique 
including our proposed.  
2. BOSSBase database: 1000 images of size 512 x 512 are used as cover images. 
However, embedding 1000 secret images in 1000 cover images is not practical, 
so we use two standard images, namely Lenna and Jet, are resized to 128 x 256  
as secret images, see Figure 7-3. Each of Lenna and Jet images is embedded in 
each of the 1000 cover images resulting 2000 stego-images for each test.  
Note that, the resulted bit-stream contains 78% and 80% of the bits that their value is 
zero for each image Lenna and Jet respectively after the proposed IWSIM is applied, 
while resulted bit-stream contains 63% and 72% of the bits that their value is zero for 
each image Lenna and Jet respectively after the proposed SIM is applied. Moreover, 
after the proposed SISR is applied on the image Lenna and Jet, the number of resulted 
bits that represent the image is reduced to 186684 and 185967 bits respectively. 
Furthermore, the resulted bit-stream from SISR that represent image Lenna contains 
55% of bits with zero value, and the resulted bit-stream from SISR that represent image 
Jet contains 57% of bits with zero value.  
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Figure 7-3: Secret images: Lenna and Jet. 
1. Payload Capacity Evaluation 
The capacity of the steganography techniques can be evaluated by measuring the 
number of the allowed embedded secret bits proportion to the cover image size using 
equation (2. 3), in Chapter 2. Table 7-3, displays the capacity of the tested 
steganography techniques.  
Table 7-3: Capacity of the tested steganography techniques. 
 LSBR LSBM LSBMR ILSBMR EB_SISR EB_SIM EB_IWSIM Fib_IWSIM L_IWSIM 
SIPI 1.0 1.0 0.952 0.952 1.0 0.994 0.978 0.978 0.978 
BOSSBase 1.0 1.0 0.978 0.978 1.0 0.993 0.979 0.979 0.979 
From Table 7-3, it is noticeable that each of the LSBR, LSBM and proposed 
EB_SISR technique has full capacity, and EB_SIM is only marginally lower. The 
lowest average capacity (0.952) is achieved by the LSBMR and ILSBMR for the SIPI 
database. In all other cases, a capacity of around 0.98 is achieved. The loss in capacity 
by the LSBMR and ILSBMR technique is entirely due to the exclusion of the saturated 
cover pixel values (i.e. 0 or 255) which account for an average of 4.8% for the SIPI 
images and 2.2% for the BOSSBase database. Whereas the loss capacity in the cases of 
EB_SIM and EB_IWSIM is accounted for by the size of the side information needed to 
send to the receiver, and in the case of EB_IWSIM there is an increase in the number of 
bits representing coefficients in some Wavelet sub-bands. It is important to realise that 
in reality, EB_SISR achieves more than full capacity, if we take into account the fact 
that SISR reduces the secret image bit-stream to 70% of its original size. 
2. Embedding Efficiency Evaluation 
Theoretically, the probability ratio of pixels that could be modified after message 
embedding is proportional to the embedded secret image size, and for the EB_IWSIM 
steganography scheme is 0.338. This is calculated by using equation             (7. 1): 
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 ) + ((1-   )  (1-   
 ))                (7. 1) 
Where    is the ratio of 0:1 in the secret image bit-stream, and   
  is the ratio of 0:1 of 
the cover pixels‘ LSB value. 
For instant, on average, the IWSIM  achieves 80% ratio of 0:1 in the secret bit-
streams while the Extended-Binary LSB plane of the cover images  yield a 77%  of 0:1 
ratio, and therefore, the probability of modifying the cover pixel by the EB_IWSIM 
scheme is: 
              ) + ((0.20   0.23)) = 0.338 
The probability of modifying cover image pixels after embedding secret images using 
traditional LSBR scheme is: 
            ) + ((0.5   0.5))= 0.5 
This is because on average secret images bit-streams have a 50% ratio of 0:1 (see Table 
7-4), and the same is true about the LSB plane of the cover images (decomposed using 
traditional binary decomposition), see Figure 6-2. 
Table 7-4: Ratio of 0:1 in the binary representation of the tested secret images. 
Databases 0:1 Ratio in original image 
SIPI 0.494 
BOSSBase 0.540 
 
On the other hand, we calculated the actual ratios of modified pixels (to the 
embedded payload) for each of the 8 tested schemes.  Figure 7- 4, Figure 7- 5, and 
Figure 7- 6 present the average of these ratios for the stego-images in the SIPI database, 
BOSSBase database when the Lenna secret image is embed, and BOSSBase database 
when the Jet secret image is embed, respectively. The corresponding embedding 
efficiency charts are presented in Figure 7-7, Figure 7-8, and Figure 7-9, respectively. 
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Figure 7- 4: Ratio of modified pixels for the SIPI experimental images. 
 
 
Figure 7- 5: Ratio of modified pixels of the cover BOSSBase image when Lenna is the secret image. 
 
Figure 7- 6: Ratio of modified pixels of the cover BOSSBase image when Jet is the secret image. 
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From the above charts, one can see that the EB_IWSIM outperforms all other 
schemes for the payload of 60% or more, but it is outperformed by the LSBMR and 
ILSBMR at the lower embedding rates. Note that the EB_IWSIM embedding scheme at 
the lower embedding rate, the effect of including the side information is the main reason 
for this low performance. These results, also explain a similar pattern of performance of 
the various schemes with regards to the embedding efficiency as displayed in Figure 7-7 
to Figure 7-9. Again EB_IWSIM outperforms all other schemes at embedding rates of 
60% and above.   
 
 
 
Figure 7-7: Embedding efficiency for the SIPI database. 
 
 
Figure 7-8: Embedding efficiency for the BOSSBase database when the secret image Lenna is 
embedded. 
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Figure 7-9: Embedding efficiency for the BOSSBase database when the secret image Jet is embedded. 
3. Stego-Image Quality Evaluation 
We evaluated the stego-image quality for all the above nine embedding schemes in 
terms of the PSNR values with respect to the original cover images. The results shown 
in Figure 7-10, Figure 7-11, and Figure 7-12, and present the average PSNR value for 
the all the experimental data.    
 
Figure 7-10: Average PSNR for the tested steganography schemes for the SIPI database. 
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Figure 7-11: PSNR for the BOSSBase stego images when the secret image Lenna is embedded. 
 
 
Figure 7-12: PSNR for the BOSSBase stego images when the secret image Jet is embedded. 
 
Clearly, the PSNR of the LSBMR and ILSBMR scored the highest value compared 
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Note that 25% of the lowest 3 bit-planes of the Extended-Binary decomposed cover 
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2, i.e. 12.5% of the cover pixels may change by 2.  The reason of that the PSNR of the 
EB_IWSIM is higher than the PSNR of the EB_SIM and EB_SISR is the ratio of 0:1 of 
the IWSIM is higher than SIM and SISR and this reduces the probability of changing 
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4. Detectability Evaluation 
In this section, we report on experiments conducted to test the robustness against 
steganalysis tools of the various mapping table schemes that are used for embedding 
pre-processed secret image bit–streams in cover images whose pixels are decomposed 
in various ways. Seven well-known steganalysis detectors have been used to evaluate 
the detectability of the proposed steganography technique. These steganalysis 
techniques are PoV, RS, DIH, WS, RWS, LSBMS, and SRM that were fully described 
in Chapter 2 and reviewed in Chapter 3. 
Robustness Against RS Detector 
Figure 7- 13, Figure 7-14, and Figure 7-15 are presenting the RS diagram for the 
tested steganography techniques for each SIPI database, BOSSBase database when the 
Lenna secret image is embedded, and BOSSBase database when the Jet secret image is 
embedded, respectively. Firstly, these results confirm what is already known that LSBR 
is not robust against the RS detector. Whereas all other tested embedding schemes 
including ours, there are no differences between RM and RM-, SM and SM-, such 
differences, and thereby demonstrating robustness against RS detector. 
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Figure 7- 13: RS diagram for all tested steganography schemes for SIPI database. 
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Figure 7-14: RS diagram for all tested schemes for the BOSSBase database when Lenna image is 
embedded. 
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Figure 7-15: RS diagram for all tested schemes for the BOSSBase database when Jet image is embedded. 
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Robustness Against PoV Detector 
We repeat the same experiments, done for RS, but to test robustness against the PoV 
detector, and the corresponding represents the PoV attack for only one stego-image 
(first stego-image in each database) as a representative sample, but in the appendix we 
put PoV diagram for 5 randomly selected stego-images for each embedding scheme and 
both databases. Clearly, all schemes, except LSBR, are undetectable by PoV detector at 
all payload rates, i.e. are robust against PoV.  
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Figure 7-16: PoV diagram for sample cover image from SIPI database. 
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Figure 7-17: PoV diagram for sample cover image from BOSSBase when the Lenna image was 
embedded. 
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Figure 7-18: PoV diagram for sample cover image from BOSSBase when the Jet image was embedded. 
Robustness Against DIH Detector 
We now report on the results of testing the same set of embedding schemes, as in the 
above sections, against the difference image histogram DIH detector using the same set 
of experimental cover and secret images. Figure 7-19, Figure 7-20, and Figure 7-21 are 
presenting the average values of the estimated length of the embedded secret image bit-
stream at the different payload rates. Again, these results demonstrate that the LSBM 
and all mapping based embedding including the Fib_IWSIM and L_IWSIM are 
 165 
 
undetectable by the DIH tool at all embedding rates with LSBM being the best 
performing scheme but only marginally better than our schemes. Again these 
experiments re-affirm the known fact that the LSBR is detectable by the DIH, while the 
DIH is able just to detect the ILSBMR at high embedding rate but not with high 
confidence.  
 
 
Figure 7-19: DIH steganalysis for all tested steganography schemes for SIPI database. 
 
 
Figure 7-20: DIH steganalysis for BOSSBase database when Lenna image was embedded. 
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Figure 7-21:  DIH steganalysis for BOSSBase database when Jet image was embedded. 
Robustness Against WS Detector 
We now report on the results of experiments to test the same set of embedding 
schemes, as in the above sections, against the weighted stego WS detector which 
estimates the length of embedded secret by solving a least square optimisation problem 
applied to versions of the input stego-image. For testing, we use the same set of 
experimental cover and secret images. Figure 7-22, Figure 7-23, and Figure 7- 24 are 
presenting the average values of the estimation results for the stego-images obtained 
from the SIPI database, BOSSBase database when the Lenna secret image is embedded, 
and BOSSBase database when the Jet secret image is embedded, respectively. The 
pattern of these results almost mimic those obtained when testing for robustness against 
DIH, i.e. the LSBM and all mapping based embedding including the Fib_IWSIM and 
L_IWSIM are undetectable by the WS tool at all embedding rates with LSBM being the 
best performing scheme but only marginally better than our schemes. Moreover, these 
experiments re-affirm the known fact that the LSBR is detectable by the WS, and WS is 
able just to detect the ILSBMR at high embedding rate but not with high confidence. 
WS outputs a slightly higher estimated secret length when EB_IWSIM stego-image is 
tested, compared to our other schemes, but this is still within the margin of error. 
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Figure 7-22: WS steganalysis for stego-images in SIPI database. 
 
 
Figure 7-23:  WS steganalysis for BOSSBase stego-images when Lenna image was embedded. 
 
 
 
Figure 7- 24: WS steganalysis for BOSSBase stego-images when Jet image was embedded. 
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Robustness Against RWS Detector 
Having shown the robustness of our schemes against the WS tool, we next 
investigated robustness against the revised version of WS.  Here, we present the results 
of investigation experiments to test the same set of embedding schemes, as in the above 
sections, against the revised WS detector using the same set of experimental cover and 
secret images.  Figure 7-25, Figure 7-26, and Figure 7-27 are presenting the average 
values of the estimation results of the flipped cover pixels‘ LSB for tested 
steganography schemes for each SIPI database, BOSSBase database when the Lenna 
secret image is embedded, and BOSSBase database when the Jet secret image is 
embedded, respectively. The pattern of these results is very similar to those obtained 
when testing for robustness against WS, except that the LSBM is the best performing 
scheme. Moreover the LSBM and all mapping based embedding including the 
Fib_IWSIM and L_IWSIM are undetectable by the RWS tool, at all embedding rates, 
with marginal differences between these schemes. The RWS predicts a slightly higher 
estimated secret length for EB_IWSIM than our other schemes. Note that, for all 
Extended-Binary decomposed schemes, the mapping table embedding may result in 
changing the pixel values by 2.   
 
 
 
Figure 7-25: RWS steganalysis for all tested steganography schemes for SIPI database. 
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Figure 7-26:  RWS steganalysis for BOSSBase database when Lenna image was embedded. 
 
 
Figure 7-27:  RWS steganalysis for BOSSBase database when Jet image was embedded. 
 
Robustness Against LSBMS Detector 
The LSBMS is a targeted tool but was designed to detect the LSB matching based 
embedding techniques. Here we focus on evaluating the robustness of the same set of 
embedding schemes, tested in this chapter, against the LSBMS.  In these experiments, 
we input the same set of stego-images obtained from the experimental cover and secret 
images. The tool will return the number of images that are detected as stego-images, i.e. 
containing a payload.  Figure 7-28, Figure 7- 29, and Figure 7- 30 sketches the average 
curves of the ratio of the detected stego-images proportion to the number of images in 
the tested database for tested steganography schemes for each SIPI database, BOSSBase 
database when the Lenna secret image is embedded, and BOSSBase database when the 
Jet secret image is embedded, respectively. Clearly, all our EB-based schemes 
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(EB_SISR, EB_SIM, and EB_IWSIM) as well as Fib_IWSIM, and L_IWSIM are 
robust against the LSBM and are less detectable even than cover images. All other 
schemes are outperformed by our schemes, but LSBMR is best among them in that few 
are detected as not cover images at high embedding rate.  
 
 
Figure 7-28: LSBMS steganalysis for SIPI database. 
 
 
Figure 7- 29:  LSBMS steganalysis for BOSSBase database when Lenna image was embedded. 
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Figure 7- 30:  LSBMS steganalysis for BOSSBase database when Jet image was embedded. 
Robustness Against SRM Detector 
Finally, we shall test the performance of all the above schemes against the only 
known blind steganalysis tools, namely the SRM tool. We repeated the same set of 
experiments above but this time to test robustness against the SRM. Note that this tool 
requires the input of a large set of cover images together with their corresponding stego-
images. In the case of BOSSBase, we input the selected 1000 cover images, the 
corresponding 1000 stego-images after embedding Lenna, as well as the corresponding 
1000 stego-images when Jet is embedded. For the 44 images in SIPI, we have 1936 
stego-images and we repeated the same original 44 cover images 44 times to make up a 
total of 1936 cover images. The SRM tool uses half of the cover image set together with 
the same number of stego-images for training and the rest for testing.  The tool is a 
binary based classification where an input test image is declared as a cover or a stego 
using a large number of local distortion features. Figure 7-31, Figure 7-32, and Figure 
7- 33 show the average ratio of the detected stego-images to the number of tested 
images. In all figures, it is obvious that all tested schemes are detected by SRM. 
Obviously, SRM can easily find sufficient distortion features that result from 
embedding messages. The only way to withstand such attack is to follow the strategy 
that was used by the UNIWARD (Holub, et al., 2014) whereby embedding avoids 
smooth and clean edge regions. However, for embedding rate > 40% even this specially 
designed scheme is detected.    
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Figure 7-31: SRM steganalysis of SIPI database. 
 
 
Figure 7-32:  SRM steganalysis of BOSSBase database when Lenna image was embedded. 
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Figure 7- 33:  SRM steganalysis of BOSSBase database when Jet image was embedded. 
7.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we developed the last step of our strategy identified in Chapter 4 for 
designing robust steganography embedding schemes that meet the main success criteria 
on stego-image quality, embedding efficiency, payload capacity, and robustness against 
known steganalysis tool. The strategy was based on increasing similarity between the 
secret image bit-stream and the cover image LSB plane. Earlier in Chapters 5 and 6, we 
developed the first two steps in this strategy by pre-processing the secret image bit-
streams for increased 0:1 ratio and developed cover pixel decomposition model that also 
results in increased 0:1 ratio in the cover LSB plane. The variable significant increases 
in 0:1 ratio in the cover image LSB plane (using different pixel decomposition models) 
and in the secret image bit-stream (using different algorithms) have increased the 
probability of similarities between the two input data to any embedding scheme. 
However, the different non-binary pixel decomposition schemes resulted in decreasing 
the number possible patterns for the 3 first bit-planes which tilted the balance in favour 
of using mapping tables rather than any other embedding scheme. Accordingly, various 
mapping based embedding schemes, each corresponding to a choice of a pixel 
decomposition scheme and a secret image bit-stream that is pre-processed by one of the 
3 such algorithms. .  
The high level of success of the adopted strategy and that of the last step is 
demonstrated by the extensive experimental work done in this chapter to evaluate the 
performance of the set of proposed and revised steganography techniques (EB_SISR, 
EB_SIM, EB_IWSIM, Fib_IWSIM, and L_IWSIM) in terms of capacity, embedding 
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efficiency, stego-image quality, and robustness against several well-known steganalysis 
tools. Experimental results demonstrated these schemes compares well with, and 
outperform, existing schemes on many of the stated success criteria. The following is a 
summary of the evaluation tests: 
1- Although in terms of payload capacity some of the schemes are outperformed by 
the LSBR and LSBM, but very marginally and this is because the side 
information needed for the SIM and IWSIM pre-processing algorithms. 
Moreover, the EB_SISR has significantly improved capacity compared to LSBR 
and LSBM as a result of its unintended compression effect on the length of the 
secret image bit-stream. 
2- For embedding rates > 40%, the best of our schemes EB_IWSIM outperforms all 
tested steganography schemes in terms of the ratio of modified cover pixels and 
embedding efficiency. In fact, while existing schemes has constant efficiency 
rates overall embedding payloads, our schemes‘ efficiency increases with 
increased payload. This is to the effect of the side information at low payloads.   
3- In terms of stego-image quality, the PSNR values achieved by our schemes are 
almost comparable to all tested existing schemes. In fact, our revised Fib_IWSIM 
is only marginally outperformed by the LSBM and LSBMR.  The shortcoming of 
our schemes in relation to PSNR is due to the fact that sometimes the cover pixel 
value is changed by 2 after secret embedding. 
4- All our schemes outperform the LSBR in terms of robustness against all targeted 
steganalysis tools. Unfortunately, like all existing tested schemes, it detected by 
the universal SRM tool. 
The fact that results are averaged over a large number of cover images is an incentive 
to select cover images carefully to overcome the marginal shortcoming on stego-image 
quality. Moreover, we can also apply the various secret image bit-streams pre-
processing schemes adaptively to achieve optimal results. This is to be done in the 
future.  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
Digital steganography is an information security mechanism that is generally 
concerned with concealing the presence of secret data by embedding in another 
innocuous data/object to be transmitted as mundane communication, i.e. making the act 
of communication itself a secret. It is becoming an alternative, but complementary, to 
cryptography in protecting sensitive secrets where adversaries are aware of the presences 
of the secret but cannot decipher.  
This thesis is devoted to investigating steganography schemes for hiding secret image 
files in image files. It was initially motivated by an interest in protecting sensitive 
communications for use by intelligence and law enforcing agencies in crime 
fighting/prevention which necessitate the secure and preserving privacy exchange of 
photos of crime scene and face images of suspects. Moreover, forensic investigators 
often need to take and transmit left fingerprints, for later comparison without 
undermining the integrity of the evidence. Armed forces need such as exchanging 
military maps or surveillance video in hostile environment/situations. Modern health care 
systems required by law to maintain the privacy of critical information when storing or 
exchanging patient‘s medical images such as X-ray. Furthermore, financial and 
commercial organizations such as banks can benefit from such technology for remote 
authentication.  
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The main objectives of the work conducted in this thesis were the design, 
development and testing the performance of secure and efficient steganography schemes 
for embedding secret images in cover images. Over the recent history of digital 
communication, many steganography techniques have been developed for embedding 
secrets into digital images primarily by manipulating their least significant bit-planes 
(LSBs). Although, the changes to the content of cover images may not be visible to 
human eye, but the presences of the secret may become detectable by automatic 
steganalysis tools that conduct statistical analysis tests and/or search for distortions to 
local features. Having conducted a literature review of the areas of digital steganography, 
and steganalysis, we identified the main challenges that steganographers face as well as 
the criteria for success. The embedding capacity of the cover image while protecting 
against detectability is a particularly challenge. Embedding longer secret bit-streams, 
bound to result in some form of local distortion and quality degradation of the stego-
image. Robustness of embedding schemes against adversary attacks is closely related to 
detectability, it is dependent on the maintenance of image quality, and it gets more 
difficult the higher the payload is.  While many existing spatial domain steganography 
schemes have been developed to perform well with respect to one or more of the above 
requirements, this thesis aims to achieve, or pave the way to achieve, optimal 
performance in terms of all these objectives.  
Having reviewed the literature on existing spatial domain based digital steganography 
and steganalysis tools, we designed two embedding schemes: Indexing-based and 
Fibonacci-Mapping. In both cases, more than the LSB plane used for hiding the secret. 
The first scheme, embeds only one bit in each cover pixel and uses a combination of 
pre-processing the cover image pixels to eliminate the possibility of having equal bits in 
the 2LSB planes, followed by a system that report the index of the bit that matches the 
secret bit. Compared to the LSBR, this scheme resulted in lower stego-image quality 
and embedding efficiency, but it was robust against two of the steganalysis tools, DIH 
and RWS. The second approach extended the Fibonacci-like steganography by bit-
plane(s) mapping instead of bit-plane(s) replacement to embed two secret bits in the 
first three Fibonacci bit-planes. Unlike the original Fibonacci scheme, no cover pixels 
were excluded from embedding because actions are taken to comply with Zeckendorf 
theorem. Consequently, this scheme has double the embedding capacity of LSBR.  
Furthermore, it is secure against steganalysis techniques such as RS, DIH, and RWS.  
The improved capacity and robustness was at the expense of further reduction of stego-
image quality compared to the Indexing-based scheme. Although, these two schemes 
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did not achieve the sought after objectives, but help develop our strategy for the 
following work that is based on pre-processing the secret image as well as considering 
various pixel value decomposition models but for different purposes.  
The source of difficulty in addressing the different challenges, mentioned above, is 
related to the fact that the embedding process may result in changing cover image pixel 
values. Most schemes make changes to the LSB (or higher) bit-plane of cover images 
that may result in local distortions even when these changes are not easy to detect by the 
human eye. Embedding efficiency is the most important quantifiable attribute for digital 
steganography as a measure of the pixel value changes. It has a direct influence on the 
stego-image quality and message detectability/security without compromising payload 
capacity. The central focus of our research was therefore on the design of embedding 
schemes that have high efficiency and message un-detectability while maintaining 
payload capacity. Our approach is to reduce the effect of the act of hiding a secret image 
in digital images by minimising the number of changed pixels.  
For LSB based embedding schemes, pixel values change whenever there are 
dissimilarities between the cover LSB plane and the secret image bit-stream, and in 
these cases the embedding process may lead to change to the statistical parameters of 
stego-image bit-planes as well as to local image features (computable linear relationship 
between neighbouring pixels). Steganalysis tools exploit these effects to model targeted 
as well as blind attacks. Usually, these problems are dealt with by randomising the 
changes to the LSB, using elaborate schemes to embed one or more secret bits in 
different/multiple cover bit-planes, or embedding in noise-tolerant regions.  
Our innovative approach to minimise the embedding-induced changes was based on 
developing efficient image procedures and models to manipulate the cover and the 
secret images, prior to embedding, that increases similarity between the cover image 
LSB plane and the secret image bit-stream. Note that most existing image-based 
steganography techniques focus on the embedding strategy and give no consideration to 
pre-processing the secret/cover image except encrypting or compressing the secret 
image. One of the premises of this thesis was applying carefully selected pre-processing 
techniques could help enhance the efficiency and security of the steganography systems. 
This was achieved in two novel steps that increase the 0:1 ratio in both the secret bit-
stream and the cover LSB plane.   
Image pixel values, in general, are not uniformly distributed, as is the case of random 
secrets, and different blocks in the image have a different texture and different statistics. 
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Therefore, secret images bit-streams are different from general secret bit-stream dealt 
with in the literature.  It is these characteristics that have been exploited in this thesis to 
develop three secret image pre-processing algorithms that help transform the secret 
image bit-stream for increased 0:1 ratio. The first two algorithms (SIM, IWSIM) are 
similar, but one in spatial domain and the other in the Wavelet domain (using integer-
valued Wavelet filter), and are based on a modified version of statistical coding used for 
image compression. The modification is based on mapping the most frequent pixels 
(Wavelet sub-band coefficients) onto bytes with more 0s. The third pre-processing 
algorithm (SISR), process blocks by subtracting their means from all pixel values and 
hence reducing the required number of bits needed to represent the pixel residues in 
these blocks. In other words, SISR also reduces the length of the secret bit-stream 
without loss of information. The extensive experimental testing demonstrated that these 
algorithms yield a significant increase in the secret image bit-stream 0:1 ratio with the 
Wavelet version, IWSIM algorithm, yielding the best performance with an average ratio 
of 80:20.  
For the second step, i.e. manipulating the cover image, we revisited the various 
existing models of pixel value decomposition schemes including the Fibonacci and 
other defining sequences that differ from the usual binary scheme. However, while 
existing steganography schemes use such models simply to expand the number of bit-
planes to enable embedding in higher bit-planes than LSB, we aimed to investigate the 
capabilities of these models for increasing the 0:1 ratio in the corresponding LSB plane. 
We investigated a number of pixel value decomposition models (including Fibonacci, 
prime, natural, Lucas, and Catalan-Fibonacci) and determine the best decomposition that 
achieves the highest ratio of 0:1 in the cover LSB plane. A number of such existing 
techniques indeed can lead to increased 0:1 ratio in the corresponding LSB plane. 
Consequently, we developed a new cover pixel value decomposition technique, referred 
to as the Extended-Binary, which is an extension of the binary decomposition scheme, 
that has results in the cover image LSB plane having one of the highest ratios of 0 to 1 
among a variety of pixel decomposition schemes, 77% on average.  
Having successfully fulfilled the objectives set out in the above 2-steps strategy, we 
embarked on designing an embedding scheme that benefits from the achieved 
similarities between the various pre-processed secret image bit-stream and the 
decomposed cover-image LSB plane. We designed embedding schemes that simply 
embeds by replacement the various pre-processed secret image bit-streams into the LSB 
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of an Extended-Binary decomposed cover image. The various schemes have shown good 
but modestly improved performance. Unfortunately, the embedding efficiency obtained 
by the best-performing scheme IWSIM_EB was still lower than what was desired, due to 
skipping the bad candidate cover pixel. Skipping cover pixels is a problem that is 
associated with LSB by the replacement that results in violating the uniqueness of pixel 
representation by non-binary decomposition schemes.  
 The Fibonacci-Mapping scheme, designed at the early stages, benefited from the 
observation that there are only 5 possible patterns for the Fibonacci decomposed cover 3 
first bit-planes. On examination of all the non-binary pixel decomposition schemes, we 
found that in all these cases the number of possible patterns for the 3 first bit-planes is 
reduced to 4 or 5 instead of 8. We used this fact to design bit-plane mappings suitable for 
embedding, instead of LSB replacement, in order to make each cover pixel a suitable 
candidate for secret bit embedding and avoid skipping. We used these mapping-based 
embedding schemes to create a number of steganography schemes, one for each 
combination of cover image decomposition model and a secret image bit-stream pre-
processing algorithm. The extensive experimental works done to test the performance of 
these new and revised schemes have shown beyond any doubt the success of our 
strategy.  
In particular, the various stego-images obtained by these schemes are minimally 
distorted as a result of reduced number of changed cover pixels post embedding and by 
implication higher embedding efficiency. Overall, the set of proposed and revised 
steganography techniques (EB_SISR, EB_SIM, EB_IWSIM, Fib_IWSIM, and 
L_IWSIM) have performed well in terms of all the four stated success criteria (capacity, 
embedding efficiency, stego-image quality, and robustness against several well-known 
targeted steganalysis tools).  These schemes also compare well with, and outperform, 
existing schemes on many of the stated success criteria. However, the stego-image 
quality, in terms of PSNR, output by our schemes was marginally lower than LSBR and 
LSBM. This is because, in some cases, the cover pixels values were changed by 2 after 
secret bit embedding. Unfortunately, like all the tested steganography schemes, ours 
were not robust against the blind SRM tool.   
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8.2 Future Research Directions 
 
The work reported in this thesis, not only demonstrated the viability of high 
embedding efficiency and un-detectable image-based steganography schemes but 
highlights several potential research directions to be explored in the future. Some of the 
initial plans aim to overcome some the above mentioned limitations. 
1. Cover Image Selection. The fact that the various performance measures are 
averaged over a large number of cover images is an incentive to adopt a credible 
cover image selection strategy to overcome the marginal shortcoming on stego-
image quality. For this, we need to investigate the relationship between image 
texture/entropy information and the 0:1 ratio obtained from the various 
decomposition schemes.   
2. Adaptive pixel decomposition and secret pre-processing. Understanding the 
relationship between texture/entropy information and the 0:1 ratios obtained from 
both steps can be used to develop adaptive block-based mapping schemes to embed 
various secret image bit-streams (pre-processed by different block-based schemes) 
adaptively into the cover image blocks that have been appropriately decomposed 
using similarity ranking.    
3. Robustness against SRM. To improve the robustness of some or all of our mapping 
based schemes against SRM, we need to investigate embedding in non-smooth 
regions and avoid clean edge regions. This would be similar to the approach adopted 
in the UNIWARD embedding scheme which was designed to be robust against the 
SRM and succeeded in doing so for low embedding rates. However, this would 
require an investigation to identify local distortion feature models that result from 
our mapping-based embedding.   
4. Alternative Secret Image pre-processing. Most of image-based steganography 
researches till date have not considered any pre-processing on the secret image 
except encryption or compression. Pre-processing algorithms can be designed to be 
applied on the secret image prior to embedding in order to achieve steganography 
requirements. Although, in this research, we developed three pre-processing 
algorithms, and the one that based on the IWT provides better performance than the 
other algorithms in terms of embedding efficiency and message detectability. Our 
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future plan is to investigate and test other integer to integer Wavelet-like transform 
domains for improved ratio of 0:1 in the manipulated secret image bit-streams.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 182 
 
References 
Abdelwahab, A. A. and Hassaan, L. A., (2008). A discrete wavelet transform based 
technique for image data hiding. IEEE, Radio Science Conference, pp. 1-9. 
Abdulla, A. A., Jassim, S. A. and Sellahewa, H., (2013). Efficient high-capacity 
steganography technique. SPIE, International Society for Optics and Photonics,  
pp. 875508-875508. 
Abdulla, A. A., Jassim, S. A. and Sellahewa, H., (2013). Secure Steganography 
Technique Based on Bitplane Indexes. IEEE International Symposium on 
Multimedia (ISM), pp. 287-291. 
Abdulla, A. A., Sellahewa, H. and Jassim, S. A., (2014). Steganography based on pixel 
intensity value decomposition. SPIE, International Society for Optics and 
Photonics, pp. 912005-912005. 
Abdulla, A. A., Sellahewa, H. and Jassim, S. A., (2014). Stego Quality Enhancement 
by Message Size Reduction and Fibonacci Bit-Plane Mapping. Springer, 
Security Standardisation Research (SSR), pp. 151-166. 
Abdullah, K. A., Al-Jawad, N. and Abdulla, A. A., (2014). Effect of using different 
cover image quality to obtain robust selective embedding in steganography. 
SPIE, International Society for Optics and Photonics, pp. 913808-913808. 
Agaian, S. S., Cherukuri, R. C. and Sifuentes, R., (2006). A new secure adaptive 
steganographic algorithm using Fibonacci numbers. IEEE, pp. 125-129. 
Agaian, S. S., Cherukuri, R. C. and Sifuentes, R. R., (2007). Key dependent covert 
communication system using fibonacci p-codes. IEEE, International Conference 
on System of Systems Engineering, pp. 1-5. 
Alharbi, F., (2013). Novel Steganography System using Lucas Sequence. International 
Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications (IJACSA), vol. 4, pp. 
52-58. 
Aroukatos, N., Manes, K., Zimeras, S. and Georgiakodis, F., (2012). Data hiding 
techniques in steganography using fibonacci and catalan numbers. IEEE, 9
th
 
International Conference on Information Technology, pp. 392-396. 
Bas, P., Filler, T. and Pevny, T., (2011).  Break Our Steganographic System. Springer, 
Information Hiding, pp. 59-70. 
Battisti, F., Carli, M., Neri, A. and Egiaziarian, K., (2006). A Generalized Fibonacci 
LSB Data Hiding Technique. 3
rd
 International Conference on Computers and 
Devices for Communication.  
 183 
 
Bender, W., Gruhl, D., Morimoto, N. and Lu, A., (1996). Techniques for data hiding. 
IBM systems journal, vol. 35, pp. 313-336. 
Bhattacharyya, D. et al., (2009). Discrete fourier transformation based image 
authentication technique. IEEE, 8
th
 International Conference on Cognitive 
Informatics, pp. 196-200. 
Bhattacharyya, D. and Kim, T.-h., (2011). Image Data Hiding Technique Using 
Discrete Fourier Transformation. Springer, Ubiquitous Computing and 
Multimedia Applications, pp. 315-323. 
Cachin, C., (1998). An information-theoretic model for steganography. Springer, 
Information Hiding, pp. 306-318. 
Calderbank, A., Daubechies, I., Sweldens, W. and Yeo, B.-L., (1997). Lossless image 
compression using integer to integer wavelet transforms. IEEE, ICIP, pp. 596-
596. 
Chan, C.-S., (2009). On using LSB matching function for data hiding in pixels. IOS 
Press,  Fundamenta Informaticae, vol. 96, pp. 49-59. 
Chan, C.-K. and Cheng, L., (2001). Improved hiding data in images by optimal 
moderately-significant-bit replacement. IET, Electronics Letters, vol. 37, pp. 
1017-1018. 
Chan, C.-K. and Cheng, L.-M., (2004). Hiding data in images by simple LSB 
substitution. Elsevier, Pattern recognition, vol. 37, pp. 469-474. 
Chang, C.-C. and Tseng, H.-W., (2004). A steganographic method for digital images 
using side match. Elsevier,  Pattern Recognition Letters, vol. 25, pp. 1431-1437. 
Cheddad, A., Condell, J., Curran, K. and McKevitt, P., (2008). Enhancing 
Steganography in digital images. IEEE, Canadian Conference on Computer and 
Robot Vision, pp. 326-332. 
Chen, M., Zhang, R., Niu, X. and Yang, Y., (2006). Analysis of Current 
Steganography Tools: Classifications and Features. IEEE, International 
Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal 
Processing, pp. 384-387. 
Chen, P.-Y., Lin, H.-J. and others, (2006). A DWT based approach for image 
steganography. International Journal of Applied Science and Engineering, vol. 4, 
pp. 275-290. 
Chen, W.-J., Chang, C.-C. and Le, T., (2010). High payload steganography 
mechanism using hybrid edge detector. Elsevier,  Expert Systems with 
applications, vol. 37, pp. 3292-3301. 
 184 
 
Codr, J., (2009). Unseen: An Overview of Steganography and Presentation of 
Associated Java Application C-Hide. Citeseer,  Retrieved January, vol.  8, pp. 
2010. 
Cogranne, R. et al., (2014). A local adaptive model of natural images for almost 
optimal detection of hidden data. Elsevier,  Signal Processing, vol. 100, pp. 169-
185. 
Cole, E. and Krutz, R. D., (2003). Hiding in plain sight: Steganography and the art of 
covert communication. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Cox, I. J., Kalker, T., Pakura, G. and Scheel, M., (2005). Information transmission and 
steganography. Springer,  Digital Watermarking, pp. 15-29. 
Cox, I. et al., (2007). Digital Watermarking and Steganography. Morgan Kauffman. 
Crandall, R., (1998). Some notes on steganography. Posted on steganography mailing 
list. 
Daneshkhah, A., Aghaeinia, H. and Seyedi, S. H., (2011). A more secure 
steganography method in spatial domain. IEEE, 2
nd
 International Conference on 
Intelligent Systems, Modelling and Simulation (ISMS), pp. 189-194. 
Dey, S., Abraham, A. and Sanyal, S., (2007). An LSB Data Hiding Technique Using 
Natural Number Decomposition. IEEE, 3
rd
 International Conference on 
Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing (IIHMSP), 
vol. 2, pp. 473-476. 
Dey, S., Abraham, A. and Sanyal, S., (2007). An LSB Data Hiding Technique Using 
Prime Numbers. 3
rd
 International Symposium on Information Assurance and 
Security, pp. 101-108. 
Filler, T., Judas, J. and Fridrich, J., (2011). Minimizing additive distortion in 
steganography using syndrome-trellis codes. IEEE Transactions on Information 
Forensics and Security, vol.  6, pp. 920-935. 
Fridrich, J., (1999). Applications of data hiding in digital images. IEEE, 5
th
 
International Symposium on Signal Processing and Its Applications, vol. 1,  pp. 
9. 
Fridrich, J. and Goljan, M., (2004). On estimation of secret message length in LSB 
steganography in spatial domain. International Society for Optics and Photonics, 
Electronic Imaging, pp. 23-34. 
Fridrich, J., Goljan, M. and Du, R., (2001). Reliable detection of LSB steganography 
in color and grayscale images. ACM, Workshop on Multimedia and Security: 
New Challenges,  pp. 27-30. 
 185 
 
Fridrich, J., Goljan, M., Lisonek, P. and Soukal, D., (2005). Writing on wet paper. 
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 53, pp. 3923-3935. 
Fridrich, J. and Kodovsky, J., (2012). Rich models for steganalysis of digital images. 
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, pp. 868-882. 
Fridrich, J., Lisonek, P. and Soukal, D., (2007). On steganographic embedding 
efficiency. Springer, Information Hiding, pp. 282-296. 
Fridrich, J. and Soukal, D., (2006). Matrix embedding for large payloads. International 
Society for Optics and Photonics, Electronic Imaging, pp. 60721W--60721W. 
Geetha, C. and Giriprakash, H., (2012). Image Steganography by Variable Embedding 
and Multiple Edge Detection using Canny Operator. Citeseer, International 
Journal of Computer Applications, vol. 48. 
Gonzalez, R. C. and  Woods, R. E., (2002). Digital image processing second edition. 
Beijing: Publishing House of Electronics Industry. 
Hempstalk, K., (2006). Hiding behind corners: Using edges in images for better 
steganography. Computing Women's Congress, Hamilton, New Zealand, pp.11-
19 
Holub, V. and Fridrich, J., (2013). Digital image steganography using universal 
distortion. 1
st
 ACM workshop on Information hiding and multimedia security, 
pp. 59-68. 
Holub, V., Fridrich, J. and Denemark, T., (2014). Universal distortion function for 
steganography in an arbitrary domain. Springer,  EURASIP Journal on 
Information Security, vol. 2014, pp. 1-13. 
Holub, V. and Fridrich, J. J., (2012). Designing steganographic distortion using 
directional filters. IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and 
Security (WIFS),  pp. 234-239. 
Huang, Q. and Ouyang, W., (2010). Protect fragile regions in steganography LSB 
embedding. 3
rd
 International Symposium on Knowledge Acquisition and 
Modeling (KAM), pp. 175-178. 
Iranpour, M., (2013). A novel steganographic method based on edge detection and 
adaptive multiple bits substitution. 18
th
 International Conference on Digital 
Signal Processing (DSP), pp. 1-6. 
Iranpour, M. and Farokhian, F., (2013). Minimal Distortion Steganography Using 
Well-Defined Functions. 10
th
 International Conference on High Capacity Optical 
Networks and Enabling Technologies, pp. 21-24. 
 186 
 
Islam, M. and Alzahir, S., (2013). A novel qr code guided image stenographic 
technique. IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE),  pp. 
586-587. 
Jain, A. K. and Uludag, U., (2002). Hiding fingerprint minutiae in images. 3
rd
 
Workshop on Automatic Identification Advanced Technologies,  pp. 97-102. 
Janakirman, S. et al., (2012). Pixel Bit Manipulation for Encoded Hiding - An Inherent 
stego. International Conference on Computer Communication and Informatics 
(ICCCI), pp. 1-6. 
Jenifer, K. S., Yogaraj, G. and Rajalakshmi, K., (2014). LSB Approach for Video 
Steganography to Embed Images. Citeseer,  International Journal of Computer 
Science and Information Technologies (IJCSIT), vol. 5, pp. 319-322. 
Johnson, N. F. and Jajodia, S., (1998). Exploring steganography: Seeing the unseen.  
IEEE, Computer, vol. 31, pp. 26-34. 
Juarez-Sandoval, O., Espejel-Trujillo, A., Nakano-Miyatake, M. and Perez-Meana, H., 
(2013). Robust Steganography Based on QIM Algorithm to Hide Secret Images. 
International Journal of Computers, vol. 7, pp. 145-152. 
Kahn, D., (1996). The history of steganography. Springer, Information Hiding, pp. 1-
5. 
Katzenbeisser, S. and Petitcolas, F. A., (2002). Defining security in steganographic 
systems. International Society for Optics and Photonics, Electronic Imaging, pp. 
50-56. 
Katzenbeisser, S. and Petitolas, F., (2000). Information hiding techniques for 
steganography and digital watermaking. Artech House, Taylor and Francis. 
Kaur, M. and Kaur, G., (2014). Review of Various Steganalysis Techniques. 
International Journal of Computer Science and Information Technologies 
(IJCSIT), vol. 5, pp. 1744-1747. 
Ker, A. D., (2005). A general framework for structural steganalysis of LSB 
replacement. Springer, Information Hiding, pp. 296-311. 
Ker, A. D., (2005). Improved detection of LSB steganography in grayscale images. 
Springer, Information Hiding, pp. 97-115. 
Ker, A. D., (2005). Steganalysis of LSB matching in grayscale images. IEEE, Signal 
Processing Letters, vol. 12,  pp. 441-444. 
Ker, A. D., (2007). Steganalysis of embedding in two least-significant bits. IEEE 
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 2, pp. 46-54. 
 187 
 
Ker, A. D. et al., (2013). Moving steganography and steganalysis from the laboratory 
into the real world. ACM workshop on Information hiding and Multimedia 
Security, pp. 45-58. 
Ker, A. D. and Bohme, R., (2008). Revisiting weighted stego-image steganalysis. 
SPEE, Electronic Imaging, Forensics, Steganography, and Watermarking of 
Multimedia Contents, vol. 6819, pp. 681905-681905. 
Khamrui, A. and Mandal, J., (2013). A Genetic Algorithm based Steganography Using 
Discrete Cosine Transformation (GASDCT). Elsevier,  Procedia Technology, 
vol. 10,  pp. 105-111. 
Khosravi, M. J. and Naghsh-Nilchi, A. R., (2014). A novel joint secret image sharing 
and robust steganography method using wavelet. Springer, Multimedia Systems, 
vol. 20, pp. 215-226. 
Kipper, G., (2004). Investigator's guide to steganography. crc press. 
Kodovsk, J., (2012). Steganalysis of Digital Images Using Rich Image Representations 
and Ensemble Classifiers. PhD Thesis, State University of New York. 
Kodovsky, J. and Fridrich, J., (2013). Quantitative steganalysis using rich models. 
International Society for Optics and Photonics, IS and SPIE Electronic Imaging,  
pp. 86650O--86650O. 
Kodovsky, J., Fridrich, J. and Holub, V., (2012). Ensemble classifiers for steganalysis 
of digital media. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, ,vol. 
7, pp. 432-444. 
Kraetzer, C., (2007). Visualisation of benchmarking results in digital watermarking 
and steganography. Citeseer,  IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT, p. 30. 
Kumar, V. and Kumar, D., (2010). Performance evaluation of dwt based image 
steganography. 2
nd
 International Advance Computing Conference (IACC), pp. 
223-228. 
Lau, S., (2003). An Analysis of Terrorist Groups‘ Potential Use of Electronic 
Steganography. Bethesda, Md.: SANS Institute, February, vol. 18. 
Liu, J., Tang, G. and Sun, Y., (2013). A secure steganography for privacy protection in 
healthcare system. Springer,  Journal of medical systems, vol. 37, pp. 1-10. 
Li, Y., Li, C.-T. and Wei, C.-H., (2007). Protection of mammograms using blind 
steganography and watermarking. IEEE, 3
rd
 International Symposium on 
Information Assurance and Security, pp. 496-500. 
 188 
 
Luo, W., Huang, F. and Huang, J., (2010). Edge adaptive image steganography based 
on LSB matching revisited. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and 
Security, vol. 5, pp. 201-214. 
Luo, X.-Y., Wang, D.-S., Wang, P. and Liu, F.-L., (2008). A review on blind detection 
for image steganography. Elsevier, Signal Processing, vol. 88, pp. 2138-2157. 
Macaulay, G. C. and others, (1904). The History of Herodotus.Macmillan and 
Company, vol. 2. 
Mammi, E. et al., (2008). A novel spatial data hiding scheme based on generalized 
Fibonacci sequences. Proc. SPIE6982 C, vol. 69820, pp. 1-7. 
Mandal, J. and Khamrui, A., (2011). A genetic algorithm based steganography in 
frequency domain (GASFD). IEEE, International Conference on 
Communication and Industrial Application (ICCIA), pp. 1-4. 
Mangarae, A., (2006). Steganography faq. Zone-H. Org March 18th. 
Marvel, L. M., Boncelet Jr, C. G. and  Retter, C. T., (1998). Reliable BLIND 
information hiding for images. Springer, Information Hiding, pp. 48-61. 
Mercuri, R. T., (2004). The many colors of multimedia security. ACM, 
Communications of the ACM, vol. 47, pp. 25-29. 
Mielikainen, J., (2006). LSB matching revisited. IEEE, Signal Processing Letters, vol. 
13, pp. 285-287. 
Petitcolas, F. A., Anderson, R. J. and Kuhn, M. G., (1998). Attacks on Copyright 
Marking Systems. Springer, Information Hiding, vol. 1525, pp. 218-238. 
Petitcolas, F. A., Anderson, R. J. and Kuhn, M. G., (1999). Information hiding-a 
SURVEY. Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 87, pp. 1062-1078. 
Pevn, T., Filler, T. and Bas, P., 2010. Using high-dimensional image models to 
perform highly undetectable steganography. Springer, Information Hiding, pp. 
161-177. 
Picione, D. D. L. et al., (2006). A Fibonacci LSB data hiding tecnique. IEEE, 14
th
 
European Signal Processing Conference, pp. 1-5. 
Ponomarenko, N. et al., (2008). Color image DATABASE for evaluation of image 
quality metrics. IEEE, 10
th
 Workshop on Multimedia Signal Processing, pp. 403-
408. 
Provos, N. and Honeyman, P., (2003). Hide and seek: An introduction to 
steganography. IEEE,  Security and Privacy, vol. 1, pp. 32-44. 
Rabah, K., (2004). Steganography-the art of hiding data. Information Technology 
Journal, vol .3, pp. 245-269. 
 189 
 
Raftari, N. and Moghadam, A. M. E., (2012). Digital Image Steganography Based on 
Integer Wavelet Transform and Assignment Algorithm. IEEE, 6
th
 Asia 
Modelling Symposium (AMS),  pp. 87-92. 
Rashid, R. D., Sellahewa, H. and Jassim, S. A., (2013). Biometric feature embedding 
using robust steganography technique. SPIE, International Society for Optics 
and Photonics,  pp. 875503-875503. 
Raul, R.-C., Claudia, F.-U. and Trinidad-BIas, G. d. J., (2007). Data hiding scheme for 
medical images. IEEE, 17
th
 International Conference on Electronics, 
Communications and Computers, pp. 32-32. 
Seyyedi, S. A. and Ivanov, N., (2014). High Payload and Secure Steganography 
Method Based on Block Partitioning and Integer Wavelet Transform. 
International Journal of Security and Its Applications, vol. 8, pp. 183-194 
Sharp, T., (2001). An implementation of key-based digital signal steganography. 
Springer, Information Hiding, pp. 13-26. 
Simmons, G. J., (1984). The prisoners‘ problem and the subliminal channel. Springer, 
Advances in Cryptography, pp. 51-67. 
Singh, K. M., Singh, L. S., Singh, A. B. and Devi, K. S., (2007). Hiding secret 
message in edges of the image. International Conference on Information and 
Communication Technology (ICICT), pp. 238-241. 
Stoica, A., Vertan, C. and Fernandez-Maloigne, C., (2003). Objective and subjective 
color image quality evaluation for JPEG 2000 compressed images. IEEE, 
International Symposium on Signal, Circuit and Systems,vol. 1, pp. 137-140. 
Swanson, M. D., Zhu, B. and Tewfik, A. H., (1996). Robust data hiding for images. 
IEEE, Digital Signal Processing Workshop Proceedings, pp. 37-40. 
Tan, P.-N., Steinbach, M., Kumar, V. and others, (2006). Introduction to data mining. 
Library of Congress, Second Edition. 
Thien, C.-C. and Lin, J.-C., (2003). A simple and high-hiding capacity method for 
hiding digit-by-digit data in images based on modulus function. Elsevier, Pattern 
Recognition, vol. 36, pp. 2875-2881. 
Viterbi, U., (1981). USC-SIPI image database. Signal and Image Processing Institute, 
University of Southren California (USC). 
Wang, C. et al., (2010). A content-adaptive approach for reducing embedding impact 
in steganography. IEEE International Conference on Acoustics Speech and 
Signal Processing (ICASSP), pp. 1762-1765. 
 190 
 
Wang, R.-Z., Lin, C.-F. and Lin, J.-C., (2000). Hiding data in images by optimal 
moderately-significant-bit replacement. IET, Electronics Letters, vol. 36, pp. 
2069-2070. 
Wang, Z. and Bovik, A. C., (2002). A universal image quality index. IEEE, Signal 
Processing Letters, , vol. 9, pp. 81-84. 
Wang, Z., Bovik, A. C., Sheikh, H. R. and Simoncelli, E. P., (2004). Image quality 
assessment: from error visibility to structural similarity. IEEE Transactions on 
Image Processing, vol. 13, pp. 600-612. 
Wang, Z., Sheikh, H. R. and Bovik, A. C., (2002). No-reference perceptual quality 
assessment of JPEG compressed images. IEEE, International Conference on 
Image Processing, vol. 1, pp. 477-480. 
Wang, Z., Sheikh, H. R. and Bovik, A. C., (2003). Objective video quality assessment. 
CRC press,  The handbook of video database: design and applications, pp. 1041-
1078. 
Wayner, P., (2002). Disappearing Cryptography-Information Hiding: Steganography 
and Watermarking. Morgan Kaufmann, Second Edition, pp. 291-318. 
Westfeld, A., (2001). F5—a steganographic algorithm. Springer, Information Hiding, 
pp. 289-302. 
Westfeld, A. and Pfitzmann, A., (2000). Attacks on steganographic systems. Springer, 
Information Hiding, pp. 61-76. 
Wu, D.-C. and Tsai, W.-H., (2003). A steganographic method for images by pixel-
value differencing. Elsevier, Pattern Recognition Letters, vol. 24, pp. 1613-1626. 
Wu, N.-I. and Hwang, M.-S., (2007). Data hiding: current status and key issues. IJ 
Network Security, vol. 4, pp. 1-9. 
Yang, B. and Deng, B., (2006). Steganography in gray images using wavelet. 2
nd
 
International Symposium on Communication, Control and Signal Processing( 
ISCCSP). 
Zhang, T. and Ping, X., (2003). Reliable detection of LSB steganography based on the 
difference image histogram. IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, 
Speech, and Signal Processing (ICASSP), vol. 3,  pp. 545-548. 
Zollner, J. et al., (1998). Modeling the security of steganographic systems. Springer, 
Information Hiding, pp. 344-354. 
 
 
 
 
 
 191 
 
List of Publications 
 
 
 Abdulla, A. A., Jassim, S. A. and Sellahewa, H., ―Efficient high-capacity 
steganography technique‖, Proceedings of Mobie Multimedia/Image Processing 
and Applications, SPIE, vol. 8755, 2013. 
 Abdulla, A. A., Jassim, S. A. and Sellahewa, H., ―Secure Steganography 
Technique Based on Bitplane Indexespp‖, IEEE International Sumposium on 
Multimedia (ISM), Proceeding of IEEE Computer Society, 2013. 
 Abdulla, A. A., Sellahewa, H. and Jassim, S. A., ―Steganography based on pixel 
intensity value decomposition‖, Proceedings of Mobie Multimedia/Image 
Processing and Applications, SPIE, vol. 9120, 2014. 
 Abdullah, K. A., Al-Jawad, N. and Abdulla, A. A., ―Effect of using different 
cover image quality to obtain robust selective embedding in steganography‖, 
Proceedings of Optics, Photonics, and Digital Technologies for Multimedia 
Applications, SPIE, vol. 9138, 2014. 
 Abdulla, A. A., Sellahewa, H. and Jassim, S. A., ―Stego Quality Enhancement 
by Message Size Reduction and Fibonacci Bit-Plane Mapping‖,  Security 
Standardisation Research (SSR), LNCS 8893, Springer, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 192 
 
Appendix 
 
 
 
 
Table A-1: Grayscale values (0-511) in descending order of number of 1s in its binary representation. 
 
value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. 
0 000000000 416 110100000 31 000011111 111 001101111 
1 000000001 448 111000000 47 000101111 119 001110111 
2 000000010 15 000001111 55 000110111 123 001111011 
4 000000100 23 000010111 59 000111011 125 001111101 
8 000001000 27 000011011 61 000111101 126 001111110 
16 000010000 29 000011101 62 000111110 159 010011111 
32 000100000 30 000011110 79 001001111 175 010101111 
64 001000000 39 000100111 87 001010111 183 010110111 
128 010000000 43 000101011 91 001011011 187 010111011 
256 100000000 45 000101101 93 001011101 189 010111101 
3 000000011 46 000101110 94 001011110 190 010111110 
5 000000101 51 000110011 103 001100111 207 011001111 
6 000000110 53 000110101 107 001101011 215 011010111 
9 000001001 54 000110110 109 001101101 219 011011011 
10 000001010 57 000111001 110 001101110 221 011011101 
12 000001100 58 000111010 115 001110011 222 011011110 
17 000010001 60 000111100 117 001110101 231 011100111 
18 000010010 71 001000111 118 001110110 235 011101011 
20 000010100 75 001001011 121 001111001 237 011101101 
24 000011000 77 001001101 122 001111010 238 011101110 
33 000100001 78 001001110 124 001111100 243 011110011 
34 000100010 83 001010011 143 010001111 245 011110101 
36 000100100 85 001010101 151 010010111 246 011110110 
40 000101000 86 001010110 155 010011011 249 011111001 
48 000110000 89 001011001 157 010011101 250 011111010 
65 001000001 90 001011010 158 010011110 252 011111100 
66 001000010 92 001011100 167 010100111 287 100011111 
68 001000100 99 001100011 171 010101011 303 100101111 
72 001001000 101 001100101 173 010101101 311 100110111 
80 001010000 102 001100110 174 010101110 315 100111011 
96 001100000 105 001101001 179 010110011 317 100111101 
129 010000001 106 001101010 181 010110101 318 100111110 
130 010000010 108 001101100 182 010110110 335 101001111 
132 010000100 113 001110001 185 010111001 343 101010111 
136 010001000 114 001110010 186 010111010 347 101011011 
144 010010000 116 001110100 188 010111100 349 101011101 
160 010100000 120 001111000 199 011000111 350 101011110 
192 011000000 135 010000111 203 011001011 359 101100111 
257 100000001 139 010001011 205 011001101 363 101101011 
258 100000010 141 010001101 206 011001110 365 101101101 
260 100000100 142 010001110 211 011010011 366 101101110 
264 100001000 147 010010011 213 011010101 371 101110011 
272 100010000 149 010010101 214 011010110 373 101110101 
288 100100000 150 010010110 217 011011001 374 101110110 
320 101000000 153 010011001 218 011011010 377 101111001 
384 110000000 154 010011010 220 011011100 378 101111010 
7 000000111 156 010011100 227 011100011 380 101111100 
11 000001011 163 010100011 229 011100101 399 110001111 
13 000001101 165 010100101 230 011100110 407 110010111 
14 000001110 166 010100110 233 011101001 411 110011011 
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value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. 
19 000010011 169 010101001 234 011101010 413 110011101 
21 000010101 170 010101010 236 011101100 414 110011110 
22 000010110 172 010101100 241 011110001 423 110100111 
25 000011001 177 010110001 242 011110010 427 110101011 
26 000011010 178 010110010 244 011110100 429 110101101 
28 000011100 180 010110100 248 011111000 430 110101110 
35 000100011 184 010111000 271 100001111 435 110110011 
37 000100101 195 011000011 279 100010111 437 110110101 
38 000100110 197 011000101 283 100011011 438 110110110 
41 000101001 198 011000110 285 100011101 441 110111001 
42 000101010 201 011001001 286 100011110 442 110111010 
44 000101100 202 011001010 295 100100111 444 110111100 
49 000110001 204 011001100 299 100101011 455 111000111 
50 000110010 209 011010001 301 100101101 459 111001011 
52 000110100 210 011010010 302 100101110 461 111001101 
56 000111000 212 011010100 307 100110011 462 111001110 
67 001000011 216 011011000 309 100110101 467 111010011 
69 001000101 225 011100001 310 100110110 469 111010101 
70 001000110 226 011100010 313 100111001 470 111010110 
73 001001001 228 011100100 314 100111010 473 111011001 
74 001001010 232 011101000 316 100111100 474 111011010 
76 001001100 240 011110000 327 101000111 476 111011100 
81 001010001 263 100000111 331 101001011 483 111100011 
82 001010010 267 100001011 333 101001101 485 111100101 
84 001010100 269 100001101 334 101001110 486 111100110 
88 001011000 270 100001110 339 101010011 489 111101001 
97 001100001 275 100010011 341 101010101 490 111101010 
98 001100010 277 100010101 342 101010110 492 111101100 
100 001100100 278 100010110 345 101011001 497 111110001 
104 001101000 281 100011001 346 101011010 498 111110010 
112 001110000 282 100011010 348 101011100 500 111110100 
131 010000011 284 100011100 355 101100011 504 111111000 
133 010000101 291 100100011 357 101100101 127 001111111 
134 010000110 293 100100101 358 101100110 191 010111111 
137 010001001 294 100100110 361 101101001 223 011011111 
138 010001010 297 100101001 362 101101010 239 011101111 
140 010001100 298 100101010 364 101101100 247 011110111 
145 010010001 300 100101100 369 101110001 251 011111011 
146 010010010 305 100110001 370 101110010 253 011111101 
148 010010100 306 100110010 372 101110100 254 011111110 
152 010011000 308 100110100 376 101111000 319 100111111 
161 010100001 312 100111000 391 110000111 351 101011111 
162 010100010 323 101000011 395 110001011 367 101101111 
164 010100100 325 101000101 397 110001101 375 101110111 
168 010101000 326 101000110 398 110001110 379 101111011 
176 010110000 329 101001001 403 110010011 381 101111101 
193 011000001 330 101001010 405 110010101 382 101111110 
194 011000010 332 101001100 406 110010110 415 110011111 
196 011000100 337 101010001 409 110011001 431 110101111 
200 011001000 338 101010010 410 110011010 439 110110111 
208 011010000 340 101010100 412 110011100 443 110111011 
224 011100000 344 101011000 419 110100011 445 110111101 
259 100000011 353 101100001 421 110100101 446 110111110 
261 100000101 354 101100010 422 110100110 463 111001111 
262 100000110 356 101100100 425 110101001 471 111010111 
265 100001001 360 101101000 426 110101010 475 111011011 
266 100001010 368 101110000 428 110101100 477 111011101 
268 100001100 387 110000011 433 110110001 478 111011110 
273 100010001 389 110000101 434 110110010 487 111100111 
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value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. value Binary rep. 
274 100010010 390 110000110 436 110110100 491 111101011 
276 100010100 393 110001001 440 110111000 493 111101101 
280 100011000 394 110001010 451 111000011 494 111101110 
289 100100001 396 110001100 453 111000101 499 111110011 
290 100100010 401 110010001 454 111000110 501 111110101 
292 100100100 402 110010010 457 111001001 502 111110110 
296 100101000 404 110010100 458 111001010 505 111111001 
304 100110000 408 110011000 460 111001100 506 111111010 
321 101000001 417 110100001 465 111010001 508 111111100 
322 101000010 418 110100010 466 111010010 255 011111111 
324 101000100 420 110100100 468 111010100 383 101111111 
328 101001000 424 110101000 472 111011000 447 110111111 
336 101010000 432 110110000 481 111100001 479 111011111 
352 101100000 449 111000001 482 111100010 495 111101111 
385 110000001 450 111000010 484 111100100 503 111110111 
386 110000010 452 111000100 488 111101000 507 111111011 
388 110000100 456 111001000 496 111110000 509 111111101 
392 110001000 464 111010000 63 000111111 510 111111110 
400 110010000 480 111100000 95 001011111 511 111111111 
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Figure A-1: PoV diagram for stego-image number 330 from SIPI database. 
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Figure A-2: PoV diagram for stego-image number 965 from SIPI database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 198 
 
LSBR LSBM 
  
LSBMR ILSBMR 
  
EB_SISR EB_SIM 
  
EB_IWSIM Fib_IWSIM 
  
  
 199 
 
L_IWSIM 
 
 
Figure A-3:PoV diagram for stego-image number 1023 from SIPI database. 
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Figure A-4: PoV diagram for stego-image number 1417 from SIPI database. 
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Figure A-5: PoV diagram for stego-image number 1832 from SIPI database. 
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Figure A-6: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 122 from BOSSBase when the Lenna image was 
embedded. 
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Figure A-7: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 489 from BOSSBase when the Lenna image was 
embedded. 
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Figure A-8: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 664 from BOSSBase when the Lenna image was 
embedded. 
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Figure A-9: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 855 from BOSSBase when the Lenna image was 
embedded. 
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Figure A-10: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 970 from BOSSBase when the Lenna image was 
embedded. 
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Figure A-11: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 122 from BOSSBase when the Jet image was 
embedded. 
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Figure A-12: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 489 from BOSSBase when the Jet image was 
embedded. 
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Figure A-13: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 664 from BOSSBase when the Jet image was 
embedded. 
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Figure A-14: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 855 from BOSSBase when the Jet image was 
embedded. 
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Figure A-15: PoV diagram for Stego-image number 970 from BOSSBase when the Jet image was 
embedded. 
